1. Observation of e-enabled elections Jonathan Stonestreet Council of Europe Workshop Oslo, 18-19 March 2010

2. 3 Purpose of election observation?  Different actors: international organizations political party/candidate representatives non-partisan civil society groups  Different objectives: Determine facts; assess process against international standards; make recommendations Ensure election is in accordance with law; complaints Political participation; citizen control over elections  Common denominator Transparency

3. Definition of observation  Election observation is the ability to verify independently that electoral and other authorities respect the law and/or international standards and that claims made by the authorities are true  Election observation is a practical exercise of the principle of transparency implicit in the conduct of democratic elections  Observation ≠ certification or auditing

4. 3 OSCE Copenhagen Document 1990  (7.4) “ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, and that they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public;”  (8) “…the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process …. [The OSCE participating States] therefore invite observers from any other participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings…”  Transparency is implicit in these commitments

5. Venice Commission Code of Good Practice  Principle of Free Suffrage: - 3.2. Freedom of voters to express their wishes and action to combat electoral fraud “iv. electronic voting should be used only if it is safe and reliable; in particular, voters should be able to obtain a confirmation of their votes and to correct them, if necessary, respecting secret suffrage; the system must be transparent;” “xiii. counting must be transparent. Observers, candidates' representatives and the media must be allowed to be present. These persons must also have access to the records;”

6. 3 Council of Europe e-voting recommendation, 2004  “…only those e-voting systems which are secure, reliable, efficient, technically robust, open to independent verification and easily accessible to voters will build the public confidence which is a pre-requisite for holding e-voting…”  “i. e-voting shall respect all the principles of democratic elections and referendums. E- voting shall be as reliable and secure as democratic elections and referendums which do not involve the use of electronic means…”

7. 2004 Rec: Standards  23: “Any observers, to the extent permitted by law, shall be able to be present to observe and comment on the e-elections, including the establishing of the results.”  108: “The audit system shall provide the ability to verify that an e-election or e-referendum has complied with the applicable legal provisions, the aim being to verify that the results are an accurate representation of the authentic votes.”

8. E-voting – what can be observed?  Context of electronic voting -Background for introduction -Previous legal challenges -Access of observers -Confidence of political parties and voters

9. 2 E-voting – what can be observed?  Cycle of events and activities legal framework setting of standards/requirements certification and testing system management physical security accessibility, usability, ballot design education of voters and officials adherence to election day procedures complaints and appeals post-election audits

10. 4 Challenges to observation  There are crucial aspects of the e-voting process cannot be directly observed electronic security of the system secrecy of the electronic ballot casting, storing, and counting the electronic ballot

11. How to ensure transparency?  For transparency, evidence is needed  Access to system documentation and certification and audit reports However…..  For casting, storing and counting ballots, the system must provide proof that voter choices are respected  At present, no purely electronic solution that can “verify that the results are an accurate representation of the authentic votes” (also respecting secrecy of vote)

12. 3 Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) / Scanned Ballots  Paper record of each vote, checked by voter, which can be audited or recounted  Raises questions: when does an audit or recount take place? what happens if there is a discrepancy between the electronic and paper records? what is the legal ballot?  VVPAT not a solution to the observability problem if rarely or never audited leads to an unclear result

13. Other Issues  Open source code  Role of and accountability of vendors and election officials  Remote e-voting

14. How to facilitate observation of electronic voting?  Legal framework  Access to documentation and reports  Testing  Observer training  VVPAT and audits  Open source codes?  Transparency should be a defining principle of any electronic voting system, just as it should be in paper ballot systems

15. Questions?