Federalist Papers 85 essays by Hamilton, Jay, Madison Published anonymously (Publius) in New York Packet and Independent Journal between October, 1787 and May, 1788 Address insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve the union. Urge New Yorkers to ratify Anti-Federalist papers weaknesses of proposal against tyranny. Bill of Rights partial response.

#10 Object -To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government.

Mischiefs of faction Governments are too unstable the public good is disregarded in conflicts of rival parties measures are not decided according to the rules of justice and rights of minority but according to superior force of majority

2 approaches to curb mischiefs remove its causes –destroy liberty essential to its existence or –Give everyone same opinions, passion, interests. –worse than the disease. –Impracticable: free operation of human reason curb its effects –Direct pure democracy wont work –Republican organization is answer

Virtues of republic Representation refine(s) and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country. Nice but unreliable. Enlarge scope: When a greater number of citizens and extent of territory are brought with the compass of a government factions are less to be feared.

Virtues of republic when have a greater variety of parties and interests you decrease the likelihood that a majority will have a common motive to invade the rights of other and if such exists will be more difficult to recognize and organize to give it tangible expression [T] he influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states.

#47 Design problem is relationship among branches Differentiate complete consolidation from partial agency not that one part of government has partial agency in other powers, but that the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands that have the whole power of another department.

#51 Want to constitute so that each department has a will of its own and so that members of each have as little agency as possible in the appointment of members of others. Provide constitutional means and person motives to resist encroachment. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. Policy is: correct by opposite and rival interests the defect of better motives.

Design features Cannot curb the predominance of the legislature so divide it into two houses with different modes of election. Power of veto for executive. Create a compound republic. State governments and federal government. Powers granted to each. Prominent among these is that authorization of both is required for amending the Constitution

Design features Return to the argument: breaking into many parts and interests minimize the possibility for tyrannical faction. In an extended republic with a great variety of interests, parties,, and sects a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good.

#78 How should judiciary be constituted and what is its extent? Standard of good behavior for tenure Least dangerous to political rights (no control sword/purse; ability to direct strength/will Neither force nor will, only judgment Liberty nothing to fear from judiciary alone, everything from unification with another branch Under constant threat Need independent, permanent judiciary Moderating influence

Questions to consider What problem(s) were framers responding to? What was their focus and style or argument? What values are expressed? How does this stand as a design for getting things done? Do these arguments still make sense?