1. Is America’s Agriculture still vulnerable to Bioterrorism????
Yes, and it will always be…….
Dr. Jimmy Tickel
NCDA& CS Emergency Programs

2. Victim’s vulnerability
Immunity
Biosecurity-
Lack of full Integration or understanding of response
Production is Grouped geographically
Market nationally-

3. Ag’s Immunity Status

4. YOU Virus visitors wildlife Stock yard New stock feed Equipment
Workers
New stock
visitors
wildlife
Stock yard
This slide reminds you that you can be connected to a positive farm through a variety of exposure routes. It’s a lot like wet paint and how when painting, even though you are careful, you can find paint in lots of places its not supposed to be. Biosecurity measures help provide a way to decontaminate or prevent virus from entering your farm and infecting your animals.
Virus

5. Independents

8. Production continues to regionalize
KEEPING FAD PROGRAMS FROM ERADICATIN G FARMS
Ag Emergency Response Workshop
Aril Des Moines, IA
Production continues to regionalize
View 2 – Production Centers (national scale)
These densely concentrated animal populations are more vulnerable than other areas. They exist in many parts of the country. They will fall to a biological attack quickly and will also do billions of dollars of damage to our economy. One of the current authors (Tickel) has participated in the last two Federally led animal disasters in AI in Va and NC and then again with END in California. In both cases the State and Federal governments were tapped out, and asked Emergency management, the Forest Service, the local organizations for help.
Production Center response/recovery needs will be bigger than any organization. In CO you have a > $ 2.5B cattle industry. Georgia has about a 2.5 B dollar poultry industry. California's dairy industry is worth $47 billion nationally, and contributed $35 billion and 257,000 jobs to the state in 2002 [
We all need to protect these as the most valuable contributors to our state and federal economies.
If we identify national Production Centers, we can use geography as a tool by forward placing detection and response assets near to them. Distance is time, and time is our enemy during an FAD outbreak. As Roger Breeze pointed out at USAHA in 2003, London is about the same distance from Paris as Spokane, WA is from the western Cascades Washington dairy centers (Verified). It makes as much sense to put a reference lab in Spokane for the WA dairy industry as it does to put a lab in Paris to protect London!

9. Protect verses Threat of Spread
KEEPING FAD PROGRAMS FROM ERADICATIN G FARMS
Ag Emergency Response Workshop
Aril Des Moines, IA
Protect verses Threat of Spread
View 2 – Production Centers (national scale)
These densely concentrated animal populations are more vulnerable than other areas. They exist in many parts of the country. They will fall to a biological attack quickly and will also do billions of dollars of damage to our economy. One of the current authors (Tickel) has participated in the last two Federally led animal disasters in AI in Va and NC and then again with END in California. In both cases the State and Federal governments were tapped out, and asked Emergency management, the Forest Service, the local organizations for help.
Production Center response/recovery needs will be bigger than any organization. In CO you have a > $ 2.5B cattle industry. Georgia has about a 2.5 B dollar poultry industry. California's dairy industry is worth $47 billion nationally, and contributed $35 billion and 257,000 jobs to the state in 2002 [
We all need to protect these as the most valuable contributors to our state and federal economies.
If we identify national Production Centers, we can use geography as a tool by forward placing detection and response assets near to them. Distance is time, and time is our enemy during an FAD outbreak. As Roger Breeze pointed out at USAHA in 2003, London is about the same distance from Paris as Spokane, WA is from the western Cascades Washington dairy centers (Verified). It makes as much sense to put a reference lab in Spokane for the WA dairy industry as it does to put a lab in Paris to protect London!

10. As strong as Ag is, it is not built to withstand intention attack…..
Economically
Insurance for catastrophic, long term market disruption (collateral damage)
Business continuity is a buzz word in response planning
Especially wide scale attack…..it really has been built on the ability to outlast small, limited attacks…
Local droughts, natural disasters, disease etc.

11. Prepared for point source outbreaks
Complicated with potential secondary breaks

12. Potential FMD disease spread after a simulated terrorist attack at 5 Locations
While considering business continuity during an outbreak, this slide shows us the magnitude of what an outbreak could be. Note, that the arrows that reveal where the disease has spread are actual animal/product movements. Business continuity requires animal and product movement. As we consider a terrorist initiated outbreak business continuity today, I would almost say that because we are in the early stages of considering business continuity, we are are somewhat like these guys trying to catch a fish….. [advance slide]
We also have a state-wide cattle population and vast wildlife herds across the state. 23
Day 10 1 15 14 16 19 13 18 17 20 5 4 3 12 6 2 9 11 7 8 30 22 21 12 5
States Infected: 33 35 37 39 38 30 27 40 23 15 19
Day 5 Disease First Detected
Even if a national “stop Movement” of all susceptible animals is ordered on Day 8, by the time the disease is eradicated the nation could lose still 23.6 million animals!
Potential Impact:

13. Collateral Damage from FMD
soybeans
goats
Dairy
Swine
Infected counties
This slide is just one that we use in NC to help producers see more of the big picture. Proof of status testing has to account for not only susceptible animals but also other Ag products that might not be able to move because they could be contaminated.
Quarantined counties
Poultry
Surveillance counties

14. Trouble??????

15. Trouble!!!!!!

17. Compartmentalization
The concept of breaking down production systems into their basic components and then bullet proofing those components. This concept
has incredible potential because production systems have already
used it to manage endemic diseases with success.
Adapting it to provide protection from and containment of an
outbreak of FMD though is still a great challenge.
Three legged pig statue from Chile….supposed to be good luck! Stool vs. chair on uneven ground….what we have going now is great when the ground is even but come outbreak, and uneven ground then the versatilityalue of a stool is very much appreciated

19. Compartmentalization on a Company level
Feed Milling and
Distribution
Compartmentalization on a
Company level
Retailer, Restaurant,
Institutional
Nucleus Unit
(Genetics)
Boar Stud
(Genetics)
Compartmentialization within a particular company
Retailers, restaurants, and institutions (incl. schools, prisons, hotel chains, recreational users, etc., etc., etc.)
Consumer (you and me)
Multiplier Sow Farms
(Production Sows)
Nursery Unit
(Commercial Pigs)
Finishing Unit
(Commercial Pigs)

20. Economic Impact “Healthy farms” are hurt by Stop Movement Rules
Typical NC Dairy (<18K 305 FCM) can survive
<13 days, IF no added costs
If FAD program changes costs/income by 3%-4%, dairy has NO resilience
Annual net goes to zero.
Higher producing farms last longer, but show same trend
Program selects against an industry segment
Days to $0 Annual Returns-to-Management by Milk Production & Cost Increases
% Cost Increase via Program
Here is an analysis I did for NC dairies. The questions are [1] If dairies face no change in costs/incomes, how long can they survive SMOs before they eat up all their net (measured as Returns to Management; income after covering fixed and variable costs), and [2] how quickly does their resilience degrade if FAD programs change the farms’ cost/income structure?
The longer the SMO, the more farms will go out of business, whether they are infected or not. Probably, the lower producing farms will go out first. To date, USDA will not indemnify lost production, at least for non-infected farms. This then becomes an incentive for farms that hit the wall to try and become infected – at least they will get some income for going down. Such activities have been blamed by workers as to why the UK FMD outbreak had such a maddeningly long tail: As farms came close to failure, they infected themselves so they could get indemnities. Do we really want to promote that?
This does not apply to grass-fed dairies – these calculations are based on confinement fed dairy production. The spreadsheet used for this is <FMD_quickcalc milk shipment losses.wb3>.

21. Lack of support for Negative producers
Initially, all producers will suffer
Stop movements
necessary
As event progresses little provision to allow movements to occur in a timely fashion
Proof of status
Standardized biosecurity
After thought instead of main goal

22. Proof of Status testing
There are 205 sow farms, 90 nurseries, and 120 finishers
If assume use 50 swabs /farm for status
50 swabs x 205 sow farms = 10,250 swabs/week 90 nurseries moving pigs/week to the finisher x 50 swabs = 4, finishing barns a week as top hogs go to market x 50 swabs = 6, = 20,750 swabs/week
Estimate from Murphy Brown-- manage 60% of the hogs in North Carolina.
Assuming 50swabs

23. Current Biosecurity Status
Old McDonald guards his farm with a
Quick Draw Chihuahua

24. Compartmentalized Biosecurity
Genetic stock
Entrance vehicle decon
Commercial sows
Nurseries
Finishers
Shower in shower out
Shower in shower out
Perimeter fencing & gates
No entrance decon for vehicles
Not all are shower in shower out or other measures of reducing exposure from personnel
Wildlife access (nose to nose prevented)
Concentration of facilities (area spread)
Overlap of Corporate farm systems
Beef fed on spray fields-sale barns
Migrant worker population (drill)
Foot bath

25. KEEPING FAD PROGRAMS FROM ERADICATIN G FARMS
Ag Emergency Response Workshop
Aril Des Moines, IA
Farm Biosecurity
Off-farm use only
Power-wash
Disinfectant solutions & equipment
On-farm use only
Controlled, lockable gate
Perimeter controls & Buffer zones for resident animals
J. Tickel DVM
NCDA/VS/EM
Great diagram but in reality, does not happen in dairy, beef, small ruminants, backyard herds/flocks, many swine, farms. In fact each of the industries is connected to areas of comingling/congregation that have 0 biosecuirty………sale barns, feed stores, etc.

26. Weakest Links Sale Barns – no biosecurity measures at all
Feed stores- likewise
Farms- various measures
???Meter readers, postal, salespeople, etc
Wildlife access—no restrictions
Hang outs- café’s, truck stops, etc

27. Farm Biosecurity Incentives
KEEPING FAD PROGRAMS FROM ERADICATIN G FARMS
Farm Biosecurity Incentives
Ag Emergency Response Workshop
Aril Des Moines, IA
Incentivize farmers to use biosecurity
Insurance, Bonds, Hedging, Lending, Legal, Taxes, etc.
Incentives acceptance better than regulation
Markets determine values and priorities of practices
View 1 – Manage FADs (cont’d)
One way to tackle the ‘do the right thing’ issue is to find means to offer market-based incentives. They could come in the form of insurance, finance, legal, taxation, etc. Incentives are accepted by the public and politicians better than are straight-out regulations, and they can be more flexible too.
What if the Fed (USA’s Central Bank) offered low rates for banks lending money to ‘resilient farming operations’? Or how about a federal re-insurance program to help insurers reward farms, transportation companies, processors, marketers, etc., when they achieve some level of biosecurity? The opportunities are large and fairly straight forward.

28. Producer Buy-in Reluctance to NAIS
People want protection but they don’t intrusion…..they want help but want to dictate how that help comes…..are not outwardly looking but certainly, farm-o-centric.
There are very few incentives to biosecure farms to the degree necessary to prevent entry of accidental FMD and no incentives to prevent bioterrorism.

29. KEEPING FAD PROGRAMS FROM ERADICATIN G FARMS
Ag Emergency Response Workshop
Aril Des Moines, IA No
[D]
Endemic FMD
R:B says FMD
can be eradicated
via Stamping
Out Only?
Yes
Do resources
exist to more than likely
accomplish
Stamping Out? 6 7
Single- or Multi-
Site FMD
Incursion?
[A]
Stamp Out
Only Protocols
Single
R:B says
FMD can be
controlled, and the
most farms saved,
by Stamping
Out only?
Multi
[B]
accomplish the
Stamping Out &
save farms?
via Stamping Out &
Emerg Vacc?
[C]
Stamp Out &
Emerg Vacc
Protocols
exist to more than
likely accomplish
Emergency
Vaccination? 1 2 3 4 5
Goal: Preserve Industry
Other/future strategy choices insert here
R:B = Risk:Benefit
Model / Analysis
Here, we are assuming that the goal is to SAVE FARMS. A tactic to achieve that goal may include Stamping Out-based eradication, but it doesn’t have to.
It acknowledges, in question 1, that if we have a single site outbreak the most cost-effective way to approach is will be to stamp out that site. Done. Finished. Move on. However, most of us doubt very much that when we diagnose something like FMD it will only be in one site. At that point, when we have a multi-site, probably multi-industry, outbreak, the driving goal of SAVING FARMS comes to the front.
We then walk through a series of questions on whether Stamping Out alone will suffice or whether we can add in emergency vaccination to the set.
It also allows the outcome that, even though the Risk:Benefit Model suggests that Stamping Out + Emergency Vaccination is ‘Best’, should resources not be sufficient, we can drop back to a strict Stamping Out policy.

30. Mitigation
Our greatest threat of massive FMD outbreak is a bioterrorist event…..to mitigate that potential we……
Have hardened value rich targets by instituting
standardized biosecurity
Increased bio surveillance standards
Bullet proof animals through vaccine etc
Business continuity measures are in place

31. Response Infrastructure
Emergency Management infrastructure
Human Health Infrastructure
Feds
FEMA
FEMA Regions
State
NEMA
State EMA/ Area Coordinators
Local
County EMA
First Responders
Public
Feds
USPHS
CDC
State
State PH /Regional PHRSTs
State labs
Local
County/Municipal PH
Hospitals etc
Public

32. Animal Response Infrastructure
USDA / A E C’s
NVSL/Plum
D of Ag / State Vet
NAHLN’s/State Labs
Farmers/Equine/Pet owners
No “dedicated position” to address Large Scale Animal/Ag Response
issues on County/ local level.
Assessment/Planning
Response Partnering
Disease response
Resource development
Training
Volunteer recruitment
EM/ AC /Extension
CART’s/ Volunteers

33. Creating Local Response infrastructure
All hazards Local Ag Disaster and Disease Response planner
Specialists positioned in key states, key Ag areas
Use resources like EDEN to develop best practices
Compartmentalization, NAIS, Local support of Disease events, Local Recovery Natural Disasters
Rural & Community Response & Recovery