NAS Enterprise Information System Security (NEISS) Vic Patel, FAA ICAP, ACP WG-I May 28th – 30th

Agenda Why do we need NEISS NEISS described Current status/activities Future plans

Introduction The NAS Enterprise Information Systems Security (NEISS) Program Seeks to implement a NAS Security Architecture that is based on Enterprise or “Common” Controls rather than the current system-by-system controls All NAS and NextGen Programs interface to and use the Common Controls to gain the mitigation benefits The five Common Controls that comprise NEISS

Changing Environment Increases Cyber Security Risks to the NAS Today’s NAS Limited inter-connectivity NextGen Significant inter-connectivity Planned NAS improvements Moving to net-centric operations Moving from custom to commercial software Cyber threats on the increase External NAS Sensors users Aviation Partner Networks IP SWIM Services External users IP Cyber risk Greater use of Internet Protocol (IP) and greater connectivity within the NAS requires an effective Enterprise Information System Security Architecture

Potential Impacts to NAS Are Serious Major disruption of NAS services possible Malware can enter the NAS accidently The NAS can be targeted Disruption can cause substantial economic loss Loss of public confidence in the NAS NAS disruption can interfere with logistical support of military missions The $76,000,000 includes only direct losses to the air carrier. For example, indirect costs to those who depend on the air carrier for shipping are not included Logistical support provides personnel and materials to the war theater. Military and non-military carriers can provide logistical support. When traversing civil airspace, logistical transport must comply with the controlling civil air authority. As an example, both United and Delta airlines have classified processing facilities to provide pilots and aircraft to transport soldiers; as was done in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Under certain scenarios, a delay in logistical support may be the entire goal of a cyber attack. It has been conjectured that an invasion of Taiwan by the Chinese that would succeed, if an immediate and forceful response from the U.S were lacking. Such a response would require logistical support originating from FAA controlled airspace. In which case, a significant disruption of U.S. civil airspace may thwart the needed U.S. response.

The Threat Cyber exploitation activity has Grown more sophisticated More targeted And more serious The intelligence community has concluded that nation states Have the technical capabilities to Target and disrupt elements of the US information infrastructure Collect intelligence information for future use against the US StuxNet – Specifically targeted an Industrial Control System similar to NAS

The Challenge It’s hard to keep them out When they get in, it’s hard to find them When we find them, it’s hard to get them out

What Can We Do? Understand the threat Lay a solid foundation Be agile Characterize the NAS cyber threat environment Identify tools, techniques, and procedures used by adversaries Lay a solid foundation Develop core Enterprise Solutions that position the NAS to deal with an ever increasing problem Be agile Develop techniques and approaches useful for defending and countering cyber attacks Developing and enforcing Enterprise Solutions that can quickly adapt to the changing threat environment and apply to all NAS systems Be resilient Adopt approaches for continued operations during cyber attacks

The Plan: NAS Enterprise Information System Security NAS ISS architecture was developed to provide a foundational cyber infrastructure for NAS enterprise security beginning now and continuing through NextGen Doable in five years Enterprise-wide solutions Minimal end-system changes Expand existing program solutions where applicable Flexible and Scalable - Security solutions can vary over time. NAS ISS architecture will allow: Improvements in security technology New security features

The NAS ISS Architecture Keep the bad stuff out Know whom you’re talking to External Boundary Protection Secured NAS Identity & Key Management Crown Jewels 01101 Certified Software Management T&E Internal Policy Enforcement Protect the software supply chain Incident Detection and Response Minimize damage and don’t let it spread If they get in, find them and deal with it

NEISS Design Principles Minimize the damage once in and don’t let it spread! Identity & Key Management Internal Policy Enforcement Incident Detection and Response Certified Software Management External Boundary Protection Know who’s who Keep the bad stuff out When they get in, find them and deal with the problem Only approved software Secured NAS Create a Cyber Security Infrastructure Enterprise wide Monitor NAS data flows Apply cyber security controls to data flows Majority of implementation involves infrastructure, rather than end-systems Modify enterprise controls, as new threats & controls warrant it Ongoing R&D effort Present controls represent 5 year timeline

Under the Hood: What’s Happening in NEISS

Why a NAS Enterprise Information System Security (ISS) Architecture Is Needed (I) Growing and evolving cyber security threats Cyber terrorism, cyber crime, cyber vandalism, cyber espionage, cyber war Evolution to support and enable NextGen Increased levels of network connectivity (from point-to-point to net-centricity) Newer technologies (satellite-based surveillance and navigation) Increased complexity from interoperability needs (legacy systems and NextGen implementation) Security is based around individual systems Non-uniform security, the weakest link paradigm applies Costly to implement Individual system security never intended to mitigate the advanced threats

Why a NAS Enterprise Information System Security (ISS) Architecture Is Needed (II) Architecture Provides Uniform and enterprise cyber security capabilities Layered cyber security capabilities (defense-in-depth) Robust, resilient, agile and scalable cyber security capabilities Incremental approach

Why a NAS Enterprise Information System Security (ISS) Architecture Is Needed (III) Benefits Protect the NAS from malware and advance cyber threats Organized crime, terrorist organizations, foreign governments Provide better opportunities to leverage net-centric services for security Greater network connectivity, newer technologies, greater complexity Provide uniform enterprise cyber security capabilities Reduce complexity, weakest link paradigm Reduce implementation costs One enterprise implementation vs. each system’s implementation NEISS will be responsible for the implementation of the NAS EA ISS roadmap

External Boundary Protection (EBP) Added Application Gateway EBP consolidates all NAS level security controls that are applied to data that transit the NAS security boundary

External Boundary Protection (EBP) FTI MATRIX

External Boundary Protection (EBP) Status Developing AMS artifacts supporting EBP Working with SWIM and FTI to implement early capability centered around the NAS Enterprise Security Gateway (NESG) Conducting the Operational Safety Assessment Future Activities: Transition strategy Governance Guidance FY13 Legacy NAS transition candidates

Identity and Key Management (IKM) The IKM capability allows users and machines to be identified and provides key services for authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation; wherever these functions are needed.

Identity and Key Management (IKM) - cont Status: Actively Developing Requirements Implementer: SWIM Accomplishments: Defined IKM requirements in SWIM S2 FPR, OSA data collection complete, Leading implementation of IKM in SWIM Segment 1+ Future Activities: Implement in test bed the four phase approach regarding integration with legacy systems. Issues: Need clarity on allocation of some IKM functions, including Security Token Service Selection of early adopters Policy/Standards needed

Internal Policy Enforcement (IPE) IPE mitigates the impact of security incidents within the NAS by dividing NAS systems and networks into enclaves and providing internal boundary protection (IBP) security mechanisms at the boundaries between enclaves.

Internal Policy Enforcement (IPE) - cont Status: Engineering new environment Implementer: NEISS Accomplishments: Defined Enclave Environment Future Activities: Prototype IPE in test bed. Implement IPE in legacy environment utilizing a four step approach. Solicit support from different lines of business to test IPE design in and design secondary network for data transmission if enclave is compromised. Issues: Concern with cost for possible secondary form of data transmission. Steve Bradford likes the test bed approach

Certified Software Management (CSM) The Certified Software Management capability ensures that malware does not enter the NAS via the software supply chain. CSM authenticates the source of the software, controls it’s entry into the NAS, provides secure retrieval, transfer, and integrity guarantee utilizing the IKM capability. EBP Progress/FUSE Repository Off-line Internet Authentication Check Have vendor sign software Potential Reference Model Based on SWIM SOA Software Acquisition/Verification Digital Signature (IKM) Verification Report Test Repository SWIM Wiki Release & snapshot Project Object Model SWIM Production Repository Available for Download Scan Build Verify Integrity scan (Veracode) per order1370.109 Located in Maintenance Enclave Located in DMZ

Certified Software Management (CSM) Status Actively developing requirements Implementer: SWIM Augments existing CM process. CSM will add Authentication Check - Vendor will Digitally sign software to be downloaded. Integrity scan - Per order 1370.109 Software Assurance Policy Digital Signature - Utilizing IKM to Digitally sign software approved for distribution. Accomplishments: Functional Analysis Use cases Started safety OSA Future Activities: Determine process to authenticate with COTS SOA software provider

Incident Detection and Response (IDR) NAS cyber security incident reporting, communications, monitoring, and maintenance

Incident Detection and Response (IDR) Status: Policy Development Update of CONUSE and Functional Analysis Documents Implementer: NEISS IDR Accomplishments: CEMWG was established to formalize/combine process of handling NAS cyber events Drafted IDR Policy and SOP OSA draft complete

Incident Detection and Response (IDR) Future Activities: Completion of Policy and SOP Continuous update of the supporting documents as we evolve Validation of SOPs Issues: AMS process time – Training and resources needed Technology – Tech changes and advancements Use of automated tools for data and traffic flows to detect anomalies

Governance and Policy Establishing policy, procedures, roles and responsibilities for implementing the NAS Enterprise Information System Security (NEISS) Architecture SUBJ: National Airspace System (NAS) Enterprise Information System Security Architecture   1. Purpose of This Notice. This notice establishes the requirements for use of FAA National Airspace System (NAS) Enterprise Information System Security Architecture for National Airspace System (NAS) systems, including NAS performance-based service contracts. It also establishes the requirements for use of NEISSA enterprise common controls that provide security services to multiple NAS systems.

Governance and Policy - cont Status: Actively Drafting Policy Extending Notice JO 1370.44 to include enterprise ISS and current NIST guidance Working with FAA’s CIO Offices on incorporating ISS in AMS life cycle Accomplishments: Annotated outline Future Activities: First full draft expected early January 2011 Identify and integrate Enterprise ISS in JRC checklist Issues: Balancing specificity and clarity against length Steve Bradford likes the test bed approach

NEISS Challenges Disposition of the NAS Enterprise ISS requirements Need a way to resolve and approve changes (particularly deletion) and implementation of NEISS requirements Conveying an understanding of the NEISS Threat/risk motivation Understanding capabilities Programs need to be clear on when and how to adapt to NEISS Schedule, Funding, Requirements ISS architecture governance What are the Rules (Policy)? Who are the Gatekeepers? Establishing NEISS priority and importance Urgency Early funding Coordinating across the many stakeholders Nearly everyone in the NAS/NextGen is a stakeholder All need attention

Backup Slides

NEISS Implementation Alternatives* Alt #1 - Distributed Alt #2 - Centralized Alt #3 - Hybrid Description ISS capabilities assigned to selected existing NAS programs Single entity to manage, implement and maintain enterprise cyber security controls Centralized entity to manage, implement and maintain SOME of the enterprise cyber security controls Benefits Takes advantage of selected NAS program domain knowledge and experience Could minimize impact on current organizational structure May reduce time delay and new program start-up costs by using existing NAS programs infrastructure and organization Focus on securing NAS, clear responsibility and accountability Increased ability to define priorities, manage, and coordinate NEISS implementation Synergies with other enterprise programs (data center consolidation, enterprise services, etc) May reduce impact and resistance to organizational changes Increased flexibility to take advantage of program domain knowledge (distributed) or focus on cyber security (centralized) Risk, Issues, Challenges NEISS implementation will depend on selected NAS programs Increased levels of management and coordination across programs Potential security accountability gap Selected NAS programs will need to acquire cyber security skills Requires a significant organizational and cultural change Requires additional infrastructure, environment, and funding stream for new program office Blend of Risks, Issues, Challenges from Distributed and Centralized alternatives *Complete details provided in the NEISS Concept of Operations, v0.5