1. Error theory Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Cognitivism v. non-cognitivism What are we doing when we make moral judgments? Cognitivism: moral judgments, e.g. ‘Murder is wrong’ –Aim to describe how the world is –Can be true or false –Express beliefs that the claim is true Non-cognitivism: moral judgments –Do not aim to describe the world –Cannot be true or false –Express attitudes towards the world

3. Mackie’s error theory Moral judgments are cognitive. However, there are no objective moral properties. Therefore, all moral judgments are false. –‘Murder is wrong’ is false –‘Murder is right’ is false

4. Epistemological ‘queerness’ If some acts had the objective property of being wrong – how would we discover this? –Intuition is no explanation –None of our usual methods of gaining knowledge work for moral knowledge (sense perception, introspection, hypothetical reasoning, conceptual analysis) Response: the same is true for mathematics or necessary truths or the existence of substance –Mackie is an empiricist – if rationalism is true, then his objection fails

5. Epistemological ‘queerness’ What is the connection between natural properties (e.g. causing pain) and moral properties (e.g. being wrong)? –We can identify the psychological facts, but not the connection to some moral ‘fact’ Moral judgments are subjective reactions –However, because this is not what they mean to express (that would be non-cognitivism), Mackie holds an error theory

6. Metaphysical ‘queerness’ Moral judgments motivate us But how can mere statements of fact be motivating? –How can there be an immediate, direct relation between some fact and our desires? –To know a truth is not enough to be motivated If moral properties exist, they would be unique –They would have ‘to-be-pursuedness’ built in!

7. Objectivity An objective claim has the following features: –It can be something we know. –It can be true or false. –Its truth is independent of what we want or choose. –It is about something mind-independent. –It is about something that is part of the ‘fabric of the world’. But these features are not equivalent. –E.g. claims about what colour something is

8. Replies to Mackie Mackie’s argument rests on moral properties being mind-independent and part of ‘the fabric of the world’ –But obviously, science won’t reveal moral values – what is meant by ‘fabric of the world’? –Psychological states exist – but they aren’t mind- independent –Could moral facts be facts about our minds?

9. Kant and Mill Whether an action is wrong depends upon whether a rational agent (us) can universalize the maxim of action –This is objectively true or false, but depends upon rationality, which is mind-dependent According to Mill, our experience gives us evidence of what is good, viz. what we desire, which is happiness –And this is why moral judgments are motivating

10. Aristotelian non-naturalism Non-naturalism claims that moral properties are objective, but they are not natural properties Moral judgments are defended by offering reasons Moral reason: a reason for someone to do something –E.g. That animals suffer is a reason for you to not eat meat. That some fact is a moral reason is a relational property

11. Moral truth Whether some fact is a reason is objectively true or false. –Epistemic reasons: Radiometric decay indicates that the some dinosaur bones are 65 million years old. This is (objectively) a reason to believe that dinosaurs lived on Earth 65 million years ago. Facts about reasons are normative facts, not natural facts.

12. Are moral reasons objective? How can something that is relational be objective? –Many facts depend on us and how we are, e.g. whether a piece of music is baroque or classical. –Aristotle: There are also facts about what we need in order to flourish. But moral reasons are relative to individuals – whether the fact that animals suffer is a reason for me not to eat meat depends on whether I care