1. Electronic Voting Linh Nguyen

2. Electronic Voting  Voting Technologies  The Florida 2000 Election  Direct Recording Electronic Devices (DREs)‏ - Diebold Touch-Voting  Security and Ethical Issues  The Future of Voting Linh Nguyen

3. Voting Technologies Electronic Voting Punch Card Optical Scan Paper Ballot Lever Machine Linh Nguyen

4. Paper Ballots Oldest voting technology Oldest voting technology Voters record their choice by placing a mark in a box next to the candidate’s name Voters record their choice by placing a mark in a box next to the candidate’s name Ballots are dropped into a sealed ballot box Ballots are dropped into a sealed ballot box Votes are counted manually Votes are counted manually Widely used today in rural areas Widely used today in rural areas Linh Nguyen

5. Direct Recording Electronic Devices (DREs)‏ Electronic versions of the lever machines Electronic versions of the lever machines Different interfaces: Different interfaces: push button, touch screen, key pads Full-faced or paginated ballot designs Full-faced or paginated ballot designs Voters record their choices by pushing a button or touching the screen next to the candidate’s name or issue Voters record their choices by pushing a button or touching the screen next to the candidate’s name or issue Not possible to vote twice for the same office Not possible to vote twice for the same office Linh Nguyen

6. The Florida 2000 Election Controversies and discriminations  Controversies There were a number of overseas ballots missing postmarks or filled out in such a way that they were invalid under Florida lawThere were a number of overseas ballots missing postmarks or filled out in such a way that they were invalid under Florida law Some 179,855 ballots were not counted in the official tallySome 179,855 ballots were not counted in the official tally 57,700 voters were incorrectly listed as felons on a “scrub list” and their votes were not counted.57,700 voters were incorrectly listed as felons on a “scrub list” and their votes were not counted. One Florida count’s hard-to-use ballot may have unfairly decided the presidency.One Florida count’s hard-to-use ballot may have unfairly decided the presidency.  Discriminations  the African Americans voter against the vote stealers Black people turned the presidential vote but it was stolen Black people turned the presidential vote but it was stolen Many African Americans did not cast ballots Many African Americans did not cast ballots Linh Nguyen

7. The outcomes before and after the recount The outcomes before and after the recount  Before the recount, the votes for President in FLORIDA as follows : Bush: 2,909,176 Gore: 2,907,451 Margin: 1,725 votes in Bush’s favor  After the recount, the votes for President in FLORIDA as follows: Bush: 2,912,790 Gore: 2,912,253 Bush wins Florida by 537 votes George W. Bush, thus, wins all 25 of Florida's Electoral Votes and the presidency with the result Tung Le 50,996,11648.8%21266GORE 50,456,16948.8%30271 BUSH VotesVote %States WonElectoral VotesPRESIDENT

8. IEEE Standardization Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers  Responsible for many of the internet protocols in use today Discussion stymied by political maneuvers  Conflicts between pro-security and pro-industry groups  Whether voting software is stored on read-only media  Whether electronic voting should produce a verifiable paper trail  Systematic disenfranchisement of pro-security group  Misinformation about voting privileges  Prevention of admission of new members before key votes  Proposals from pro-security group often ignored Linh Nguyen

9. Diebold Touch-Voting The design goals The design goals  To create a and voting system that is to the entire voting population correctsecureaccessible Linh Nguyen

10. Diebold Touch-Voting Implementation  Proprietary Software  Inherited code from Global Election Systems, formerly I-Mark Systems, which it acquired in September, 2001  Interface Hardware  AccuVote-TS touch-screen terminal  “Smart” voter access card reader  Accessible Design  Simple touch-screen interface  Multi-language  Voice-directed for the blind or illiterate  Third-party OS  Windows CE platform Linh Nguyen

11. Diebold Touch-Voting Analysis of Source Code “Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts” – “Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts” – Analysis of an Electronic Voting System  Unauthorized privilege escalation  Incorrect use of cryptography  Vulnerabilities to network threats  Poor software development processes  No assurance that the output is correct Linh Nguyen

12. Future of Voting Ethics  Software used by an electronic voting system manufactured by Sequoia Voting Systems has been left unprotected on a publicly available server, which raised people concern about the possibility of tampering. The software, made available at ftp.jaguar.net, is stored on an FTP server owned by Jaguar Computer Systems, a firm that provides election support to a California county.  Company like Diebold Election Systems aware of security flaws in its e-voting software for years but sold the faulty systems to states anyway. Linh Nguyen

13. Future of Voting Empowerment or Disappointment?  Voter confidence in current system waning  IEEE standardization efforts stalled  Foremost electronic voting software maker below par Linh Nguyen

14. Thank You