VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Security, Paper Trails, Accountability Michael I. Shamos, Ph.D., J.D. Institute.

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Presentation transcript:

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Security, Paper Trails, Accountability Michael I. Shamos, Ph.D., J.D. Institute for Software Research International Carnegie Mellon University

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Outline My role: performing state certifications in –Pennsylvania ( , ) –Texas ( ) >110 systems examined Certification is a test for compliance with state law Not intended to substitute for federal qualification

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Testing Is Inadequate At All Levels Too many systems pass ITA qualification but shouldn’t State certifications can’t replace ITAs – too brief, too cheap Required pre- and post-election testing is often not performed Acceptance testing is not revealing unreliable machines About 10% of DREs fail on Election Day – way too high

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS ITA Testing In Pennsylvania, ITA qualification is required by law BUT: over 50% of systems fail state certification, about 25% for reasons particular to PA This has been true for 25 years The ITA system did not improve the pass rate Most of the failures are glaring and apparent within 30 minutes, e.g. failure to tabulate properly What are the ITAs doing? I don’t know and I can’t find out

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS The Fix No more business as usual Full transparency, reports made public No vendor choice of ITA; no vendor payment of ITA Require vendors to publish bug lists Failed systems reported, not just passed systems Fix the standards faster –Don’t need a full new set right away –Requirements can be added incrementally

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Source Code All voting system software should be disclosed to the public Despite vendor trade secret claims Escrow doesn’t work Pennsylvania requires source code to be submitted to the examiner. Likewise, FL, GA, MN, NC California requires open (disclosed) source for verification mechanisms effective July 1, 2006

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS VVPATs I’m not against VVPATs Should not be required until effectively engineered systems are available that comply with law None currently do Discrepancy between paper and electronic record, neither should automatically govern

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS VVPATs V V PAT SYSTEMS CONTINUOUS ROLL CUT SHEET VIEW-ONLY VOTER-HANDLED DEPOSIT (e.g. AccuPoll) TAKE-HOME (e.g. VoteHere) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Sequoia) NO INDICIA (e.g. Diebold) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Avante) NO INDICIA

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS VVPATs V V PAT SYSTEMS CONTINUOUS ROLL CUT SHEET VIEW-ONLY VOTER-HANDLED DEPOSIT (e.g. AccuPoll) TAKE-HOME (e.g. VoteHere) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Sequoia) NO INDICIA (e.g. Diebold) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Avante) NO INDICIA COMPLETE VIOLATION OF VOTER PRIVACY

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS VVPATs V V PAT SYSTEMS CONTINUOUS ROLL CUT SHEET VIEW-ONLY VOTER-HANDLED DEPOSIT (e.g. AccuPoll) TAKE-HOME (e.g. VoteHere) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Sequoia) NO INDICIA (e.g. Diebold) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Avante) NO INDICIA

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS VVPATs V V PAT SYSTEMS CONTINUOUS ROLL CUT SHEET VIEW-ONLY VOTER-HANDLED DEPOSIT (e.g. AccuPoll) TAKE-HOME (e.g. VoteHere) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Sequoia) NO INDICIA (e.g. Diebold) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Avante) NO INDICIA NOT VOTER-VERIFIABLE

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS VVPATs V V PAT SYSTEMS CONTINUOUS ROLL CUT SHEET VIEW-ONLY VOTER-HANDLED DEPOSIT (e.g. AccuPoll) TAKE-HOME (e.g. VoteHere) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Sequoia) NO INDICIA (e.g. Diebold) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Avante) NO INDICIA

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS VVPATs V V PAT SYSTEMS CONTINUOUS ROLL CUT SHEET VIEW-ONLY VOTER-HANDLED DEPOSIT (e.g. AccuPoll) TAKE-HOME (e.g. VoteHere) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Sequoia) NO INDICIA (e.g. Diebold) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Avante) NO INDICIA CAN BE USED AS PROOF OF VOTE

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS VVPATs V V PAT SYSTEMS CONTINUOUS ROLL CUT SHEET VIEW-ONLY VOTER-HANDLED DEPOSIT (e.g. AccuPoll) TAKE-HOME (e.g. VoteHere) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Sequoia) NO INDICIA (e.g. Diebold) CRYPTO INDICIA (e.g. Avante) NO INDICIA

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS VVPAT No continuous rolls No thermal paper! No crypto indicia, barcodes, etc. that can be used to invalidate ballot No identifying strings (e.g. pointer to electronic record) No fiddling with the voter’s choices No reversing the VVPAT tape No walking out with the VVPAT (except take-home systems)

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Wireless There is no legitimate use of wireless communications in voting systems One manufacturer uses RFID for no reason except its parent company manufactures RFIDs Wireless is proposed for accessible headsets. Why? Forbid cellphones The draft standards should be revised to forbid wireless

VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING SUMMIT NOV. 29, 2005 COPYRIGHT © 2005 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Q A &