TEM as an Analytical Tool

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Presentation transcript:

TEM as an Analytical Tool Bert Ruitenberg Flight Safety and Human Factors – ICAO Second ICAO Global Symposium on TEM & NOSS in ATC Washington, DC 7 – 8 February 2007 1 1 1

Presentation Overview Brief introduction to Threat and Error Management (TEM) Case Study: occurrence at Schiphol How to determine which countermeasure is the most effective one? Conclusion

TEM Terminology for ATC Threats: Events or errors that occur beyond the influence of the air traffic controller, increase operational complexity, and which must be managed to maintain the margins of safety Errors: Actions or inactions by the air traffic controller that lead to deviations from organisational or controller intentions or expectations Undesired States: operational conditions where an unintended traffic situation results in a reduction in margins of safety

Threats (Aerodrome Environment) VFR traffic Military activities Photoflights Parajumping activity Pilots Threats (Aerodrome Environment) Comsfailure/ sticking mike Distractions Runway crossings Visitors Shift handovers Weather Similar call signs Maintenance Non-standard local procedures Airspace restrictions Runway inspections Heavy traffic System malfunctions Unfamiliar crews Automation events Missed approaches

TEM Framework Incorrect readback (pilot) Hearback Error (ATC) Aircraft climbing/ descending to other altitude than expected Loss of separation

18L YZS158 Airline 158 18C YXS148 Flyfine 148

Potential Countermeasures Dedicated Supervisor Deconflicting of callsigns Two runway controllers active ….. How effective are those countermeasures?

Threats Strong, gusty wind Only one landing runway available Several earlier go-arounds because of Wx Combined role Runway Controller and Supervisor Departure from non-standard runway No extra marking on strip (non-standard runway) No remark from GC about non-standard runway Occasional departure between landing traffic Occasional departure from non-standard holding point Runway crossing by RFFS vehicles because of emergency Similar company identifiers on strips outbound traffic (YXS and YZS) Company identifiers do not resemble callsign (Flyfine/Airline) Similar flight numbers (148 and 158) Acceptance and confirmation of clearance for incorrect runway by YXS148 YZS158 does not challenge take-off clearance 18L for other flight Holding point 18C obscured because of rainshower

Errors Didn't notice YXS148 was at holding point 18C Incorrect information ("several departures in front") to YXS148 [result of E1] Use of incorrect callsign/ flight number/ runway combination with t/o clearance Didn't notice readback was by YXS148

Undesired States YXS148 departs from runway 18C on take off clearance intended for YZS158 on runway 18L YZS158 remains stationary on 18L

Threats Linked to Errors 1 - 2 Combined role Runway Controller and Supervisor Departure from non-standard runway No extra marking on strip (non-standard runway) No remark from GC about non-standard runway Occasional departure between landing traffic Holding point 18C obscured because of rainshower Those Threats were not managed. Result: Errors 1 and 2: Didn't notice YXS148 was at holding point 18C Incorrect information ("several departures in front") to YXS148 [result of E1]

Threats Linked to Error 3 Similar company identifiers on strips outbound traffic (YXS and YZS) Company identifiers do not resemble callsign (Flyfine/Airline) Similar flight numbers (148 and 158) Those Threats were not managed. Result: Error 3: Use of incorrect callsign/ flight number/ runway combination with take off clearance

Threats Linked to Error 4 Acceptance and confirmation of clearance for incorrect runway by YXS148 This Threat wasn’t managed. Result: Error 4: Didn't notice readback was by YXS148

Those Threats were managed or inconsequential Remaining Threats Strong, gusty wind Only one landing runway available Several earlier go-arounds because of Wx Occasional departure from non-standard holding point Runway crossing by RFFS vehicles because of emergency Those Threats were managed or inconsequential

Error Management Didn't notice YXS148 was at holding point 18C Incorrect information ("several departures in front") to YXS148 [result of E1] Use of incorrect callsign/ flight number/ runway combination with take off clearance Didn't notice readback was by YXS148 E1 Not noticed, not managed  E2 E2 Not noticed, not managed  inconsequential E3 Not noticed (except by YZS158), not managed  T15  US2 E4 Not noticed, not managed  US1, US2

Undesired State Management YXS148 departs from runway 18C on take off clearance intended for YZS158 on runway 18L YZS158 remains stationary on 18L US1 Noticed afterwards by ATCO; not managed. Outcome: take off from incorrect runway US2 Noticed by ATCO; managed, inconsequential

Countermeasures – effectiveness (1) Dedicated Supervisor Combined role Runway Controller and Supervisor Deconflicting of callsigns Similar company identifiers on strips outbound traffic (YXS and YZS) Company identifiers do not resemble callsign (Flyfine/Airline) Similar flight numbers (148 and 158) Acceptance and confirmation clearance for incorrect runway by YXS148

Countermeasures – effectiveness (2) Two runway controllers active Departure from non-standard runway No extra marking on strip (non-standard runway) No remark from GC about non-standard runway Occasional departure between landing traffic Similar company identifiers on strips outbound traffic (YXS and YZS) Company identifiers do not resemble callsign (Flyfine/Airline) Similar flight numbers (148 and 158) Acceptance and confirmation of clearance for incorrect runway by YXS148 YZS158 does not challenge take-off clearance 18L for other flight Holding point 18C obscured because of rainshower

Potential Countermeasures Dedicated Supervisor Deconflicting of callsigns Two runway controllers active … Most effective countermeasure: With mixed mode operations use a dedicated runway controller.

Conclusion The TEM framework can potentially be applied in incident and accident investigation by quantifying elements in the context of air traffic control operations and by providing an understanding of the relationships between those elements Application of the TEM framework can assist in validating countermeasures that are proposed in investigation reports

Conclusion Controllers, pilots and other aviation professionals have intuitively been familiar with Threats (and Errors, and Undesired States) throughout their careers – the TEM framework provides a structured way to look at them The TEM framework adds a valuable dimension to the analysis of safety data