The Euthyphro dilemma Michael Lacewing

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The Ontological Argument
Advertisements

© Michael Lacewing A priori knowledge Michael Lacewing
Empiricism on a priori knowledge
The ontological argument
The Euthyphro dilemma.
Descartes’ rationalism
Descartes’ cosmological argument
Descartes’ trademark argument Michael Lacewing
Rachels Chapter 4 Does Morality Depend on Religion?
Knowledge innatism Michael Lacewing
Computer Ethics PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS Chapter 1 Computer Ethics PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS Chapter 1 Hassan Ismail.
© Michael Lacewing Omnipotence and other puzzles Michael Lacewing co.uk.
Malcolm’s ontological argument Michael Lacewing
Religious Moral Theories Introduction to Philosophy Jason M. Chang.
Hume’s empiricism and metaethics
© Michael Lacewing Representative realism Michael Lacewing
Divine Might Makes Right? Divine Command Theory. As a Metaethical theory, DCT states that … ‘Good’ =df ‘approved of by God. ‘Right’ =df ‘commanded by.
Metaethics and ethical language Michael Lacewing Michael Lacewing
Descartes on Certainty (and Doubt)
Substance dualism: do Descartes’ arguments work? Michael Lacewing
Mill’s proof of utilitarianism
Descartes on scepticism
Knowledge empiricism Michael Lacewing
Concept innatism I Michael Lacewing
Prescriptivism Michael Lacewing
Two objections to non- cognitivism Michael Lacewing
Cosmological arguments from contingency Michael Lacewing
© Michael Lacewing Plato and Hume on Human Understanding Michael Lacewing
Divine attributes Michael Lacewing
© Michael Lacewing The attributes of God Michael Lacewing
© Michael Lacewing Three theories of ethics Michael Lacewing
Error theory Michael Lacewing
Does morality depend on God?
© Michael Lacewing Reason and experience Michael Lacewing
2 March.
© Michael Lacewing Doubt in Descartes’ Meditations Michael Lacewing
© Michael Lacewing Substance and Property Dualism Michael Lacewing
Functionalism and consciousness
© Michael Lacewing Conceptual schemes Michael Lacewing.
© Michael Lacewing Kant on conceptual schemes Michael Lacewing osophy.co.uk.
Ethical non-naturalism
Substance dualism Michael Lacewing
Morality in the Modern World. Where does morality come from?
Knowledge rationalism Michael Lacewing
Learning objective: To understand the objection that even if a zombie world is conceivable it may not be possible, and to evaluate how convincing this.
THEOLOGY OF THE BODY CHAPTER FIVE – TRUTH AND FREEDOM.
The zombie argument: objections Michael Lacewing
Plato’s Euthyphro. Questions to answer 1. Socrates asks Euthyphro to define piety. What is Euthyphro’s first answer? How does Socrates criticize it? 2.
Relativism, Divine Command Theory, and Particularism A closer look at some prominent views of ethical theory.
Cosmological arguments from contingency
Religious language: cognitive or non-cognitive?
Substance and Property Dualism
Michael Lacewing Ethical naturalism Michael Lacewing
Intuition and deduction thesis (rationalism)
The Ontological Argument
Religious Moralism – Divine Command Theory
Michael Lacewing Mackie’s error theory Michael Lacewing © Michael Lacewing.
O.A. so far.. Anselm – from faith, the fool, 2 part argument
Descartes’ Ontological Argument
Descartes’ ontological argument
Descartes’ trademark argument
Descartes’ conceivability argument for substance dualism
Descartes’ proof of the external world
Michael Lacewing The attributes of God Michael Lacewing © Michael Lacewing.
The zombie argument: responses
Michael Lacewing Hume and Kant Michael Lacewing © Michael Lacewing.
Kant’s objection to ontological arguments
Plato and Hume on Human Understanding
Where does morality come from?
Descartes and Hume on knowledge of the external world
Presentation transcript:

The Euthyphro dilemma Michael Lacewing

The question Can God make right be wrong, or good bad? Is morality whatever God wills it to be or is morality something independent of God?

The first lemma If morality is independent of what God wills, then God cannot make what is wrong be right –God wills what is morally right because it is right. But then, to be good, God must conform his will to something independent of himself –This places a constraint on God, and God is not omnipotent.

The second lemma If morality is whatever God wills, then if God wills what is (now) morally wrong, then what is wrong will become right –What is morally right is right because God wills it. But then, ‘God is good’ states a tautology – whatever God wills is, by definition, good. And morality is arbitrary –Why does God will what he wills?

‘God is good’ ‘God is good’ = ‘God is good to us’ –God wants what is best for us –But then what is best for us provides an independent standard for God’s goodness, so morality is independent of God. ‘God is good’ is not moral, but metaphysical, i.e. ‘God has all perfections’ –But does that entail that God is morally good? –If so, ‘God is (morally) good’ is a tautology –If not, then morality is independent of God.

Morality is arbitrary If morality is dependent of God, whatever God willed would be morally right –Killing babies? If God willed it? –There are no reasons for God to will what he does. Reply: God’s will is guided by God’s love –Objection: this makes love the standard of morality –Reply: no, God’s love – so nothing independent of God –But is God’s love arbitrary?

Properties and concepts It is not an analytic truth that God is good –‘God’ and ‘morally good’ are different concepts. However, goodness is the same property as what God wills. Compare: it is not an analytic truth that water is H 2 O –‘Water’ and ‘H 2 O’ are different concepts –But water is identical to H 2 O. Good = what God wills, not conceptually but metaphysically.

Knowledge and reality But unless we have an independent standard of goodness, we cannot claim that God’s will and what is good are the same thing. True, just as we can only judge that water is H 2 O if we have some independent idea of what water is But this doesn’t show that water is not H 2 O, So we need some reason to think that morality is what God wills but that doesn’t show that they are distinct.