Is America’s Agriculture still vulnerable to Bioterrorism???? Yes, and it will always be……. Dr. Jimmy Tickel NCDA& CS Emergency Programs

Victim’s vulnerability Immunity Biosecurity- Lack of full Integration or understanding of response Production is Grouped geographically Market nationally-

Ag’s Immunity Status

YOU feed Equipment Workers New stock visitors wildlife Stock yard Virus

Independents

Production continues to regionalize

Protect verses Threat of Spread

As strong as Ag is, it is not built to withstand intention attack….. Economically – Insurance for catastrophic, long term market disruption (collateral damage) – Business continuity is a buzz word in response planning Especially wide scale attack…..it really has been built on the ability to outlast small, limited attacks… – Local droughts, natural disasters, disease etc.

Prepared for point source outbreaks Complicated with potential secondary breaks

Day Potential FMD disease spread after a simulated terrorist attack at 5 Locations Day 5 Disease First Detected Potential Impact: Even if a national “stop Movement” of all susceptible animals is ordered on Day 8, by the time the disease is eradicated the nation could lose still 23.6 million animals! States Infected:

Infected counties Quarantined counties Surveillance counties Swine soybeans goats Poultry Collateral Damage from FMD Dairy

Compartmentalization The concept of breaking down production systems into their basic components and then bullet proofing those components. This concept has incredible potential because production systems have already used it to manage endemic diseases with success. Adapting it to provide protection from and containment of an outbreak of FMD though is still a great challenge.

Compartmentalization on a Compartmentalization on a Company level Feed Milling and Distribution Nucleus Unit (Genetics) Boar Stud (Genetics ) Nursery Unit (Commercial Pigs) Retailer, Restaurant, Institutional Finishing Unit (Commercial Pigs) Multiplier Sow Farms (Production Sows)

“Healthy farms” are hurt by Stop Movement Rules Typical NC Dairy (<18K 305 FCM) can survive – <13 days, IF no added costs – If FAD program changes costs/income by 3%-4%, dairy has NO resilience Annual net goes to zero. Higher producing farms last longer, but show same trend – Program selects against an industry segment Days to $0 Annual Returns-to-Management by Milk Production & Cost Increases % Cost Increase via Program Economic Impact

Lack of support for Negative producers Initially, all producers will suffer – Stop movements necessary As event progresses little provision to allow movements to occur in a timely fashion – Proof of status – Standardized biosecurity – After thought instead of main goal

There are 205 sow farms, 90 nurseries, and 120 finishers – If assume use 50 swabs /farm for status 50 swabs x 205 sow farms = 10,250 swabs/week 90 nurseries moving pigs/week to the finisher x 50 swabs = 4, finishing barns a week as top hogs go to market x 50 swabs = 6, = 20,750 swabs/week Estimate from Murphy Brown-- manage 60% of the hogs in North Carolina.

Old McDonald guards his farm with a Quick Draw Chihuahua

Compartmentalized Biosecurity Commercial sowsNurseries Finishers Genetic stock Shower in shower out Perimeter fencing & gates Foot bath Shower in shower out Entrance vehicle decon

Farm Biosecurity Off-farm use only Power-wash Disinfectant solutions & equipment On-farm use only Disinfectant solutions & equipment Controlled, lockable gate Perimeter controls & Buffer zones for resident animals J. Tickel DVM NCDA/VS/EM

Sale Barns – no biosecurity measures at all Feed stores- likewise Farms- various measures – ???Meter readers, postal, salespeople, etc Wildlife access—no restrictions Hang outs- café’s, truck stops, etc

Incentivize farmers to use biosecurity Insurance, Bonds, Hedging, Lending, Legal, Taxes, etc. – Incentives acceptance better than regulation – Markets determine values and priorities of practices

People want protection but they don’t intrusion…..they want help but want to dictate how that help comes…..are not outwardly looking but certainly, farm-o-centric. There are very few incentives to biosecure farms to the degree necessary to prevent entry of accidental FMD and no incentives to prevent bioterrorism.

Other/future strategy choices insert here R:B = Risk:Benefit Model / Analysis No [D] Endemic FMD [D] Endemic FMD R:B says FMD can be eradicated via Stamping Out Only? R:B says FMD can be eradicated via Stamping Out Only? Yes Do resources exist to more than likely accomplish Stamping Out? Do resources exist to more than likely accomplish Stamping Out? No Yes Single- or Multi- Site FMD Incursion? Single- or Multi- Site FMD Incursion? [A] Stamp Out Only Protocols [A] Stamp Out Only Protocols Single R:B says FMD can be controlled, and the most farms saved, by Stamping Out only? R:B says FMD can be controlled, and the most farms saved, by Stamping Out only? Multi No [B] Stamp Out Only Protocols [B] Stamp Out Only Protocols Yes Do resources exist to more than likely accomplish the Stamping Out & save farms? Do resources exist to more than likely accomplish the Stamping Out & save farms? R:B says FMD can be controlled, and the most farms saved, via Stamping Out & Emerg Vacc? R:B says FMD can be controlled, and the most farms saved, via Stamping Out & Emerg Vacc? No Yes [C] Stamp Out & Emerg Vacc Protocols [C] Stamp Out & Emerg Vacc Protocols No Do resources exist to more than likely accomplish Stamping Out & Emergency Vaccination? Do resources exist to more than likely accomplish Stamping Out & Emergency Vaccination? No Yes

Our greatest threat of massive FMD outbreak is a bioterrorist event…..to mitigate that potential we…… Have hardened value rich targets by instituting standardized biosecurity Increased bio surveillance standards Bullet proof animals through vaccine etc Business continuity measures are in place

Emergency Management infrastructure Human Health Infrastructure Feds FEMA FEMA Regions State NEMA State EMA/ Area Coordinators Local County EMA First Responders Public Feds USPHS CDC State State PH /Regional PHRSTs State labs Local County/Municipal PH Hospitals etc Public

USDA / A E C’s NVSL/Plum D of Ag / State Vet NAHLN’s/State Labs Farmers/Equine/Pet owners No “dedicated position” to address Large Scale Animal/Ag Response issues on County/ local level. – Assessment/Planning – Response Partnering – Disease response – Resource development – Training – Volunteer recruitment EM / AC /Extension CART’s/ Volunteers

Creating Local Response infrastructure All hazards Local Ag Disaster and Disease Response planner – Specialists positioned in key states, key Ag areas – Use resources like EDEN to develop best practices – Compartmentalization, NAIS, Local support of Disease events, Local Recovery Natural Disasters Rural & Community Response & Recovery