1. Crisis Management and Arms Control The Evolutions of Nuclear Strategy US – Soviet Security Cooperation Yi-Ren Chen | Hist 5N | May 4 th, 2004

2. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy Problems: Problems: Schelling, “ theory degenerates at one extreme if there is not scope for mutual accomodation; it degenerates at the other extreme if there is no conflict at all and no problem in identifying and reaching common goals. Schelling, “ theory degenerates at one extreme if there is not scope for mutual accomodation; it degenerates at the other extreme if there is no conflict at all and no problem in identifying and reaching common goals. Each claiming to be powerful enough to destroy the other and neither believing the other ’ s protestations of his peaceful intentions Each claiming to be powerful enough to destroy the other and neither believing the other ’ s protestations of his peaceful intentions task: to recognize when mutual interests conincide task: to recognize when mutual interests conincide

3. Stable conflict Stable conflict Retaliation is not to win, but to prove to the attacker that his losses would be large Retaliation is not to win, but to prove to the attacker that his losses would be large Hurt social and economic structure Hurt social and economic structure Coercive bargaining – coercion, intimidation and deterrence Coercive bargaining – coercion, intimidation and deterrence Best weapons are protected from a first strike Best weapons are protected from a first strike Did the development of intercontinental missiles strengthen the concept of deterrence? Did the development of intercontinental missiles strengthen the concept of deterrence? What do you think about the analogy of the modern deterrence to the ancient institution of the exchange of hostages? What do you think about the analogy of the modern deterrence to the ancient institution of the exchange of hostages? Do you agree with the proposal that a nation should abstain from the most advanced weapons, while encouraging the enemy to improve his defenses? Do you agree with the proposal that a nation should abstain from the most advanced weapons, while encouraging the enemy to improve his defenses?

4. Problem with arms control: alien to military thinking, surprise attacks: one needs more weapons so adversary cant wipe all out in first attack Problem with arms control: alien to military thinking, surprise attacks: one needs more weapons so adversary cant wipe all out in first attack Arms control over disarmament Arms control over disarmament From mid 1950 ’ s US negotiation position in UN changes – how to live with the bomb From mid 1950 ’ s US negotiation position in UN changes – how to live with the bomb Can nuclear weapons be confined to the role of arms control? Can nuclear weapons be confined to the role of arms control?

5. Nuclear pacifists Nuclear pacifists “ tradition of civilized warfare ” “ tradition of civilized warfare ” Nuclear weapons violated any attempts to proportionate violence Nuclear weapons violated any attempts to proportionate violence Accidents, ensured east-west conflict Accidents, ensured east-west conflict Arms race intermediate stop to disarmament Arms race intermediate stop to disarmament Terror can be used to deter and keep international peace Terror can be used to deter and keep international peace Act of threatening use of nuclear weapons immoral? Threats imply usage Act of threatening use of nuclear weapons immoral? Threats imply usage Does threatening to use nuclear weapons carry the same moral stigmas as actually using them? Does threatening to use nuclear weapons carry the same moral stigmas as actually using them?

6. US – Soviet Security Cooperation Close calls in Berlin, Korea, the Middle East, Cuba, South Asia Close calls in Berlin, Korea, the Middle East, Cuba, South Asia Managing crisis over avoiding them Managing crisis over avoiding them Set standards and approach to dealing with management, but not avoidance Set standards and approach to dealing with management, but not avoidance

7. Crisis Management Crisis Management Operational requirements Operational requirements 1. top level political body maintain knowledge and informed control 1. top level political body maintain knowledge and informed control 2. coordinate movements of military with diplomatic strategy 2. coordinate movements of military with diplomatic strategy 3. slow down tempo of military movements 3. slow down tempo of military movements Avoid military threats Avoid military threats Military alerts and force movements undertaken to reduce vulnerability and readiness Military alerts and force movements undertaken to reduce vulnerability and readiness Select diplomatic proposals and define interest Select diplomatic proposals and define interest

8. Prudence: Prudence: Neither superpower shall initiate military action against the other Neither superpower shall initiate military action against the other Shall not exploit its advantage in a crisis Shall not exploit its advantage in a crisis Operate with great restraint in policies and actions Operate with great restraint in policies and actions Shall not permit a regional ally to drag into shooting war Shall not permit a regional ally to drag into shooting war Accept intervention by the other power in a regional conflict if such intervention becomes necessary to prevent overwhelming defeat of ally, each shall accept responsibility for pressuring ally to stop sure of defeating opponent Accept intervention by the other power in a regional conflict if such intervention becomes necessary to prevent overwhelming defeat of ally, each shall accept responsibility for pressuring ally to stop sure of defeating opponent

9. Threats to Crisis Management Threats to Crisis Management Tension Tension Temptation to exploit advantage Temptation to exploit advantage Regional conflicts Regional conflicts Crisis military movements Crisis military movements Controlling own military Controlling own military Crisis induced stress Crisis induced stress

10. Crisis Avoidance Crisis Avoidance How does the US – Soviet conflict defer from other classical forms of power conflict and how much do you think this affected the course of events? How does the US – Soviet conflict defer from other classical forms of power conflict and how much do you think this affected the course of events? Deterrence, alliance commitments, military, and economic aid Deterrence, alliance commitments, military, and economic aid Example: Berlin airlift Example: Berlin airlift New opportunities emerged for reducing conflict, particularly in Europe where the vital interest of both sides were engaged New opportunities emerged for reducing conflict, particularly in Europe where the vital interest of both sides were engaged Vital interests facilitate cooperation and crisis prevention Vital interests facilitate cooperation and crisis prevention

11. Was d é tente “ oversold ” in the Basic Principles Agreement, which included general principles that committed the US and Soviet union to avoid nuclear war and outbreaks? Was d é tente “ oversold ” in the Basic Principles Agreement, which included general principles that committed the US and Soviet union to avoid nuclear war and outbreaks? For Soviets: peaceful coexistence means political equality with US For Soviets: peaceful coexistence means political equality with US The proposal put forward in 1983 by the American committee on the east west accord urges the US and the Soviet Union to negotiate “ a precise set of ground rules having to do with specific geography and specific ban on direct or indirect use of combat forces ” was such an agreement possible? The proposal put forward in 1983 by the American committee on the east west accord urges the US and the Soviet Union to negotiate “ a precise set of ground rules having to do with specific geography and specific ban on direct or indirect use of combat forces ” was such an agreement possible? Norms of competition lack institutionalized arrangements. Norms of competition lack institutionalized arrangements.

12. Powers should undertake case by case diplomatic conversations on various regions Powers should undertake case by case diplomatic conversations on various regions Trends of third world toward greater conflict will confront both superpowers with declining influence in those areas Trends of third world toward greater conflict will confront both superpowers with declining influence in those areas Pressures to reduce both superpower ’ s involvements aboard might lead to mutual restraint and tacit cooperation Pressures to reduce both superpower ’ s involvements aboard might lead to mutual restraint and tacit cooperation

13. Bibliography: Bibliography: - Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Macmillan 1981) pp. 190-207. - Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Macmillan 1981) pp. 190-207. - Alexander George, "U.S.-Soviet Efforts to Cooperate in Crisis Management and Crisis avoidance," in Alexander George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, (Oxford U.P., 1988) pp. 581-599. - Alexander George, "U.S.-Soviet Efforts to Cooperate in Crisis Management and Crisis avoidance," in Alexander George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation, (Oxford U.P., 1988) pp. 581-599.

14. End Yi-Ren Chen | Hist 5N | May 4 th, 2004