Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Longino Science as Social Knowledge Ch. 2

The Paradox of Inquiry… There is a long tradition in Western thought – still central to much of Philosophy – that inquiry is a matter of conceptual analysis Plato’s Meno: Knowledge as remembering Descartes: Knowledge a ‘clear and distinct ideas’ Frank Jackson & David Chalmers

Longino Contends that the traditional notion of inquiry in science is based on this idea: We start with laws, or theories (as sets of propositions) And then deduce, through conceptual analysis, testable predictions. That the act of inquiring is not working in the lab, it is considering the implications of a theory.

Longino’s claim That theories are the products of inquiry, and not the process of inquiry. (17) Scientific inquiry is a human endeavor, and therefore social in nature. 1.It has certain goals, the realization or nonrealization of which determine success and the criteria to which we measure success 2.It is organized socially in certain ways that affect both goals and the criteria of success 3.It develops within historical social and political contexts with which it is in dynamic interaction.

Goals and Practices… Inquiry is an activity in which we engage as human beings and in believing that this overall approach enables one to think about sciences and their place in human life more realistically than does reducing them to their products (17)

Based on MacIntyre… Two kinds of goals: 1.The elegance of a scientist’s argument and the ingenuity of a scientist’s experiment (internal) 2.The excellencies of the resultant theory itself (external) (recall that this is exactly the distinction that Kuhn failed to make in his equivocation between ‘paradigm’ as in ‘paradigmatic experiment’ and ‘dominant world-view’)

BUT… Longino will remain non-committal regarding the specific internal goods of scientific inquiry. Why? 1.It is social and complex. Different conceptions could arise in different places (Einstein) [similar to Feyerbend’s point] 2.To some extent, those standards are historically bound. 3.In this time period, what counts as ‘good theory’ varies from science to science.

2 theories about ‘good’ science Logical Positivism Hempel Popper Theories are meaningful if they can be observationally verified Wholism Quine Duhem Kuhn Feyerbend Theories are meaningful insofar as they fit with the totality of of your beliefs about the world.

A couple of careful distinctions: 1.Prescription v. Description Describe which methodologies scientists actually do use Prescribe which methodologies scientists actually should use. (example of AI) 2. Conditions of Meaning v. conditions of knowledge Grass doesn’t grow on kangaroos `Twas brillig, and the slithy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: / All mimsy were the borogoves, / And the mome raths outgrabe.

Logical Positivism Is a thesis about meaning and truth conditions: –A statement is meaningful iff it can be either true or false. Meaningless statements can neither be true or false. –Something is true or false iff it can be observed or experienced. –Therefore, a statement is meaningful iff it can be observed or experienced. (verificationism / falsificationism)

Careful… Are the Logical Positivists prescribing or describing?

So… To understand (and create) scientific theories, we need only to understand the relationship between scientific theories and the evidence that (a) supports them and (b) is explained by them: All cats are black All cats are black (Bob the cat) = Bob is black

The Problem All cats are black and Bob is a cat Observational term! All cats are black (Bob the cat) = Bob is black

So: In order to (a) support (confirm) a theory or (b) explain a phenomenon, the theory must, itself, have only observational terms. Two problems: 1.As we have covered – science is often about positing underlying mechanisms (which often contain terms for unobservables)! 2.New hypotheses are possible only if they contain the same terms as the observations!

Taking stock: 1.Description Doesn’t account for the main activity of science: explaining through the positing of underlying unobservable mechanisms 2.Prescription Makes science impossible: for just as observational statements will never entail a true theory (the problem of induction), observational statements can never confirm a theory (the problem of circularity)

Wholism Attack not the foundations, nor the logical structure of logical positivism. The attack is on what counts as evidence. 1.Meaning 2.Observation

Meaning Terms only have meaning in relation to other terms (“Semantic wholism” –often identified with Quine, appears in Duhem) In Phil Science the claim is that: theoretical terms get their meaning only from the theory in which they are embedded.

Observation Observations are ‘theory-laden’ (Kuhn, e.g. – based on the Gestalts, all that stuff we did at the beginning of the term, etc.) In Phil Science, the claim is that confirming or disconfirming observations cannot be specified independently of a theoretical framework (paradigm).

This entails… 1.There is no neurtral or independent set of data that can serve as arbiter between theories 2.The theories are expressable in mutually untranslatable languages. These 2 entail: that theories are incommensurable… Crucial experiments are impossible… One cannot falsify individual hypotheses, but entire theoretical frameworks…

Taking stock: 1.Description: Yup 2.Prescription: ? Not entirely clear: for if theories are truly incommensurable, then we can’t even judge if they are about the same phenomena, therefore, we can’t compare theories at all. So, if there is theory change in science, it is on rather mysterious grounds.

A ‘new’ approach: Scientific realism: the theories of ‘mature’ sciences are close to true – in the sense that they correspond to the world. Defended ‘abductively’: 1.The theories that are accepted provide the best explanation of a set of data – and that is good reason for believing that they are true. 2.The fact that the theories correspond to reality explains their predictive success better than the others. 3.Realism explains the success of methodologies that might, at first pass, seem odd or unmotivated (like, modeling)

Longino’s claim: That scientific realism broadens what counts as ‘evidence’ to include explanatory virtue If truth of a theory is used to explain why a theory is explanatorily powerful, then explanatory power can’t be used to claim that the theory is true.

Side note: Why not?

In Sum… The positivists and the realists have no room for social values (note: not sure about the realists) The wholists do, but seem to be more interested in the historical factors driving theory change than the goals of scientific inquiry.

What then, are the goals of scientific inquiry?

To find descriptions of the world that will allow for successful predictions and interventions in (or control of) the natural world Popper Kuhn To discover truth about the world Hempel Feyerbend

This tension is not just a matter of philosophers, however. Theoretical v. practical physics Engineering v. scientific investigation ‘Pure’ math v. ‘applied’ math ‘Pure’ logic v. ‘applied’ logic (computer science) Etc.

Why is this an issue: Anomalies: 1.‘applied’: Anomalies are problems to be solved, stumbling blocks, things to ‘get around’. 2.‘Pure’ Anomalies are falsifying cases: they are what we’re looking for,

Longino’s point? Make sure we distinguish these conflicting values to the surface, and be aware of them as we inquire: Consider psychology: the ‘Clockwork Orange’ possibility!