Softwalls: Preventing Aircraft from Entering Unauthorized Airspace Adam Cataldo Prof. Edward Lee Prof. Ian Mitchell, UBC Prof. Shankar Sastry NASA JUP Sep 26, 2003 Los Angeles, CA
Outline Introduction to Softwalls Objections Control system progress Future challenges Conclusions
Introduction On-board database with “no-fly-zones” Enforce no-fly zones using on-board avionics Non-networked, non-hackable
Autonomous control Pilot Aircraft Autonomous controller
Softwalls is not autonomous control Pilot Aircraft Softwalls + bias pilot control
Relation to Unmanned Aircraft Not an unmanned strategy –pilot authority Collision avoidance
A deadly weapon? Project started September 11, 2001
Design Objectives Maximize Pilot Authority!
Unsaturated Control No-fly zone Control applied Pilot lets off controls Pilot turns away from no-fly zone Pilot tries to fly into no-fly zone
Objections Reducing pilot control is dangerous –reduces ability to respond to emergencies
There is No Emergency That Justifies Landing Here
Objections Reducing pilot control is dangerous –reduces ability to respond to emergencies There is no override –switch in the cockpit
Hardwall
Objections Reducing pilot control is dangerous –reduces ability to respond to emergencies There is no override –switch in the cockpit Localization technology could fail –GPS can be jammed
Localization Backup Inertial navigation Integrator drift limits accuracy range
Objections Reducing pilot control is dangerous –reduces ability to respond to emergencies There is no override –switch in the cockpit Localization technology could fail –GPS can be jammed Deployment could be costly –Software certification? Retrofit older aircraft?
Deployment Fly-by-wire aircraft –a software change Older aircraft –autopilot level Phase in –prioritize airports
Objections Reducing pilot control is dangerous –reduces ability to respond to emergencies There is no override –switch in the cockpit Localization technology could fail –GPS can be jammed Deployment could be costly –how to retrofit older aircraft? Complexity –software certification
Not Like Air Traffic Control Much Simpler No need for air traffic controller certification
Objections Reducing pilot control is dangerous –reduces ability to respond to emergencies There is no override –switch in the cockpit Localization technology could fail –GPS can be jammed Deployment could be costly –how to retrofit older aircraft? Deployment could take too long –software certification Fully automatic flight control is possible –throw a switch on the ground, take over plane
Potential Problems with Ground Control Human-in-the-loop delay on the ground –authorization for takeover –delay recognizing the threat Security problem on the ground –hijacking from the ground? –takeover of entire fleet at once? –coup d’etat? Requires radio communication –hackable –jammable
Here’s How It Works
Reachable Set starting at a point in the state space set of all points reachable with some control input reachable set
Backwards Reachable Set given a final point in the state space set of all states that can reach the final point for some control input backwards reachable set
Backwards Reachable Set No-fly zone Backwards reachable set Safe States States that can reach the no-fly zone when control is applied Can prevent aircraft from entering no-fly zone
Implicit Surface Functions No-fly zone implicit surface function for no-fly zone Backwards Reachable Set implicit surface function for backwards reachable set
Analytic Solution Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDE no-fly zone implicit surface function dynamics backwards reachable set implicit surface function Tomlin, Lygeros, Sastry v
Control from Implicit Surface Function Backwards Reachable Set Safe States Control at boundary Control decreases to zero
Numerical Solution Mitchell states computations & storage
Assumptions for Verification The pilot and control inputs could be any bounded, measurable functions
In Fly-By-Wire Aircraft The pilot and control inputs will be piecewise constant, bounded functions which can change only every T milliseconds T
Fly-By-Wire Aircraft How do we verify this?
In the News ABC News NPR Market Place CBC As It Happens Slashdot Reuters…
Conclusions Embedded control system challenge Control theory identified Future challenges identified
Acknowledgements Xiaojun Liu Steve Neuendorffer Claire Tomlin
Backup Discrete-Time Modified HJI PDE