1. eVoting
23 October 2006

2. What is included in e-voting
Range of Systems
Optically scanned paper
Touch screen systems
Internet voting
All Processes (what is the weakest link?)
Registration
Ballot design
Voting
Counting of votes
Recounts

3. Major concerns raised Correctness Certification process Digital divide
System set up
Auditing (recounts)
Accessibility
Internet vulnerability

4. Correctness Should code be open source? Corruption
What is open source?
Belief that more eyes are valuable
Easier to hack
Corruption
Vulnerability – improved by open source
Checking for errors that hackers can exploit
Malicious changes – primarily a concern of which version is running

5. Certification process
More than 40 states require certification
But what does it mean?
Need to guarantee certification of last minute fixes or changes – not always possible
Both California and Indiana found themselves using uncertified code

6. A New Literacy Test? Intimidation Difficulty executing
California recall
Less than 1% missed (under voted) for yes/no
But nearly 10% under voted in the candidate selection

7. System Set Up Lack of local technical skills
Large number of local polling stations
Short set up time

8. Auditability vs. Privacy
Storing the full record means that someone could get at the information
Acceptable in England
Secret Ballot Act of 1872
Requires that each ballot be tied to the voter
Records held as a state secret

9. Auditing (recounts) Voter Verified Audit Trail Used for Problems
Print a copy
Voter verifies
Puts it into a ballot box
Used for
Routine audits (random)
Recounts
Problems
Cost: Australia opted out
Training

10. Why do an audit?
If you can only identify a problem, what is the remedy?
If audit can also produce the corrected results, more valuable

11. Broward County, Florida
special election to fill a state House seat
victor won by only 12 votes
137 of the electronic ballots were blank
Florida law requires a manual recount
but no paper ballots
recount isn't possible

12. Are there other options?
Code can be verified against manipulating
Example: encryption within the system
But, needs to get into the system
User interface is the vulnerable spot
Assuming no program errors, can we be sure that people will read a screen version correctly if they made a voting mistake?
Depends …
Primarily on the quality of the ballot design

13. Partial Solutions Turnout: separate track of how many people voted
Number of votes cast should match
Need to count abstentions
Need to track people who quit in the middle
Does not help to determine if the vote went to the right person

14. Accessibility
Florida ban on plastic templates with holes for use by the visually impaired because NOT CERTIFIED
How do you address this problem without compromising privacy?
How is it done today?
Generally, advocates for the visually impaired prefer electronic voting
Techniques to support them, primarily audio
What about the paper audit trail?

15. New Mexico last year
Only two voting machines certified by the federal government for disabled and non- English speaking
Neither measures up to state law that requires voter-verified paper record
Upgrade would require $1000/machine