Westinghouse Perspective on New Reactor Sumps

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Generic Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR): Safety Systems Overview
Advertisements

Slide 1 NRC Perspectives on Reactor Safety Course Special Features of BWR Severe Accident Mitigation and Progression L. J. Ott Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
ASME SMR ROADMAP (STP-NU-072)
ACADs (08-006) Covered Keywords Cathodic protection, corrosion. Description Supporting Material
1 August 30-31,2010 Kyushu Electric Power Co.,Inc. Nuclear Power Operatio n Dept. Masahiro Yoshinaga Approach for dose reduction in Sendai NPS August 30-31,2010.
The 2002 Davis Besse Event and Safety Culture Policy at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Stephanie Morrow, Ph.D. Safety Culture Program Manager Office.
NREP 2009 Emergency Preparedness and the New Reactor Licensing Process: An Update on Where We Are Now Dan Barss Division of Preparedness & Response Office.
Thermal-Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) TRTR Annual Meeting September 17-20, 2007 Dr. Robert C. Nelson1,
NRC Perspective of Recent Configuration Management Issues Tom Farnholtz Chief, Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety, Region IV June 2014 CMBG.
1 Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 191 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Sump Performance Presented by: Donnie Harrison Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Presented.
> NRC Regulatory Information Conference March 12, 2009 AREVA NP Inc. 2 AREVA Perspectives on the Containment Sump Design and Downstream Effects for U.S.
NRC PERSPECTIVE ON RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVES Charles G. Hammer Component Performance & Testing Branch Division of Component Integrity Office of Nuclear.
Debris Effects in Long-Term Post-LOCA PWR Cooling
Lindy Hughes Fleet Fire Protection Program Engineer Southern Nuclear Operating Company June 4, 2013 Fire Protection.
Hydraulic Screening and Analysis Needed for USACE Review
Actionable Process Steps and Focused Mitigation Strategies
NUNAVUT TUNNGAVIK INCORPORATED Lands Policy Advisory Committee Draft Uranium Policy.
Codex Guidelines for the Application of HACCP
MPMP Power Supply 1 Nuclear Power Update for The Society of American Military Engineers September 15, 2010.
KIT – University of the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and National Research Center of the Helmholtz Association Institute for Nuclear and Energy Technologies.
Hartley, Project Management: Integrating Strategy, Operations and Change, 3e Tilde Publishing Chapter 11 Procurement Management Embedding value into the.
1 © 2013 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. All Rights Reserved Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 David Cliff UK Licensing Manager AP1000 Westinghouse.
NSF/SRC Engineering Research Center for Environmentally Benign Semiconductor Manufacturing Beaudoin, et al. 1 Environmental Impacts of Manufacturing Stephen.
Voice over IP Spring LNA Meeting April 1, What is Voice over IP? n A technology for transporting integrated digital voice, video and data over IP.
GSI-191 Status and Lessons Learned Presented by: Donnie Harrison Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Presented at:
PWR Owners Group Post-Accident Chemical Effects Work NEI Chemistry Meeting, January 26, 2012.
What is an Inventory Program for? Dr. Emilio Moceo Ph.D Director of Studies Meet international obligations and expectations Inform international, national,
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory Assessment of Margin for In-Vessel Retention in Higher Power Reactors 2004 RELAP5 International.
Westinghouse Operational Experience and Prospects for New Build
An Industry Technical Position On LOCA Rulemaking 21 st Regulatory Information Conference Rockville, MD March 12, 2009 Ken Yueh Electric Power Research.
1 Attributes of a Successful Nuclear Construction Project – A Regulator’s Perspective Victor M. McCree Deputy Regional Administrator for Operations U.S.
GSI-191 RESOLUTION OPTIONS
Types of Positive Barrier Screens  Rotary Drum  Fixed Vertical Plate  Vertical Traveling – belt and panel  Non-Vertical Fixed Plate  Horizontal Fixed.
San Diego Workshop, 11 September 2003 Results of the European Power Plant Conceptual Study Presented by Ian Cook on behalf of David Maisonnier (Project.
Configuration Management in New Reactor Construction Tom Kozak, NRO/DCIP/CAEB
1 RIC 2009 MELCOR Analyses to Address Regulatory Issues: Evaluation of System Success Criteria Hossein Esmaili USNRC March 12, 2009.
EPA Cooling System Regulations Hall of States Briefing February 22, 2011.
New Reactors: Licensing Basis and Configuration Mgmt Challenges June 22, 2010 David B. Matthews Director Division of New Reactor Licensing Office of New.
1 Current Issues in Siting Safety Reviews Michelle Hart, Sr. Reactor Engineer Division of Site and Environmental Reviews NRC Regulatory Information Conference.
Repository Design Overview Presented to: NSNFP Meeting Presented by: Joe Price Office of Repository Development April 13, 2005 Bethesda, MD.
Nuclear Power Plant Orientation
Specific Safety Requirements on Safety Assessment and Safety Cases for Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste – GSR Part 5.
1 RIC 2009 Perspectives on Digital I&C Licensing in the 10 CFR 52 Environment Thomas R. Fredette, PE NRO/DE/ICE2 March 11, 2009.
1 Impact of Revised 10 CFR 50.46(b) ECCS Acceptance Criteria 2009 Regulatory Information Conference Rockville, MD March 12, 2009 Mitch Nissley Westinghouse.
RIC 2009 Construction Inspection Program: Industry Perspectives Russ Bell Director, New Plant Licensing March 11, 2009.
1 RIC 2009 NRO New Reactor Design Reviews and Engineering Jennifer Dixon-Herrity USNRC/NRO/DE March 11, 2009.
Eric Mathet, OECD-NEA MASCA Seminar June 2004 PROJECT USE ONLY 1.
1 RIC 2009 Design Acceptance Criteria: Searching for Acceptance Andrea Sterdis Tennessee Valley Authority March 11, 2009.
ECCS Operability Determination Jim Andrachek Fellow Engineer Westinghouse Electric Company.
Option 2b Template Example Phillip Grissom – Southern Nuclear Based on Vogtle (more or less)
Option 2a Template Example Phillip Grissom – Southern Nuclear Based on Farley (more or less)
Closure Option 1 GSI-191 Workshop October 18-19,2012.
1 Nuclear Power Technology Development Westinghouse View Kiev March 2012 Dr. Nick Shulyak AP1000® is a registered trademark in the United States of Westinghouse.
Workshop on Risk informed decision making on nuclear power plant safety January 2011 SNRC, Kyiv, Ukraine Benefits and limitations of RIDM by Géza.
Use and Conduct of Safety Analysis IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decission Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop Lecturer.
Industrial Resources, Inc.
MELCOR model development for ARIES Safety Analysis
Summary of Int’l ITL Program (1)
Defense-in-Depth and Mitigative Measures
Flooding Walkdown Guidance
Change Request Panel report
Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group
Nuclear Power Update for The Society of American Military Engineers
Bypass Testing Paul Leonard.
Session Name: Lessons Learned from Mega Projects
Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group
GNI Advanced Reactors Safeguards Analysis & Findings
PWR Sump Performance (GSI-191) Industry Workshop
RESOLUTION OF GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 191
Risk-Informing In-Vessel Effects
Presentation transcript:

Westinghouse Perspective on New Reactor Sumps Presented by: Timothy S. Andreychek Westinghouse Electric Company Phone: 412-374-6246 E-mail: andreyts@westinghouse.com Date: March 12, 2009

Long-Term Sump Performance Three Areas of Concerns Upstream (in front of and at recirculation screens) Debris Sources Insulation Protective Coatings (Paints) Chemical Precipitates Latent Containment Debris Debris Transport to and Collection on Screens Head Loss across Debris Bed / Screens Downstream Ex-Vessel Wear and abrasion Blockage of component flow paths Downstream In-Vessel Reduction / Blockage of Flow into Core Precipitation of Debris on Fuel Cladding Each have been addressed in and for the AP1000 Design

Upstream Concerns AP1000 Design provides for: Limited debris generation Metal reflective insulation (MRI) used on components subjected to direct jet impingement loads Other insulation inside containment and outside the zone of influence is jacketed or not submerged Reduction in debris transport to screens Natural recirculation flows are low No containment spray High flood-up levels - enhanced potential for debris settle-out Protective overhangs over Containment Recirculation Screens Reduction in materials contributing to chemical precipitates Stainless Steel metal reflective insulation (MRI) Elimination / control of aluminum inside containment Advanced Recirculation Screen Design

AP1000 Debris Sources Only two potential post-LOCA debris sources for AP1000 Latent containment debris Dirt, dust, lint and other miscellaneous materials inside containment at initiation of a LOCA Amount limited/controlled by plant cleanliness program Post-accident chemical effects Minimized by design Used WCAP-16530-NP-A, Revision 1, “Evaluation of Post-Accident Chemical Effects in Containment Sump Fluids to Support GSI-191,” to evaluate generation of chemical precipitates Impact of these debris sources tested Head loss across the screens Head loss at core inlet Sufficiency of AP1000 latent debris amounts under discussion with NRC

AP1000 Recirculation Screens AP1000 advanced screen Provides for large surface areas Can collect debris with negligible impact on head loss across screen Used for both Containment Recirculation screens In-containment Refueling Water Tank (IRWST) screens

Recirculation Screen Testing Head loss tests investigated: Spectrum of debris inventories Debris staging Chemical effects and flow rates Debris loading / flows: Scaled from AP1000 design Based on screen frontal area Testing demonstrated: Screen design successfully performs its design functions Insufficient debris in the AP1000 to form a contiguous debris bed on the screens Essentially no increase in head losses observed AP1000 Screen Test Operating Plant Screen Test

Downstream Ex-Vessel Concerns Addressed in Analyses Potential for wear, abrasion and blockage evaluated WCAP-16406-P-A, Revision 1, “Evaluation of Downstream Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI‑191,” applied to: Passive containment cooling liquid recirculation flow paths (safety case) RHR circulation (non-safety case) Both flow paths determined to not be adversely impacted by debris in the recirculating liquid

Downstream In-Vessel Concerns Head Loss Testing at Core Inlet: Test loop same as used for PWR Owners Group Bounding flow rate scaled to a single AP1000 fuel assembly Latent debris loading conditions bound those expected following a LOCA for the AP1000 Chemical precipitates exceeded those calculated for AP1000 Tests demonstrated: Essentially no head loss for debris loads tested Fibrous latent debris could increase by order of magnitude before significant head loss

Downstream Issues Resolution Support the PWROG topical WCAP-16793-NP and its approach Timely approval of this topical will support addressing concerns For operating plants For new-build plants Analysis of AP1000 shows that Post-accident chemical precipitate deposit on fuel does not challenge long-term core cooling ADS Stage 4 Effectively moves water through the core Limits chemical precipitate deposition on fuel cladding

Impediments to Resolution Need uniform, consistent and justifiable criteria to apply, for each plant to measure against Need to reach agreement on amount and makeup of latent debris applicable to AP1000 Need to reach agreement on Level of detail requested for DCD Appears more detail requested than is provided for other safety analysis and safety features Amount and scope of requested ITAACs ITAACs do not apply to operating programs / conditions

Overcoming the Impediments Continue to work with the NRC to define an acceptance criteria Address NRC RAIs Use plant walkdown data to resolve latent debris amount / makeup Improve level of communication / understanding Conduct a Design Centered focus meeting Define and agree on an acceptable closure path consistent with the industry (operating plants) direction Push for rapid turn around of questions / answers on both sides

Role of ITACC in Resolution NRC suggested ITAACs to verify key assumptions associated with design and operational features (insulation, coatings, latent debris) in containment Westinghouse has proposed several ITAACs to verify key aspects of “as-built” plant, including Use of Metal Reflective Insulation (MRI) on Class 1 components Screen type, areas and location Size, location and use of protective stainless steel plates over recirculation screens Ex-core detectors are enclosed in stainless steel housing Westinghouse has not proposed an ITAAC on latent debris ITAAC not for operating programs or conditions

Level of Detail for Inspections Recirculation screens are required to be inspected regularly by AP1000 Technical Specifications Specified in AP1000 DCD LCO 3.5.6, SR 3.5.6.8 Plant containment cleanliness program will ensure that latent debris is limited to values consistent with AP1000 testing Required in AP1000 COL item 6.3.8.1

Summary AP1000 design features address post-accident sump performance NRC-approved PWR evaluation methods used to evaluate Ex-vessel flow paths Chemical precipitate loading on recirculation screens and core In-vessel (currently under NRC review) Debris capture on grids Chemical precipitate deposition on fuel cladding Impediments to closure identified Need uniform, consistent and justifiable criteria to apply, for each plant can measure against Need agreement on: Level of detail requested for DCD Amount and scope of requested ITAACs Westinghouse is actively working with NRC to address the impediments