Bargaining in the Shadow of Power Dangerous Dyads Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

Part I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction A. Why do some pairs of states have dramatically different relationships? Conflict Hostile statements Hostile nonviolent actions Use, threat, display of force War Positive statements Diplomatic recognition Intercultural exchanges Alliances Trade Aid Vs.

B. Example: Six Dyad-Years US-Iraq 1987: US forgives Iraqi attack on USS Stark, aids Iraq US-Iran 1987: US destroys Iranian oil platforms, ships Iran-Iraq 1987: Bloody war continues

B. Example: Six Dyad-Years US-Iraq 2003: War US-Iran 2003: No War Iran-Iraq 2003: No War Why the differences? No single state has become more or less warlike….but the dyads have!

C. Forms of Cooperation Between Cooperation and Conflict: Bargaining Formal Bargaining: Treaties, etc. Tacit Bargaining: Reciprocal Action Arbitration: Third-party resolution Mediation: Third-party support

2. Alliances: Only 25% reliable at first glance…. War occurs… Allied Not Allied Intervene, YES 25% 2% Intervene, NO 75% 98%

From Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000):

…but examining the fine print reveals a different story!

3. Behavior: Convergence Example: Mutual Tariff Reduction

D. Forms of Conflict War – Standard definition is 1000 battle-deaths Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) – use, threat, or display of force

E. Are Conflict and Cooperation Opposites? 1. The Continuum View

2. High-Conflict Events

3. High-Cooperation Events Are these mutually exclusive with the conflict list?

3. Sometimes Conflict and Cooperation Co-Exist

Part II. The Spiral to War Interaction Salience Issues Conflict- Producing Factors Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Outcomes A Model of Dyadic Interaction

Part II. The Spiral to War Conflict- Producing Factors Interaction Salience Issues Bargaining Conflict Cooperation A Model of Dyadic Interaction

A. Political Relevance Interaction Ability to communicate Ability to act

c. Measures of Interaction Contiguity – Countries that border each other (or narrow body of water) (Countries surrounded by blue are contiguous to Red) 

Interaction ii. Major power status State-level finding: Major powers do more of everything – conflict and cooperation Result = Dyadic effect: If at least one dyad member is major power, increased levels of cooperation and conflict

iii. Politically-Relevant International Environments (PRIE), 1816-2001 Criteria Dyad-Years % of Dyad-Years % of Wars % of MIDs All Dyads 675,015 100% Land Contiguity 19,723 2.9% 65.9% 50.3% Land/Sea Contiguity 32,881 4.9% 75.8% 63.7% Either is major power 71,770 10.6% 51.6% 45.8% PRIE (Any of these) 86,393 12.8% 94.5% 85.2%

A. Political Relevance Issue Salience Interaction Salience Issues A. Political Relevance Issue Salience Priority relative to other concerns Determines amount of power applied Low salience = inaction

B. What leads to dyadic conflict? Producing Factors B. What leads to dyadic conflict?

1. Opportunity: Contiguity and Proximity Conflict- Producing Factors

Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient Conflict- Producing Factors Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient Wealthy/Advanced State Poor State Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distance Shift in gradient due to technology or development

2. Dyadic Balance of Power Conflict- Producing Factors 2. Dyadic Balance of Power a. Disparity = Peace b. Parity = War Risk

c. Transitions: Dangerous? Conflict- Producing Factors c. Transitions: Dangerous?

Conflict- Producing Factors 3. Issue Type: Territory

4. Rivalry: Shadow of the Past Conflict- Producing Factors 4. Rivalry: Shadow of the Past Repeated disputes  Future disputes Easier for diversionary war

c. Question: Is rivalry the cause of conflict? Producing Factors c. Question: Is rivalry the cause of conflict? Rivals fight more wars – or do states likely to fight become rivals? Repeated crises  Use of more aggressive bargaining strategies Rivals use more forceful strategies – against non-rivals!

iv. Rivals Learn Over Time

5. Arms Races Rivalry + Arms Race = Risk of War? Conflict- Producing Factors 5. Arms Races Rivalry + Arms Race = Risk of War? Most arms races difficult to demonstrate:

Can You Pick Out the 3 Arms Races? Canada-Mexico US-USSR Israel-Syria Belgium-Netherlands Australia-NZ India-Pakistan

Part III. Pathways to Peace Interaction Salience Issues Conflict- Producing Factors Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Outcomes A Model of Dyadic Interaction

Part III. Pathways to Peace Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Producing Factors A Model of Dyadic Interaction

A. What Leads to Cooperation? Producing Factors A. What Leads to Cooperation?

1. Joint Democracy Effects of Joint Democracy: Cooperation- Producing Factors 1. Joint Democracy Effects of Joint Democracy: The “Democratic Peace:” Virtually no wars between democracies Alleged Exceptions: US-UK 1812 (UK not democracy), UK-Germany WW1 (Germany not democracy), Finland-UK WW2 (no real combat), Peru-Ecuador (few casualties), India-Pakistan (civilians left out of the loop) Fewer MIDs (1/3 to 2/3 reduction) Shift to covert from overt when force is used MIDs less likely to escalate to higher levels of violence Increased reliance on mediation, arbitration Increased common interests (alliances, UN votes, IOs, etc) Increased Trade – Why should this be?

Cooperation- Producing Factors v. Formal Agreements

b. Institutional Explanation Cooperation- Producing Factors b. Institutional Explanation

Cooperation- Producing Factors c. Norms Explanation

2. Shared Interests Power Transition Theory: Cooperation- Producing Factors 2. Shared Interests Power Transition Theory: Mutual Satisfaction = Peace Side A Side B Outcome Satisfied Peace Dissatisfied Conflict Peace or Intense Conflict

Evidence for Peace Through Shared Interests Cooperation- Producing Factors Evidence for Peace Through Shared Interests Alliance portfolios: Similarity generally reduces conflict Better predictor than dyadic alliance! UN Votes: Similar votes = closer economic ties

3. Similar Institutions 4. Advanced Economies Cooperation- Producing Factors 3. Similar Institutions Even after controlling for democracy / autocracy, similar government mechanisms (executive-legislative relations, etc) increase cooperation / reduce conflict. 4. Advanced Economies Joint advanced economies trade, cooperate, ally more / fight less with each other than other dyads

5. Economic Interdependence Cooperation- Producing Factors 5. Economic Interdependence Mutual gains from trade Short explanation: Trade is voluntary Absolute and Comparative Advantage

Absolute Advantage USA Colombia Missiles OR 20 5 Coffee 10 200 Given 100 resources, what can each country produce? 200 20 Missiles Coffee 10 100 Production possibilities without trade Trade allows specialization. US buys Coffee at < 10 resources. Colombia buys Missiles at < 20 resources. Example: Coffee = 1, Missiles = 10. US trades 5 missiles (50 resources) for 50 coffee (50 resources) Result: Both sides can achieve levels of consumption outside of the original production possibilities!

Comparative Advantage USA Britain Wheat OR 100 20 Cars 10 5 Given 100 resources, what can each country produce? US has absolute advantage in both goods – 5 to 1 in wheat, 2 to 1 in cars -- so has comparative advantage (bigger relative advantage) in wheat UK has comparative advantage (smaller relative disadvantage) in cars (½ as productive rather than 20% as productive) UK buys wheat at < 5 resources, US buys cars at < 10 resources Example: Wheat = 1.5, Cars = 9. US sells 24 wheat (36 resources), buys 4 cars (36 resources) 50 10 100 Wheat Cars 5

5. Economic Interdependence Cooperation- Producing Factors 5. Economic Interdependence Mutual gains from trade Short explanation: Trade is voluntary Absolute and Comparative Advantage Reinforces democratic peace:

5. Economic Interdependence Cooperation- Producing Factors 5. Economic Interdependence Mutual gains from trade Short explanation: Trade is voluntary Absolute and Comparative Advantage Reinforces democratic peace Allies trade more than enemies…but sometimes trade continues during war!

Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes Interaction Salience Issues Conflict- Producing Factors Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Outcomes A Model of Dyadic Interaction

Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes Bargaining Conflict Cooperation A Model of Dyadic Interaction

A. The Logic of Game Theory Bargaining Conflict Cooperation A. The Logic of Game Theory 1. Game theory = formal way to represent strategic interaction

2. Assumptions of Game Theory Bargaining Conflict Cooperation 2. Assumptions of Game Theory Rational choice, unrestricted preferences Connected preferences – Some outcomes preferred over others by the player (subjective utility) Transitive preferences – If a player prefers outcome A to outcome B, and also prefers outcome B to outcome C, then the player must prefer outcome A to outcome C. Choice – Pick the option believed to lead to preferred outcome

Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Bargaining Conflict Cooperation b. Elements of a game Players – In IR, this means states Strategies – The choices players have Outcomes – The results of the players’ choices Payoffs – How much each player values each Outcome Player 2 Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B Outcome 1 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Outcome 2 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Outcome 3 Outcome 4

c. Where do payoffs come from? Bargaining Conflict Cooperation c. Where do payoffs come from? Realism: Power and security (relative gains concerns) Liberalism: “There’s no accounting for taste” – but money often used (emphasis on absolute gains) Radicalism: Distribution of wealth (relative economic gains) key Constructivism: Skeptical of rationalism, but payoffs socially constructed, just like the game.

3. Making Predictions: Solving a Game Bargaining Conflict Cooperation 3. Making Predictions: Solving a Game Goal = Find an equilibrium (stable behavior, unlikely to change without change in conditions) Basic tool = Nash Equilibrium  Neither player could do any better by unilaterally changing its strategy choice How to solve a simple 2x2 game  Player 2 Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B 2,3 3,4 0,0 4,2

c. Limitation: No Equilibrium Bargaining Conflict Cooperation c. Limitation: No Equilibrium Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium. Prediction = no stable pure strategy, stability only results from “mixing” strategies (probabilistic prediction) Example: Player 2 Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B 2,3 3,4 0,5 4,2

d. Limitation: Multiple Equilibria Bargaining Conflict Cooperation d. Limitation: Multiple Equilibria Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria. Prediction = either equilibrium can result Example: Player 2 Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B 2,5 3,4 0,4 4,5

Misdemeanor, Misdemeanor Bargaining Conflict Cooperation 4. Games Nations Play Prisoners’ Dilemma: Used to model “Security Dilemmas” -- Efforts to increase own security make others less secure (arms races, etc.) Both players end up worse, even though each plays rationally! Player 2 Player 1 Remain Silent Confess Misdemeanor, Misdemeanor Life, Walk Free Walk Free, Life Felony, Felony

4. Games Nations Play Bargaining Conflict Cooperation b. Chicken Equilibria: Someone swerves – but who? Used to model nuclear crises Credible commitment – throw away the steering wheel! Player 2 Player 1 Swerve Drive Straight Status Quo, Status Quo Wimp, Cool Cool, Wimp DEAD, DEAD

4. Games Nations Play Bargaining Conflict Cooperation c. “Battle of the Sexes” Equilibria: Both do better than nothing, but someone benefits more Used to model environmental cooperation, border demarcation, etc. Incentive to deceive – Convince other player you would prefer no agreement to getting your way Player 2 Player 1 Tearjerker Action 2, 1 0,0 1, 2

5. Is There Hope for Cooperation in a Rationalist World? Bargaining Conflict Cooperation 5. Is There Hope for Cooperation in a Rationalist World? Realists and some Radicals argue that Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) represents the international system  “Tragedy of (Great Power) Politics” or “class war” i. BUT: Tournament of Strategies showed that when playing repeated PD the best strategy is not “Always Defect” – it’s “Tit-for-Tat!” ii. Tit-for-Tat = Cooperate, then Reciprocate: Allows cooperation even in the most hostile circumstances BUT also risks escalation Liberalism argues that few interactions are true PDs and that those that are should be approached with TFT Social Constructivism argues that people create these structures, so they can transform them

6. Conclusions from Game Theory Bargaining Conflict Cooperation 6. Conclusions from Game Theory Anarchy need not  war. Cooperation can evolve even in a world full of PD players! Institutions and “tying hands” can allow credible commitment, allowing cooperation. Cooperative “win-win” strategies (maximize joint payoffs) include: Commit to silence in PD (join a gang that punishes squealers) Commit to “no play” in Chicken Commit to take turns in Battle of the Sexes, PD, or Chicken

7.Weaknesses of Game Theory Bargaining Conflict Cooperation 7.Weaknesses of Game Theory Does not independently account for preferences – intuition and other theories do a lot of “work” for game theory Realistic games tend to have an infinite number of possible Nash Equilibria  limitations on predictive power Assumes structure of game is “fixed” Assumes common knowledge of rationality – may be problematic (Princess Bride)

B. Empirical Outcomes of Dyadic Bargaining Who gets more? More power Cost Tolerance: Willing to take losses Salience ● Power predicts better than Power alone “Tied Hands” and Costly Signals: Ability to convince opponent that further concessions are impossible / unacceptable Will bargaining fail? Zones of Agreement: Area of mutually acceptable outcomes (better than no agreement – which often means war -- for both sides) Expected costs of failure: What happens if there is no agreement? “Shadow of the Future” – Bargaining over future bargaining power (i.e. territory) is most difficult

Outcomes C. Outcomes of Conflict Economic conflict (tariffs)  increased political conflict (and vice versa) Dyadic war is rare and getting rarer: 197 sovereign states  19,306 dyads. Formula = [n(n-1)]/2 Nearly 1 million “dyad-years” over the past two centuries Less than 1 war per 1,000 opportunities since 1816. 2004-2012 = only 1 interstate war-year out of more than 150,000 dyad-years (Russia vs. Georgia)

c. Who Wins Wars? Outcomes Total victory uncommon (2/3 end by negotiation) 59% of wars won by initially stronger side -- BUT: initiators of wars victorious 68% of the time, yet only stronger 59% of the time Implication: “Which side started it?” better predicts victory than military power, though advantage declines over time Extension: Democracies win more often, though advantage declines over time (they lose long wars)

3. Outcomes of Cooperation Some evidence that political cooperation  economic cooperation (US/USSR) Mediation and Arbitration appear unreliable BUT selection bias probably responsible (they get the tough cases) Foreign aid  increases dyadic trade gains  increased interdependence

Review: Back to the Model Interaction Salience Issues Conflict- Producing Factors Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Outcomes

Part V: Deterrence – or Destruction? Will nuclear weapons save us from war?

A. Historical Background Melians: It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves? Athenians: To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation. Melians: But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you? Athenians: No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness. Ancient Greece: The Melian Dialogue “The strong do what they will and the weak do what they must.” Athens demands submission by Melians, even though Melos is insignificant Why fight a war over something so small?

2. Masada Jewish revolt against Rome Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada

b. Masada Jewish revolt against Rome Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada Rome imports 15,000 laborers from around empire, spends a year building ramp Why?

3. 1919-1938: Intra-War Deterrence Fails Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war  destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries  panic and social collapse 1922, 1932-4: Attempts to ban bombers Despite fear of bombers, Britain actually initiated city warfare in World War II! Deterrence failed… Mass killing / city destruction generally didn’t have the expected effect on civilian morale

B. Nuclear Deterrence Strategies Massive Retaliation: Depended on atomic superiority Mutually-Assured Destruction: “Tripwires” Flexible Response: Credibility at every level Proportional Deterrence: Enter the French…. Warfighting: Soviet and US Hard-liners’ doctrine

C. Requirements Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

No [adequate] attention has been paid to a proposal, extremely important from the military and political point of view, to create a fully automated retaliatory strike system that would be activated from the top command levels in a moment of a crisis. -- Soviet Central Committee, 1985

The “Dead Hand” System: Underground command post If communications fail AND nuclear explosions detected by sensors… Rocket is launched with internal radio Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to Soviet ICBMs Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will annihilate the USA Problem: They didn’t TELL us about it!

Iraq Invades Kuwait, 1990 All evidence suggests that Saddam did not expect opposition from the US – misinterpreted generic statement that US doesn’t take a position on the border disputes of other nations as permission to invade

C. Requirements Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

Examples: US Nuclear Threats Year Issue Threat US Nuclear Position Result 1945 Iran Truman: “We're going to drop it on you.” Monopoly USSR Withdraws 1955 Quemoy/ Matsu Eisenhower: “Atomic bombs can be used... as you would use a bullet.” Dominance PRC ceases shelling 1961 Berlin Kennedy: “One chance in five of a nuclear exchange” Superiority Draw – USSR builds Wall 1969 Vietnam Kissinger: “USA will take measures of the gravest consequence.” Advantage No Effect

C. Requirements Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

Sanctions on the PRC US Demand: Stop anti-democracy crackdown (i.e. Don’t preserve Communist government authority) Sanctions: Ban on arms sales Ban on direct high-level military contacts Ban on some government financing suspension of export licenses for satellites contracted to be launched in China suspension of export licenses for crime control and detection instruments and equipment denial of export licenses for any goods or technology used in nuclear production, if the President finds that such products could be diverted to the research or development of a nuclear explosive device Outcome: China ignores sanctions, most of which are lifted within a year or two

Iraq Violates the Geneva Protocol, 1982-1983 Iran-Iraq war is intense and bloody Iraq begins using tear gas, then blister agents, then nerve gas West is silent because Iran is considered the greater threat Iran retaliates, but lacked enough chemical weapons to do serious damage

C. Requirements Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

D. Types of Deterrence General Deterrence: You won’t dare attack me because you know I’m armed and ready Immediate Deterrence: I’m warning you right now – attack and I’ll shoot! Extended Deterrence: Don’t attack my friend either -- or I’ll shoot Existential Deterrence: I don’t have a gun but I could go buy one if needed

E. Dilemmas of Deterrence Security Dilemma: Increased costs and credibility also mean decreased restraint Vulnerability Dilemma: If you don’t attempt to counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to strike first… (Soviet silos) Rational Irrationality: Fait accompli and “The threat that leaves something to chance:” Rationality decreases credibility, but irrationality decreases restraint

F. Does deterrence work? Inherent uncertainty: If opponent does nothing, is deterrence working? General deterrence creates bias: unstated threats may deter. Perhaps having to state a threat means it is unlikely to succeed… Some evidence supports extended immediate deterrence

Part VI: Unanswered Puzzles of Dyadic Relations Do IGOs promote dyadic peace? Do alliances create peace between dyads, or do they raise the specter of war? What bargaining strategy best avoids war and produces cooperation?

A. Do Joint IGOs produce dyadic peace?

A. Do Joint IGOs produce dyadic peace? 1. Unexplained finding: Same IGOs = increased war risk 2. Possible reasons Coincidence (IGOs not associated with war) Similar interests (IGOs and war have common causes) Interaction (IGOs cause war) Levels of Analysis (Improperly Aggregating to System Level) Differences between IGOs (Let’s study this more) Universal: No effect Limited-purpose: Depends Regional Political or Social = Increased war risk Regional Military or Economic = Decreased war risk 3. Another puzzle: Same IGOs = decreased MIDs!

4. IGOs can produce convergence

B. Alliances Statistical evidence: disputed. After controlling for contiguity, alliances seem to make war less likely between the allies Why might allies be more likely to fight each other?

Alliances and Preferences Allies: Nowhere to go but down Nonaligned: Equal chance of increased conflict and increased cooperation Rivals: If not already fighting, nowhere to go but up

3. When have allies fought each other?

4. How do most alliances end?

5. When are alliances broken?

C. Which bargaining strategies promote peace? Known hazards – Bully and Fight Bully: one OR both sides respond to concessions by increasing demands (i.e. appeasement fails) Fight: Reciprocal escalation (BOTH sides respond to conflict with higher level of conflict) Appeasement also fails – Of six known cases in crises, five were diplomatic defeats for appeaser and one led to war

3. Reciprocity: A Strategy for Cooperation? Yes – But ALSO a recipe for conflict spirals!

D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle? Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other

The Vicious Circle

D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle? Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other So do most cooperation-producing factors

The Virtuous Circle

D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle? Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other So do most cooperation-producing factors Which of these two feedback loops is more powerful in the long run?