Open Voting Solutions Critical Analysis 1 America’s Voting Systems Presenter: David RR Webber, CTO What Change has Occurred, What Changes are Needed?

Open Voting Solutions 2 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Agenda What Changes have Occurred? Lessons Learned Challenges and Needs Current Risks and Threats Opportunities and the Way Forward

Open Voting Solutions 3 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions What Changes have Occurred? Who drove the change? What were their objectives? How was democracy served?

Open Voting Solutions 4 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Facilitation of Change The Florida “hanging chad” election was the trigger for the introduction of computerized voting and tabulation systems HAVA – Help America Vote Act was vehicle for appropriating $4B to help States acquire computer systems EAC – Election Assistance Commission given oversight and facilitation role Result – private industry was given free rein and huge $ incentives and they took full advantage

Open Voting Solutions 5 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Changes in Voting Process Prior to computer systems adoption process was managed by citizens and appointed officials and overseen by the political parties, citizen groups and the legal process After computer systems introduction control of vote gathering and tabulation was handed over to private corporations Oversight through the EAC and State officials challenged by their lack of computer knowledge International standards not adopted

Open Voting Solutions 6 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Buying driven by expedience Objections over the impacts on democracy ignored Voter access used as blanket justification Format of EAC and funds distribution rules encouraged States to substitute haste for good practice and due diligence Blind faith in the infallibility of computer technology and lack of knowledge and experience by decision makers Fundamental failure to realize that voting is not like a cash register in a store or a banking ATM.

Open Voting Solutions 7 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions What is wrong today? Voters have no way to check how computer recorded their actual votes – seeing “inside” the computer is impossible – so voting is now an act of faith in the machine Scanners or touch screens simply do not use enough voter verification to confirm how they interpret voters intentions – and record them - the result is digital equivalent of “hanging chads” Absolutely need hand cast paper ballots to restore verification and audit trail of real voter ballots

Open Voting Solutions 8 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions What else is not there? Open public reporting of computer records Recently California SOS began publishing election results using open public record formats on the internet – no other State does this Ability for State election officials to manage the computer equipment and voting ballots configuration and election day operations – instead this is all done by paid staff of private corporations Results tabulation on election day that can be independently counted and double checked

Open Voting Solutions 9 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Resulting Situation A lot of money was spent for over priced ill conceived solutions that were poorly validated Control of the voting process is in the hands of private companies Inspection, auditing and verification of election results is deeply challenged Serious errors have occurred and false election results returned as a consequence Democracy worldwide has suffered because of American failure and inability to provide leadership

Open Voting Solutions 10 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Lessons Learned? Technology is not a solution by itself Need citizen oversight and operational transparency Means to verify each operation and results must be designed-in Voter Bill of Rights and open public standards are essential Systems become obsolete much faster than predicted Democracy needs better voting systems that can be fully trusted

Open Voting Solutions 11 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Technology alone is not the answer Unfettered use of technology does not deliver the desired solutions There is always yet another wonder solution being offered by techno-vendors – aka snake oil Simple and transparent wins over complexity, obfuscation and encryption Open public standards are demanded so that systems are interchangeable and interoperable Low costs and maintainability are essentials

Open Voting Solutions 12 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Oversight and Transparency All aspects of the system setup and use must be open and verifiable by regular appointed election staff Vigilance is needed to make sure systems operate as expected and required Systems used need to be checked both before and after election day Election results must be independently crosschecked and reported in open public recording formats

Open Voting Solutions 13 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Voter Bill of Rights There are internationally recognized standards for electronic voting processes that protect voters rights These establish the formal process from announcement of the election to completion and declaration of the results Public inspection and citizen involvement is absolutely a key inviolatable need for these processes

Open Voting Solutions 14 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Democracy needs better voting systems On every continent we look today we see countries where elections are being compromised and sham democracy enacted The results are always that citizens are living worse and unfulfilled lives Every year America pays a huge price in dealing with the effects and results of such inequities These effects include: population disease threats, terrorism, refugees, military intervention, costs of trade and goods, aid costs, and drug trafficking

Open Voting Solutions 15 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Challenges and Needs How do we create trusted solutions? Provide better access for everyone Promote more transparent democracy globally

Open Voting Solutions 16 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Creating Trusted Solutions

Open Voting Solutions 17 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Providing Voter Access Military Voters

Open Voting Solutions 18 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Promoting Transparent Democracy

Open Voting Solutions 19 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Current Risks and Threats The 14 “Swing States” are highly vulnerable to computer voting issues Repeat of winners being determined by the Courts, not the voters Weakening of position of President by questions over the result legitimacy Democratic process in America being fundamentally undermined

Open Voting Solutions 20 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions

Open Voting Solutions 21 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Opportunities and the Way Forward Providing better democratic processes Solving the technology impasse Building tools to enable more democracy worldwide Change we can believe in

Open Voting Solutions 22 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions

Open Voting Solutions 23 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Solve Technology Impasse Public Open Source –Provides peer review and validation Anonymous Recording and Counting of Voting Ballots –Technology techniques so that A) candidate information is not exposed to software inspection B) voter privacy is ensured

Open Voting Solutions 24 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions EML Transactions Summary Communicating specific result details on candidates and electionsEML result Results of election contest(s) and countsEML count Documents access to voting records and reasonEML 480 – audit log Group of votes being transferred for countingEML 460 – votes group Actual record of vote castEML 440 – cast vote Used for voter authentication during a voting processEML 420 – voter authentication Used to register voters for an electionEML 310 – voter registration Details of actual voters for an electionEML 330 – voter election list Notification to voter of an election, their eligibility and how to voteEML 340 – polling information Describes the actual ballot to be used for an electionEML 410 – ballot Contest and candidates detailsEML 230 – candidate list Used to nominate candidates or parties, consenting or withdrawingEML 210 – candidate nomination Information about an election or set of elections. It is usually used to communicate information from the election organizers EML 110 – election event PurposeDocument Name Standard record structures to hold election information, ballot details and voting records

Open Voting Solutions 25 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Example - EML 230 Candidate List OK Brad Henry John Wayne Bill Okapi Jane Smith Example of an XML formatted file

Open Voting Solutions Critical Analysis 26 Supporting the 5 Phases of an Election Ballot Preparation, Candidate & Proposal Details Voting & Accessibility Handling on Election Day Counting & Tabulating Declaration of Results Distribution and Archiving

Open Voting Solutions 27 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Concept of Operations

Open Voting Solutions Critical Analysis 28 Ballot Preparation From: The official printed paper ballot To: Computerized ballot definition

Open Voting Solutions 29 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Computerized Ballot Definition After printed paper ballot is scanned, election staff can check the scanned ballot image

Open Voting Solutions 30 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions What‘s behind the scanned ballot image? Makes definitions straightforward and intuitive process Keeps definitions anonymous and secure ……… Row / Column offsets XML Simple Columns of checkboxes for each Contest

Open Voting Solutions 31 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Defining the Contests -<EML Id="410" SchemaVersion="5.0“ - xmlns:xsi=" - xmlns:ns1="urn:oasis:names:tc:ciq:xsdschema:xNL:2.0“ - xmlns:ns2="urn:oasis:names:tc:ciq:xsdschema:xAL:2.0" - xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:evs:schema:eml"> en-US Connecticut Election Board T18:13:51.0Z State Election CT-2007-Wilton Town of Wilton State Election Officers Connecticut State Governor and Lieutenant Governor Election Details Entry Software Ballot Items Definition Output

Open Voting Solutions Critical Analysis 32 Voting Process Open Poll Procedures Vote and Scan process Accessible Voting Close Poll & Print – precinct totals

Open Voting Solutions 33 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Ballot Vote & Scanning Process Voter goes to voting station – enters selections on paper ballot Proceeds to scanner station – and scans in ballot…

Open Voting Solutions 34 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Ballot Choices Review Voter Choices Shown in Blue Summary of all selections Voter can optionally scroll with mouse device to verify whole ballot

Open Voting Solutions 35 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Summary – OpenScan Approach Empowers election authorities to control, inspect, verify, audit and manage voting systems. Dramatically lowers the cost of voting systems by using COTS hardware and free, public open source software. Adheres to open source principles and EML specifications to create transparency and verifiable elections. Creates trustworthy technology-enabled election solutions using paper ballots.

Open Voting Solutions 36 Critical Analysis Copyright © 2006/ 2007, Open Voting Solutions Useful Voting Resources OASIS EML specifications site – Open Voting Consortium site – Brookings Institute Report - Agenda for Election Reform CalTech site on ensuring voting integrity Analysis of counting irregularities in US elections MIT Study on accuracy of voting systems Verified Voting site Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) NYVV – cost analysis of ballot scanners over DREs -