Situational Awareness UPDEA - Workshop. Awareness of the Situation 25,623 Alarms in 8 Hours 53 Alarms / min (average) 80% Are consequential Things to.

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Presentation transcript:

Situational Awareness UPDEA - Workshop

Awareness of the Situation 25,623 Alarms in 8 Hours 53 Alarms / min (average) 80% Are consequential Things to keep in mind during a disturbance - Analog data is not reported in time with the state data Controls are issued but the feedback is very slow Control staff are no longer aware of the situation. Communications protocol (IEC ) SCADA data base design

State Alarming to Process Alarming 27 / 16:00:22 ARNOT SIMPL2 MVA HIGH ALARM 400 kV Arnot Customer 132 kV 400 kV Simplon 220 kV 27 / 15:30:00 ARNOT SIMPL2 MVA HIGH ALARM Customer Items to keep in mind that will cause a blackout: The trip limit is 50% above the 90 degree limit. Don’t have predictive analysis tools No Rate-of-change alarm processing. No consequential analysis warning No warnings of when it could trip. 30 MVA in 30 min

Alarm Questions Customer How much knowledge do Control Staff have of the situation? Address of a state change – there is no context. No information - only data! Why 2 separate messages? Why not 1 message with all the event Information e.g. 27 / 15:30:00 ARNOT_SIMPL1-Trip - ARC - Trip, -Main 1, Zone 1, White phase, -Impedance Earth Fault - 35 km from Arnot -Tripped 3 phase - Locked out – Permanent Fault -320 MVA Loss at 402 kV - DR indicates lightning strike on White phase

Transmission transports the electricity to Distribution Generation makes the electricity Distribution then sells the electricity to the customer Electricity Production Electricity production is a continuous process but we do not monitor it as such.

SCADA Master data base Substn (Network Model) CB Line Bus KV XF Un Power ApplicationSCADA Substation Device Point Analog Counter Device Type PAS Prediction tools  State Estimation  Short-circuit analysis  Contingency analysis  Voltage VAr dispatch Violation alarming is kept on this side Real Time alarming is done on this side X

Problems : Load / Truck Processes are never static - they are always changing Monitoring Problems Result : We do not predict the future but we can Limit Exceeded 1 d a d t 2 Rate-of-change a a’ b b’

Hands up who recognise this.

Adding Situational Awareness Add Consequential Analysis - (New) Combine PAS tool outputs Add predictive warnings to SCADA Monitor the Rate-of-Change of the Process Variables. ReactiveProactive 1.Temperature 2.Megawatts 3.Megavars 4.Kilo Volts Trip Limit High ++ High 5 – 60 minutes Customer

Venus VT Designing for a Disturbance (1) SCADA Master Containerise substation data Bay State Substation State Bay states Station Bay In classical systems each point is reported individually to the SCADA master. SCADA Master Philosophy Front Ends use the bay and station state to filter the alarms Messages are automatically suppressed based on bay state Event data from both ends of a line is combined Substation Philosophy Bays report their state to the station bay following a change The station state is a function of the bay and busbar states The station bay decides what is sent to the SCADA Master Update messages are sent to all bays on the same busbar A Dead Bus automatically sets the alarm suppression flag. 1 message is sent to the control staff for dead busses Include the protection, analog data and what happened

Summary Change the: –Substation data base to Object Oriented structure –Master station data base to support Object Orientation –Communications protocol to allow for containerisation Allow –Ad hoc messages from RTU –Dynamic alarm suppression at Master based on bay state Provide –Situations Awareness identification areas using colour –Consequential Analysis tool to SCADA tool box

SCADA Database Protocol Conversion Dual Front End Computers EMS Back End Computers VT Designing for a Disturbance (2) X.21 RTU Host I/O Station Level 2 Bay Level 1 Bay Level 1 Station Level 2 Network Level 3 Bay Level 1 Bay Level 1 Primary Plant input via the RTU SCADA – Substation philosophy : Each status and analog values is reported individually to the SCADA master The physical bay structure is modelled in SCADA

SCADA Bay model Level 1:Bay Modelling Bay Device Element Sub - Element Bay Device Element Sub - Element Bay Device Element Sub - Element Region Level 3 Level 3 : Network and region Modelling Master Station Philosophy Each physical Bay is modelled in SCADA including the substation and region bays. All tele-metered state changes are defined as log only. No messages are sent directly to the control staff from the station. All incoming status and analog value are used to update the bay state only. The station state is a function of the bays and busbar states. The bays send messages to update the Station bay state. The station object updates the bay states based on the overall station state. Station Level 2 Level 2 : Sub-station Modelling Station Level 2 Station Level 2

Designing for a Disturbance (3) Alarming The station bay sets flags that decides what alarm data is sent to the control staff by the bays. See example on next slide. The station bay generates and sends messages that are common to the station. For local bay events the bay generates and sends bay related messages For line events the alarm data is combined from both bays to create a single line alarm message A Dead Bus automatically sets the alarm suppression flag. All alarm messages include the protection, analog data and explain what happened Station Level 2 Bay Level 1 Bay Level 1 Station Level 2 Network Level 3 Bay Level 1 Bay Level 1

Primary versus Consequential Bay 1 Battery Charger Bay 2 Bay 3 Bay DC Fail indication(Consequential) Battery Fail Alarm (Primary) Alarm Log 13H14 Bay 1 DC Fail Alarm 13H14 Bay 2 DC Fail Alarm 13H14 Bay 3 DC Fail Alarm Battery DC Fail condition Alarm Log 13h14 Battery DC output fail alarm System Activity Log 13H14 Bay 1 DC Fail Alarm 13H14 Bay 2 DC Fail Alarm 13H14 Bay 3 DC Fail Alarm 80% of alarms are consequential

Summary Change the: –Substation data base to Object Oriented structure –Master station data base to support Object Orientation –Containerisation is performed at the Master Station Allow –Bays to generate alarm messages –All alarms are defined as log only at Master Provide –Situations Awareness identification areas using colour –Consequential Analysis tool to SCADA tool box

Situational Awareness Problem identificationHighlight problem areas in colour on the display Sequential AnalysisIndicate the cause and effect and number of possible incidents in a possible event Rate of changeIdentify time to Trip Contingency AnalysisIdentify consequences of Trfr 2 trip and reasons for tripping. VSATIdentify local voltage changes and risks Consequential AnalysisIdentify Time to Trip (Trfr 4) Identify size of Load loss and number of customers affected

Situational Awareness Scenario : Trfr 2 has reported an oil temperature high alarm – note red line. Since we measure the actual temperature and can predict, based on the current, when the transformer will trip, i.e. how much time we have before it will trip. Contingency Analysis calculated how much load will be carried by transformer 4 if trfr 2 trips. Contingency Analysis also predicts that trfr4 will also trip on overload. We can also predict how long it will take before trfr 4 trip based on the new load, With VSAT we can estimate the resulting voltage collapse risk if both transformers trip. We can also calculate the total load loss and the number of customers that will be affected. Adding Situational Awareness

1) Highlight problem area in colour on the display 2) Indicate the cause and effect and number of possible incidents in a possible event Sequence = 1 of 2 Trip Time = + 0 Interruption= 76 + j26 Reason = °C Customers = 0 VSAT = No threat Sequence = 2 of 2 Trip Time = + 2 Interruption = j55 Reason = Amps Customers = 6 VSAT = No threat 3) Highlight second problem area in a different colour. Include time to trip and consequences.

Questions