HiRadMat Safety Register HiRadMat Review CERN, May 26, 2011 Outline  Guideline Documents  Hazard Inventory  Facility Risk Analysis  Risk Management.

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Presentation transcript:

HiRadMat Safety Register HiRadMat Review CERN, May 26, 2011 Outline  Guideline Documents  Hazard Inventory  Facility Risk Analysis  Risk Management Examples  Safety File S. Evrard – EN/MEF EDMS No:

Guideline documents S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26,  MARCHE À SUIVRE POUR CONSTITUER UN DOSSIER DE SÉCURITÉ  EDMS  MARCHE À SUIVRE POUR LA CONDUITE D’ANALYSES DE RISQUES  EDMS  Risk and impact register form  EDMS

Hazard inventory S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26, Electrical installations and equipmentEffluents to site drainage – non-radioactive – water leak Chemical substances (including dust) Radioactive materials (including sealed sources and wastes) Electromagnetic fields Storage/Usage – radioactive material Accelerators or other radiation generating devices Atmospheric emissions – radioactive Consumption of resources – power Effluents to site drainage – radioactive High pressure, vacuum Ionising stray radiation (external exposure) Moving parts of machines Waste generation – radioactive Waste generation – banal industrial Soil and wall activation Fire Historical site pollution Lifting and carrying loads Internal exposure (contamination) Use of equipment, tools or materials outside of the design specifications or outside of the manufacturer's recommendations OR use of equipment or apparatus designed or built at CERN UV, IR, laser, and microwave radiation Explosion

Facility Risk Analysis S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26, Code rating explanation Evaluation of significance Evaluation of the degree of control over the risk/impact Priority Hazard/AspectRisk/ImpactP C1C1 C2C2 C3C3 C4C4 S Org. measures in place O Technical meas. in place T DCDC Feedback on accidents F DCDC P Electrical installations and equipment personnel safety, risk of fire 32221M Safety inspections (installation acceptance ) (EDMS xxx) 2 Equipment group monitoring 2M 1L2 PProbability of Occurrence C1Legal compliance C2 Harm in terms of human injury or ill health C3Geographical dispersion C4Public image From a combination of C1, C2, C3 and C4, the severity is assessed (here calculated) F Evaluation of feedback on past incidents/accidents O Evaluation of organisational measures and their implementation T Evaluation of technical measures and their implementation Significance of risk and impact Severity 4MMHH 3SMMH 2nSMM 1nnSM 1234 Occurrence Intermediate degree of control organis. 3LMH 2LMM 1LLL 123 Technical Measures Final degree of control feedback 3LMH 2LMH 1LLL LMH Intermediate degree of control Evalutation of priority Significance nNot significant SP2P3 MP2 P3 HP1 P3 LMH Final degree of control

5 Beam related hazards Facility Risk Analysis Hazard/AspectRisk/ImpactPC1C2C3C4SOrg. measures in placeOTechnical meas. in placeTDCFeedback on accidentsFDCP Electrical installations and equipment personnel safety, risk of fire 32221M Safety inspections (installation acceptance ) (EDMS xxx) 2 Equipment group monitoring 2M 1L2 Chemical substances (including dust) neutal gaz (N2, He) pipes low pressure - personnel safety 32211M Safety inspections + safety rule 2 2M 1L2 Electromagnetic fieldsPersonnel & equipment safety 32121M IS 36 - Safety Rules for the Use of Static Magnetic Fields at CERN (EDMS ) 2 Access fobidden by access interlock (EDMS EDMS ) 3M Very few accident reported 2M2 Accelerators or other radiation generating devices Beam “lost” to LHC 22121S CCC operation procedures and interlock system 3TBSE (EDMS )3H Very few accident reported 2H3 Accelerators or other radiation generating devices Beam accidentally sent to LHC instead of HiRadMat (simultaneous failure of equipment and interlock system), while LHC in access mode 32121M Transfer line will be operated in the same way as alll other beam lines: CCC operation procedures, Beam Loss Monitors, interlock system, HiRadMat beam sent only on request and protected by RBAC (Role Based Access Control system) 3 BLM, beam interlock system BIS (EDMS ), RBAC for beam request 3H (damage of component due to unexpected beam loss, for example following simultaneous failure of a beamline element and of the interlock system). Consequences would be irradiation of component, down-time for component exchange. 2H3 Accelerators or other radiation generating devices Exit window failure 22111S Mechanical analysis (EDMS ) 3 Beam size measurement by BTV using low intensity beam before any high intensity beam is sent + BIS (EDMS ) 3H Consequences would be vacuum leak and downtime for window exchange. 2H3 Accelerators or other radiation generating devices TED water cooling failure 32111M Mechanical and thermal analysis (EDMS EDMS ) 3BIS (EDMS )3H Consequences would be downtime to locate fault and repair, possibly on activated equipment 2H3 Consumption of resources – power Power shortage, power cuts 32131MTIOC meetings3 Secured network/ Safety network / UPS 3H 1L2 High pressure, vacuumContamination of personnel 22211S Safety inspections (installation acceptance ) (EDMS xxx) 3 Equipment group monitoring 3H 2H3

Facility Risk Analysis S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26, Building related hazards Hazard/AspectRisk/ImpactPC1C2C3C4SOrg. measures in placeOTechnical meas. in placeTDCFeedback on accidentsFDCP Moving parts of machinesCollision with people or equipment 32211M PR532 risk analysis (EDMS ) + Safety inspections (installation acceptance ) (EDMS ) 3 Remote control operated crane (EDMS ) 2M 1L2 Waste generation – banal industrial Environment pollution 32111M Waste management procedure (EDMS ) 3Recycling area3H 1L2 FirePersonnel and equipment safety 32322M respect of Safety code E, G and IS23,41,42,47 + recommandations of the Fire prevention officer + Fire brigade emergency procedure (EDMS ) 3 Fire prevention (EDMS ) + Fire detection (EDMS ) + Extinguishing means (RIA, fire extinguishers) + air tightening (RF2H partitions) of TNC and TJ7 (EDMS ) 3H 2H3 Lifting and carrying loadsCollision with people or equipment 32211M PR532 risk analysis (EDMS ) + Safety inspections (installation acceptance ) (EDMS ) 3 Remote control operated crane (EDMS ) 2M 1L2 Use of equipment, tools or materials outside of the design specifications or outside of the manufacturer's recommendations OR use of equipment or apparatus designed or built at CERN Collision with people or equipment 32211M PR532 risk analysis (EDMS ) + Safety inspections (installation acceptance ) (EDMS ) 3 Remote control operated crane (EDMS ) 3H 1L2 Effluents to site drainage – non-radioactive – water leak Environment pollution 32121M installation acceptance (pressure tests) (EDMSxxx) 3 Circuit filling alarm monitoring system available + existing drain network and sump 3H 2H3

Facility Risk Analysis 7 Radiation related hazards Hazard/AspectRisk/ImpactPC1C2C3C4SOrg. measures in placeOTechnical meas. in placeTDCFeedback on accidentsFDCP Radioactive materials (including sealed sources and wastes) Irradiation and/or contamination of personnel 32211M Safety Code F Rev. + ALARA + RP habilitation + dedicated training (EDMS ) 3 HFM + IPE + dosimeters + area sectorization (EDMS ) 3H 2H3 Storage/Usage – radioactive material Irradiation and/or contamination of personnel 32211M Safety Code F Rev. + ALARA + RP habilitation + dedicated training (EDMS ) + TNC future waste inventory (EDMS ) 3 Reuse of existing radioactive equipment 3H 2H3 Atmospheric emissions – radioactive Environment pollution 22133MSafety Code F Rev.3 Ramses (EDMS ) + ventilation flush (EDMS ) + area sectorization (EDMS ) 3H 2H3 Effluents to site drainage – radioactive Environment pollution 22133M installation acceptance (pressure tests) (EDMS xxx) 3 Circuit filling alarm monitoring system available + existing drain network and sump + Ramses (EDMS ) 2H 2H3 Ionising stray radiation (external exposure) Irradiation of personnel 42222M Safety Code F Rev. + ALARA + RP habilitation + dedicated training (EDMS ) + impact on design stage of the facility 3 HFM + IPE + dosimeters + source term removal + Ramses (EDMS ) + area sectorization (EDMS ) 3H 1L2 Waste generation – radioactive Irradiation and/or contamination of personnel, environment pollution 32211M Waste management procedures (EDMS ) + safety code F Rev. + TNC future waste inventory (EDMS ) 3 Reuse of existing radioactive equipment 3H1L2 Soil and wall activation Irradiation and/or contamination of personnel 32221M Radiation survey follow-up (EDMS ) 3TNC wall and floor painting3H 2H3 Historical site pollution Irradiation and/or contamination of personnel 32222M Radioactive material inventory (EDMS ) + Radiation survey follow-up (EDMS ) 3 HFM + IPE + dosimeters + area sectorization (EDMS ) 3H 2H3 Internal exposure (contamination) Contamination of personnel 22221S Safety Code F Rev. + ALARA + RP habilitation + dedicated training (EDMS ) + impact on design stage of the facility 3 HFM + IPE + dosimeters + TNC wall and floor painting + area sectorization (EDMS ) 3H 2H3

Facility Risk Analysis S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26,  No priority 1 risk 1. Ionizing stray radiation (external exposure) 2. Electrical installations 3. Consumption of resources 4. Moving parts of machines 5. Waste generation - radioactive Priority of risks: TOP 5

Risk Management Examples S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26, Ionising stray radiation (external exposure)  Design stage:  Fluka simulations  CV and Ramses design  Dedicated handling means (lifting jig and eyes)  Prefabricated structure (easily removable)  Reduced maintenance in TNC (no patrol box, long life TL’s)  Waste management plan  Operational procedures  Frequent radiation survey of TNC tunnel  Dedicated RP training  ALARA, JOLI & DIMR preparation with all stakeholders  On-site close RP monitoring  Remote controlled PR532 crane  Technical measures  Access and RP sectorization  Ventilation system  Ramses monitoring system

Risk Management Examples S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26,  A lot of stuff will be reused and is not considered as waste  Experimental waste = Experiment responsibility  Owner to dispose waste if fully authorized  CERN would take in charge if owner is not authorized  Infrastructure waste  TNC future waste inventory (EDMS ) Waste generation - radioactive Débit de dose à 10 cm< 10 µSv.h -1 De 10 µSv.h -1 à 2 mSv.h -1 > 2 mSv.h -1 TraitementTravail normal (>95% des cas) Traitement spécifique, ALARA, balisage. Zone blindée ISR 6, manipulation à distance ProcédurePas de procédure spécifique EDMS

Safety file S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26, Content  Inventory document  Descriptive part  Demonstrative part  Operation part  Feedback part

Safety file S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26, Additional support & expertise  Marion Picard will join the team as from June, 1 st, for 6 months.  Ingénieur INSA maîtrise des risques industriels et impacts sur l’environnement.  First CERN (Risk analysis Isolde)  Mission:  Propose procedures to minimize risk of accidents, prepare emergency plans and finalize the safety file to document the work  Define specifications for the operation of the facility and the safety issues involved. This will include remote handling operations and handling of the radioactive waste as a results of the tests  Analyze, determine and specify the procedures and safety documentation that will be required for each experiment prior their approval for beam time in the facility  Coordinate the operational safety aspects of the facility including the defining of intervention protocols and reporting on operations in terms of safety.  Act as safety linkman and collaborate with the various safety groups at CERN

Spare – 3D view S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26,

Spare - HiRadMat sectorization S. Evrard – HiRadMat Review May 26, SectorizationPA7TA7TCC6TJ7TNCPit 846 AccessSector 1 Sector 3Sector 1Sector 6Sector 7 RPControlled Radiation Area – Limited stay Controlled Radiation Area - High Radiation Ventilation1+2SPS loop IdAir Handling unitFunction Air flow (m3/h) Location 1UACV inlet16.000BA7 2UUW outlet16.000BA7 3UUW outlet2000BA7 4UACV inlet3600B846 5UACV inlet3600B846