Plato’s Vision of the Human Philosophy 224 Plato’s Vision of the Human

Plato (428-347 BCE) Plato was from an old aristocratic family in Athens. Many of the important people of his time appear as characters in his dialogues. As a young man, Plato was greatly interested in philosophy and politics. He was a friend and companion of Socrates. After the death of Socrates, he fled Athens. Upon returning to Athens around 385 BCE, he founded his school, the Academy, which many people call the first university. It lasted until 529 ACE. He taught at the academy, with a few interruptions, until his death.

Plato’s Work Plato’s philosophical project is available to us primarily through a series of dialogues. The dialogues pose us a particular problem of interpretation. They are very tightly constructed dramatic presentations of various philosophical issues. Though the philosophical content is at the heart of these dialogues, it is not a simple matter to separate the dramatic elements from the philosophical. Actually, we might not even want to, as Plato himself seems to suggest that the dramatic form is important to the content.

Socrates (470-399 BC) Like many other characters in Plato’s dialogues, Socrates was a real person. We know some things about him, because he was a relatively prominent Athenian. He came from a middle class background. He was usually described as a robust, though unattractive man. He was born at the time of the peak of Athenian power and was an adult at the time of the Peloponnesian war, in which he served with distinction.

The Republic The Republic is generally regarded as Plato’s masterwork. It’s a dialogue devoted to the question: What is Dikaiosune? Dikaiosune is a complicated Greek word. It is usually translated as ‘justice,’ but probably means something closer to ‘the proper way to live one’s life.’ In the dialogue, Socrates’s two main interlocutors (Glaucon and Adiemantus) ask Socrates to accomplish two things: Provide an account of human nature which makes clear why Dikaiosune suits us; Explain how we can create a person of Dikaiosune (education) and demonstrate that their life is the best life.

Book I In the text, we have just the first of the ten books which comprise the Republic. Though it basically just sets the stage for the discussion to come, it does establish some important negative points, particularly in the debate with Thrasymachus. Read the first 2 sentences. Help set the context. Mythic element to the setting. Pireaus, the port city of Athens, literally means ‘beyond land’—land beyond the river. Pireaus has a unique position—the long walls place it both in and out of the polis. Bendis is a goddess of the underworld. All of these things point to an identification of the progress of the book with a trip to Hades (the underworld). Hades is the land beyond the river Lethe (forgetfulness). Cephalus is the first person he talks to (described as being on the threshold between life and death). As in Hades, Socrates confronts three judges (Cephalus, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus). There is also an identification of Thrasymachus with Cerebus, “He coiled himself up like a wild beast…” (31).

Cephalus and Polemarchus Let’s pick up the dialogue when Socrates is taken by Polemarchus to the house of his father, Cephalus. When Socrates goes to pay his respects to Cephalus, they engage in conversation about the problems of old age. This conversation quickly turns to question of just action and thus the topic of the dialogue is announced: What is Justice? (Dikaiosune). Cephalus gets out of the conversation quickly, but his role is taken up by his son (his heir) who offers a series of definitions all of which are quickly refuted by Socrates: D1: Justice is to give to each what they are owed. This clearly can’t be right— example of a mad friend. NB: 26, justice is defined as a craft (techne). D2: Justice is to benefit one’s friends and to harm one’s enemies. This is the traditional Greek understanding of justice and Socrates goes to some lengths to disprove this notion. He starts by nit-picking a little bit but eventually advances two arguments which have real impact: D2a: many people mistake who is their friend and who is their enemy (epistemological problem); D2b: a truly just person would never harm anyone (harming people makes them bad, justice can’t make people bad, ergo, 335d, D2 can’t be right (30)).

Thrasymachus Part 1 Thrasymachus enters the conversation, initially to mess with Socrates, but eventually offers his own definition of Dikaiosune. D3: Justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger (33), where stronger means ruler. S’s initial response is to offer an epistemological objection akin to the one offered against D2—Rulers aren’t infallible, so they will occasionally make laws that are not to their advantage, therefore, T’s definition would seem to suggest that sometimes what is Just would be to the disadvantage of the ruler Notice that D3 amounts to a form of conventionalism— justice is whatever the ruler says it is.

Thrasymachus, Part II T responds by purifying the notion of ruler (a ruler is only a ruler when they make laws to their advantage). S then shifts ground and gets T to acknowledge that the excellence in a craft (including ruling) comes not in what the practice of the craft does for the practitioner, but in what it does for the object of the practice (37). T counters with the example of the shepherd. Cares for the sheep, but not for the sheep’s sake, but for his own. He then goes on to expand on his account of Justice (38-9): A just man (in the conventional sense) always gets less than an unjust one (in the conventional sense). A person of power always outdoes everyone else. The greatest injustice (one which is not mixed/limited with justice) has the greatest rewards. People avoid injustice not because it is bad, but because they are afraid of punishment.

Socrates’s Response The rest of book I is concerned with S’s refutation of these claims. Shepherd analogy: S points out that the fact that all practitioners of a craft demand pay for their work shows that they are not themselves benefitted by the practice (41). S then concerns himself with refuting the claim that the life of an unjust person is better than that of a just one. He begins by getting T to admit that his suggestion amounts to the claim that injustice is not just more profitable, but rather is the choice of the virtuous and the wise. S then concentrates on this notion of outdoing and connects it to the notion of virtue (excellence). A person who lacks excellence wants to outdo both those like him and those unlike himself, while a person with virtue only those unlike himself (ex., musician). So, justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice is vice and ignorance. The focus then turns to the effects of justice and injustice, and in particular, which one is more powerful. What S points out is that any expression of power necessitates a unified purpose, but injustice interrupts this unity. So any expression of power necessitates justice.

Is a life of Dikaiosune best? As a last point, S acknowledges that it still hasn’t been proven that a just life is better and happier than an unjust one. Tries to respond to this with the function argument. His first attempt is with what is known as the Function Argument. P1 The function of a thing is that which the thing alone can do or what it does better than anything else (eyes for seeing) P2 Having a function implies having a virtue—lacking this virtue amounts to lacking the capacity to perform the function. P3 The Soul’s function is to rule, think and live. corollary: virtue of the soul makes possible ruling wisely, living well. P4 Justice is the virtue of the soul (agreed to by T earlier in the discussion). ________________________ Conclusion. The just soul will rule wisely, live well and be happy and the unjust one won’t.

We still need to talk about human Nature The account is, if anything, more complex than the account we get of justice. Book I doesn’t give us much to work with, but the rest of the Republic does. In particular a section called the Allegory of the Cave. The Allegory is part of Plato’s response to metaphysical and epistemological issue concerning universals like dikaiosune: namely, what sort of things are they and what sort of knowledge is it that we have of them? Plato offers three different analogies or allegories to help us understand his answers to these questions. The Allegory of the Cave is the final (and unifying) of these.

Platonic Metaphysics Because of the limitations of the material covered in the text, it’s difficult to discern Plato’s account of the nature of reality there. Actually, it’s a challenge in its own right, and there are important disagreements that continue to this day about this issue. We can say a few things that are generally accepted. Plato was a metaphysical dualist. Reality is composed of two different metaphysical orders. The most fundamental order is formal, not physical. The forms are universal aspects of reality. Particular things get their being from the forms. The world of experience is a metaphysically dependent world.

The Analogy of the Line

The Cave

The Prisoners All that a person like those described as being chained in front of the wall could see of themselves, other people, and the puppets would be shadows on the wall. All that they could have any sensory experience of would be mediated by the wall (hearing=echo). The implication is clear: we are like prisoners in the cave (for the most part, humans live on the bottom part of the line), but there is a way out.

The Escapee What if a prisoner were released? What would her experience be like? She would be disoriented, her senses painfully struggling to deal with the increase in illumination/change in object, and her consciousness struggling to process the new experience. If someone asked her, she’d likely insist that the familiar shadows were more real than the blurring/buzzing confusion she was currently experiencing. Eventually she would orient to her new context and she would grasp the nature of the illusion that she had lived in. Her senses would be capable of distinguishing the faint light of the exit of the cave, and she would likely enough explore it and find her way into the full light of the sun. What would her experience be like at this stage? Probably much like when she was first freed (though with more confidence). Eventually she would discover that the sun (Good) is the truth of the whole.

The Philosopher What do you think the mood of this lucky person would be? How would she evaluate her situation relative to the situation of the people still in the cave? In the face of the gap between the situations, she might be motivated to return to the cave. Why? What would the experience of the return be like? She would once again be blind, but this time by darkness (ignorance) rather than light (access to knowledge). Her former colleagues would doubtless be tempted to blame her blindness and lack of fit on what she know knows, and thus stigmatize her accomplishment. If she kept trying to convince people to accept what she knows to be true, they’d likely end up killing her (like Socrates).

Human Nature So, what does the cave analogy suggest about Plato’s understanding of human nature? Reason gives us the capacity to bridge the ontological gap between the formal and material dimensions of reality (the intelligible and visible worlds). We are bodies, caught up in the visible world and thus susceptible (like the prisoners) to the trap of recognizing only that which the limited understanding of Doxa makes available. But, if we order our soul correctly (if Diakosune rules it) we can be philosophers, and thus recognize the truth of the formal, intelligible world.