1. Substance dualism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Substance and properties A substance is an entity, a thing, that does not depend on another entity for its continued existence. –It has ‘ontological independence’. Substances are what possess properties. Properties can’t exist without substances –They depend on substances to exist. Substances persist through changes in properties.

3. Substance dualism Dualism: there are two sorts of substance, mind (or soul) and matter –Minds can exist independent of bodies –Mental properties are properties of a mental substance Materialism: there is just one sort of thing, matter –Mental properties are properties of a material substance

4. Descartes’ conceivability argument I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as something that thinks and isn’t extended. I have a clear and distinct idea of body as something that is extended and does not think. –Nothing in our concepts rules out the possibility that mind and body are distinct.

5. Descartes’ conceivability argument If I have a clear and distinct thought of something, God can create it in a way that corresponds to my thought. –If God is omnipotent, God can make anything that is not self-contradictory. The concepts of mind and body are not self-contradictory. Therefore, God can create mind as something that thinks and isn’t extended and body as extended and does not think. –It is important that our concepts of mind and body are complete and exclusive. This is shown by their being clear and distinct.

6. Descartes’ conceivability argument Therefore, mind and body can exist independently of one another. –A substance is something that can exist independently. Therefore, mind and body are two distinct substances.

7. The simple version It is conceivable that mind can exist without body. Therefore, it is possible that mind can exist without body. Therefore, mind and body are distinct substances.

8. Descartes’ divisibility argument The body is extended in space; it has (literal) parts. The mind has no (literal) parts. Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals: If X and Y are the same thing, then they have the same properties –Therefore, if X and Y have different properties, they are not the same thing Therefore, mind and body are different.

9. The unity of mind and body If the mind and body are two distinct things, how are they related? –‘I (a thinking thing) am not merely in my body as a sailor is in a ship. Rather, I am closely joined to it—intermingled with it, so to speak—so that it and I form a unit.’ (Meditation VI) –How can a unit be two separate things?

10. The unity of mind and body Our bodily appetites, sensations, emotions have their origin in the body –If mind and body were not intermingled, then ‘I wouldn’t feel pain when the body was hurt but would perceive the damage in an intellectual way, like a sailor seeing that his ship needs repairs’ (p. 30). But we can exist as the things we are without them.

11. The unity of mind and body ‘it seems to me that the human mind can’t conceive the soul’s distinctness from the body and its union with the body, conceiving them very clearly and both at the same time. That is because this requires one to conceive them as one single thing and at the same time as two things, which is contradictory.’ The idea of the union between mind and body is a third ‘basic notion’ alongside the ideas of mind and body. –Is this a notion of a third type of substance, the human being?