Transmission Investments Daniel Kirschen © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 1.

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Transmission Investments Daniel Kirschen © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 1

Functions of Transmission Transport electric power – Securely – Efficiently Minimize operating costs – Optimize scheduling over a larger set of plants – Take advantage of the diversity in peak loads – Reduce the reserve requirements by pooling risks Make possible a competitive electricity market © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 2

Rationale for transmission Transmission exists only because generation and loads are in the wrong place.. © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 3

Integrated Generation and Transmission Planning Least cost development must consider interactions between generation and transmission © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 4 Generation Expansion Plan Generation Expansion Plan O(G,T) Transmission Expansion Plan Transmission Expansion Plan G T Operation Analysis Operation Analysis

Features of the transmission business Capital intensive business Small re-sale value of transmission assets – Investments are irreversible: stranded investments Long-lived assets – Things change over their lifetime Economies of scale – Average cost decreases with capacity Long-lead times for construction Monopoly © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 5

Business models Traditional – Integrated development of generation and transmission Competitive – Generation and transmission are separated to ensure fair competition – Regulated transmission expansion Monopoly, subject to regulatory approval Regulator “buys” transmission capacity on behalf of users – Merchant expansion Treat transmission like any other business Unregulated companies build capacity and sell it to users © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 6

Cost-based transmission expansion Transmission company proposes a new investment – Transmission line or other form of reinforcement Regulator approves (or rejects) the proposed investment Transmission company builds the new expansion Transmission company collects revenues from users to pay for the investment Transmission company’s profit based on rate of return (small but low risk) © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 7

Cost-based transmission expansion Issues: – How much transmission expansion is needed? – How should the cost be shared between the users? © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 8

How much transmission capacity? Make projection of needs based on forecasts – Demographics, economic growth Lots of uncertainty Better too much than too little – Transmission cost is only about 10% of overall cost – Lack of transmission has severe consequences However, rate of return encourages companies to invest too much Difficult to achieve economic optimum © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 9

How to allocate the cost of transmission? Discuss methods that could be used to allocate the cost of transmission to users of the transmission network: – Generators – Consumers Basis for allocation of cost Advantages and disadvantages Consider both: – Internal users – “Wheeling” transactions © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 10

Wheeling transactions © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 11 Network of Transmission Company G G C C

Postage stamp methods Based on peak MW demand – Adjustment for MWh, voltage level Simple Adjusted to make sure company gets enough revenue Does not reflect distance Reflects average cost, not usage by particular user Does not encourage generators to locate “in the right place” “Pancaking” of rates if transaction involves network of several transmission companies © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 12

Contract path method Used when transactions were infrequent Users and transmission company would agree on a (fictitious) contract path Cost of transmission would be based on the cost of the transmission facilities included in that path Appears more cost reflective but power flows know nothing about contracts © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 13

MW-mile methods Use power flow calculations to trace the power through the network Multiply the MW-miles of the power flows by an agreed rate Would be rigorous if network were linear Non-linear networks  choice of base case affects the overall cost © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 14

What is the value of transmission? Assume – No limit on transmission capacity – No limit on generation capacity – Ignore losses and security issues © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington $/MWh45 $/MWh 1000 MW G2G2 G1G1 AB

What is the value of transmission? © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington $/MWh 1000 MW G1G1 AB Value is now based on what value consumers put on electricity!

Perspective of a vertically integrated utility Balance transmission capital cost and generation operating cost – Reinforce the transmission or supply the load from more expensive local generation? © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington $/MWh45 $/MWh 2000 MW G2G2 G1G MWAB ?

Perspective of a transmission merchant Unregulated company No guarantee on revenue No limit on profit Builds a transmission line Collects revenue based on: Amount of power transmitted Price difference between the two ends of the line © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 18

Merchant interconnection Should an interconnection be built between Borduria and Syldavia? What is the demand for transmission? What is the optimal capacity of this line ? © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 19 D B = 500 MW Borduria D S = 1500 MW Syldavia ?

Zero transmission capacity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 20 D B = 500 MW Borduria D S = 1500 MW Syldavia Each country supplies its own demand

Zero transmission capacity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington $/MWh P B = D B = 500 MW P S = D S = 1500 MW 15.0 $/MWh Supply curve for Syldavia Supply curve for Borduria

Infinite transmission capacity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 22 D B = 500 MW Borduria D S = 1500 MW Syldavia No limit on flows means that the two countries operate a single market

Infinite transmission capacity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 23 = 567 MW 24.3 $/MWh = 1433 MW = 2000 MW = 500 MW = 1500 MW 24.3 $/MWh = 933 MW Supply curve for Syldavia Supply curve for Borduria

Price difference as a function of capacity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 24 = 500 MW = 1500 MW F MAX = 933 MW Supply curve for Syldavia Supply curve for Borduria F MAX = 0 MW

Transmission demand function © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 25

Transmission demand function © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington MW 28$/MWh F

Transmission revenue © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 27

Transmission supply function Cost of building a transmission line: Marginal cost: Hourly marginal cost: © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 28 Capacity in MW Length of the line in km Annuitized cost of building 1 km of line in $/MW.km.year (assumed linear for simplicity)

Supply/Demand Equilibrium © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 29 ($/MWh ) F (MW) k = 35 $/year. MW. km l = 1000 [km]

Supply/Demand Equilibrium © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 30 ($/MWh ) F (MW) Optimal Transmission Capacity Optimal Price Difference Add transmission capacity until the marginal savings in generation cost is equal to the marginal cost of building additional transmission capacity

Optimal transmission capacity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington $/MWh = 500 MW = 1500 MW 23 $/MWh = 800 MW 4 $/MWh

Total cost © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 32 Total cost Cost of constraints Investment cost

Revenue with suboptimal transmission capacity In practice, actual transmission capacity ≠ optimal System operated based on actual capacity Nodal energy prices and congestion surplus are determined by the actual network Over-investment – Difference in prices is too low  under recovery of investment costs Under-investment – Difference in prices is high  over recovery of investment costs © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 33

Effect of variable demand © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 34 BorduriaSyldavia Simplified load duration curves

Unconstrained generation costs © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 35 LoadGeneration in Borduria Generation in Syldavia Total hourly generation cost [MW] [$/h] , ,650 During some hours the flow will be constrained by the capacity of the interconnection. To calculate the cost of this congestion, we need to know the unconstrained generation cost for the peak- and off-peak loads

Off peak performance © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 36 Interconnection Capacity Generation in Borduria Generation in Syldavia Total hourly generation cost Hourly constraint cost [MW] [$/h] ,4881, , , , , , , , , , , ,6500

On peak performance © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 37 Interconnection Capacity Generation in Borduria Generation in Syldavia Total hourly generation cost Hourly constraint cost [MW] [$/h] ,05038, ,40033, ,05029, ,00025, ,08823, ,25021, ,48819, ,80018, ,65015, ,80012, ,2509, ,0007,350

Optimal transmission capacity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 38 Interconnection Capacity Annual constraint cost Annuitized investment cost Total annual transmission cost [MW][k$/year] 0158, ,83514,000149, ,99328,000143, ,78042,000140, ,15949,000140, ,01256,000140, ,15763,000140, ,59370,000140, ,34284,000142, ,25798,000145, ,339112,000149, ,587126,000154,587 k = 140 [$/year. MW. km]

Revenue recovery Off-peak hours: – No congestion on the interconnection – Operation as a single market with uniform price of $/MWh. – Short run marginal value of transmission is zero – Congestion surplus is thus also zero On-peak hours: – 400 MW transmission capacity limits the power flow – Locational price differences Borduria $/MWh Syldavia $/MWh – Short run marginal value of transmission is thus $/MWh. © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 39

Recovering the fixed cost Ignored the fixed cost so far Fixed cost does not affect the optimal transmission capacity – Calculation is based on the marginal cost Optimal transmission capacity recovers only the variable cost How can we recover this fixed cost? © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 40

Withdrawing transmission capacity Example – Assume that fixed cost = 20,000 $/km.year – Build 800 MW of transmission capacity – Offer only 650 MW to the system operator – Flow between Borduria and Syldavia is then 650 MW. – Energy prices: Borduria $/MWh Syldavia $/MWh – Short run value of transmission increases from 4.00 $/MWh to 8.50 $/MWh. © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 41