1. Philosophy of science II
From positivists to Thomas Kuhn

2. Key concepts in the philosophy of science
Positivism
Logical positivism
Falsificationism
Paradigms
Anarchy
Social constructions

3. Positivism Auguste Comte (1798-1857)
Facts
More facts
Generalize from those facts
= induction

4. Comtes evolutionary stages
Law of three phases of civilisation’s evolution
Theological
Metaphysical
Scientific
The final positive stage

5. Logical positivism Vienna circle 1920’s- 1930’s
Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, A. J. Ayer
Metaphysics ( = not science):
All propositions that are neither verifiable by empirical observation nor demonstrable as analytic.
Ex.: religious and ethical statements....
Scientific method
Induction and verifiability

6. Alfred Ayer (1910-89) in his Language, Truth and Logic first published in 1936.
The first claim of logical positivists is that a statement can only be true only if either
it is a self-evident analytic, deductive truth of the kind found in mathematics and formal logic (e.g. ‘2+2=4’) or because
the statement matches reality precisely. A consequence of this was that statements had to be verifiable to be meaningful.

7. Vienna circle project
Develop an exact and unbiased language for science.
logic, mathematics.
Demarcation problem
make a clear distinction between science and metaphysics (not science)
Reductionism:
Physics, the queen of science.

8. Falsificationism Karl R. Popper 1902-1994
Criticized inductivism and verifiability:
No number of cases of “A being B” can establish that “all A being B”. All such statements remain disprovable.

9. Principle of falsifiabillity
Scientific theory can never be accorded more than a provisional acceptance.
A theory holds until it is disproved.
Falsification, not verification is the appropriate object of the observational and experimental procedures of science.
Falsifiability is a necessary part of a scientific theory.

10. Popper’s hypothetico-deductive method
Enlargements of our temporary knowledge begins with the conversions of hunches or imaginative insights into hypotheses.
Then, once the conditions for falsification have been established by the application of deductive logic, such hypotheses must be tested through sustained search for negative instances.

11. Assignment
Try to give an examples of theories which are falsifiable and not falsifiable.
What would Popper say about a theory which is not falsifiable?
Are popperianism or/and logical positivism descriptive or normative theories of science? Argue for your answer.
What does this have to do with the problem of demarcation?

12. Post-Popperian theories
Both The logical positivists and popperians did not describe reality, they were creating norms about how they thought science should be practiced for the best ( most effective ) results.
Critics by
Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend…

13. Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–96)
“Structure of the scientific revolution” (1962)
Paradigm theory
Prescience - normal science - crisis - revolution - new normal science - new crisis- revolution…
A theory based on study of history of science
Attempts to describe how science develops in reality

14. Kuhn's normal science Grand theory as a paradigm Praxis
community of scientists
social power-relations and structures in the scientific community
methodological school, exemplars
puzzling reality in terms of the grand theory by deduction
increasing anomalies lead to crisis

15. Paradigm shift
In crisis there will be ‘extraordinary science’ where there will be several competing theories
One theory will win because it will get the greatest number of supporters in the scientific community
‘Paradigm shift is an ‘irrational’ process, such as accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the ‘like’ of each paradigm

16. Kuhns wiew on scientific revolution
Not (unexpected) new results from research, rather a new perspective or interpretation of data.

17. Assignment Exemplify the following concepts: Paradigm Normal-science
Exemplars
Anomalies
Paradigm in crisis
Extraordinary science
Paradigm shift
incommensurability

18. Imre Lakatos
‘Criticism and the methodology of scientific research programs’ (1968 )
Reacts to Kuhn’s views and claims that
there does exist an objective criteria where scientists can make a rational choice between two competing theories
it is due to dishonesty that some scientists do not give up their position

19. Lakatos’ scientific research programs
Research programs are series of theories which can be viewed in two ways
a. negative heuristic that states a ‘untouchable hard core’ of hypothesis with a protective belt around it, protecting it from falsification
b. positive heuristic declaring that the core can be altered slightly in order to fit progression

20. Positive heuristic is the good one from Lakatos point of view
The development from Copernicus to Newton is his good example
Negative heuristic is the less good one
Tyco Brahes geocentric theory is Lakatos example here

21. The Lakatos view ? He revised the Popperian view after Kuhn
If the Popperian view had been practiced through history none of the progressive theories would have survived
He wanted to save the sciences from Kuhn's irrational grounds

22. Anarchy Paul Feyerabend No single correct method in science
Anything that works is fine
= epistemological anarchy

23. Social construction of science
“laboratory life” is disorganized
Scientific logic vs. availability of equipment, funds, careers etc.