A Framework to Implement a National Cyber Security Structure for Developing Nations ID Ellefsen - SH von Solms - Academy for Information Technology University of Johannesburg

Outline Introduction Critical Information Infrastructure Protection – Background Protection Structures CSIRTs C-SAWs CIIP Framework for Developing Nations Challenges Two-Factor Development Role of the CSIRT and C-SAW Stages of Development Initial, Intermediate, Mature Timeline Conclusions SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 2

Introduction I With the growth of the Internet in developing countries there is a need to develop CIIP solutions Growth of Internet facilities effects all levels of society: Cost of connection Speed of connections Number of users SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 3 Table: Showing various cable systems that are becoming operational since 2009

Introduction II Developing nations are finding themselves on the receiving end of massive improvements in bandwidth They do not have structures in place to deal with the effects of increasing bandwidth Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks SPAM Phishing Malware Increasing size of the user-base. Users are unaware of how to deal with these new threats. Companies and Governments might not be aware of the possible threats to their systems. SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 4

Critical Information Infrastructure Protection - Background The internal structures that countries have in place to prevent attacks on their information infrastructures. Many systems are now making use of Internet technologies Critical Systems (Power, Water, Telecommunications, etc.) Economic Systems (Stock Exchanges, Reserve Banks, Financial Institutions, etc.) eServices (Tolling Systems, Online Booking Systems, etc.) If any of these systems were to be attacked via the Internet it would have serious implications. All countries need to create structures to handle possible cyber attacks. For often historic reasons, developing nations often have unique challenges that must be addressed in the development of these structures. SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 5

Protection Structures The structures counties create to handle cyber security incidents. Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) Well-understood platform Operates within a constituency of users Encapsulates the expertise to responding to computer security incidents “Top-Down” by design – implemented at a governmental level. Unique for a particular environment Computer Security, Advisory and Warning (C-SAW) Team Part of continuing research Smaller in scale to that of a CSIRT Operates within a community of related members Focuses the computer security expertise of the community “Bottom-Up” by design Interfaces with the community and a larger CSIRT SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 6

A CIIP Framework for Developing Nations Developing nations must deploy these structures quickly They must be customised for their environment Structures in Developed Countries have evolved over the past 20 years Grown and developed with the development of technology Developing countries have unique challenges Directly importing an existing structure will not effectively address these challenges Development of a unique structure for a unique environment Heavily influenced by social problems SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 7

Specific Challenges Significantly faster development of information infrastructures. High-levels of “cyber security illiteracy”. A high number of users utilising mobile technologies. A demand to adopt and provision eServices. Inadequate legislation addressing cyber security. Inadequate policy documentation addressing cyber security. SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 8

Two-Factor CIIP Development SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 9 Approach the development of a holistic cyber security structure on two fronts: Top-Down Large entities Direct coordination from CSIRT Bottom-up Smaller entities Interaction with C-SAW teams Two structures are developed concurrently Resulting in a comprehensive final structure

Role of the CSIRT To provide high-level coordination Bridge between government and the national computer security structure Focused on large roleplayers: Governmental Entities Departments, Military, etc. Large Commercial Entities Financial Institutions Telecommunications Manufacturing, etc. Large Academic Entities National Research Organisations Large Tertiary Academic Institutions All of these roleplayer have: Established computer facilities Consume large amounts of bandwidth High number of users SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 10

Role of the C-SAW To provide “low-level” coordination Bridge between small roleplayers and the national computer security structure Focused on small roleplayers: Small Academic Entities Primary and Secondary Schools, etc. Small Commercial Entities Small and Medium Enterprises Individuals The “man-on-the-street” All of these roleplayers have: Limited computer facilities Consume “small” amounts of bandwidth Relatively little collective knowledge of computer security threats SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 11

Stages of Development (Framework) A high-level structure should developed in three stages: Initial Stage Intermediate Stage Mature Stage Each stages consists of a number of goals that must be achieved Each goal allows the resulting national computer security structure to develop incrementally Each the actual length of each stage would depend on the environment Ideally would allow for rapid deployment of a national computer security structure on two fronts: Top-down Bottom-up SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 12

Initial Stage Concerned with initial assessments and environmental reports The deployment environment must be evaluated and the following taken into consideration: The Deployment Environment Critical systems Stakeholders Legislation Expertise The Legal Environment Current Legislation Required amendments Technological Environment Current and future technologies International Partners Finally, small-scale test deployments should be done to practically evaluate the environment SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 13

Intermediate Stage Primarily concerned with the development of the national structures, CSIRT is formally created A number of C-SAW Teams are deployed Communities and Constituencies are established Relationships are solidified: International Local CSIRTs and C-SAWs should focus on awareness: The national computer security structure Computer security in general The development can follow directly from the initial phase. Build on from the small-scale structure SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 14

Mature Stage The mature stages indicates a fully functioning and operations national computer security structure Does not signify complete protection of critical information infrastructure The structure is able to operate on a day-to-day basis and is able to respond to incidents There must be on-going development There must be on-going awareness campaigns New services that can be offered by the national computer security structure can be identified Education campaigns to expand local expertise. SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 15

Timeline Ideally the development of a national computer security structure to happen quickly Deployment time will vary Commitment from all roleplayers is needed in order for the development to be successful. Idealised timeline (3 years) – assuming all preparation been done Initial Phase: 8 months Intermediate Phase: 1 ½ to 2 years Mature Phase (development): 1 year SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 16

Framework Timeline SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 17

Conclusions Developing counties must deploy national computer security structure There are many unique challenges that developing nations face In light of this, importing an existing structure or framework will not adequately address these challenges Two-factor development: Top-down: focused on the development of a CSIRT structure Bottom-up: focused on the development of a C-SAW structure Concurrent development to promote the rapid development of a comprehensive, holistic, structure. Questions? SACSAW '11 - ID Ellefsen & SH von Solms - University of Johannesburg 18