LHC Machine Protection

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Presentation transcript:

LHC Machine Protection Acknowledgments to my colleagues of the MPWG Rossano Giachino for input and material. J.Wenninger B.Todd R.Schmidt B. Puccio September 2007

Outline Energy stored in the LHC magnets LHC Dipole Magnets Power Interlock Controllers Quench Protection System Energy stored in the LHC beams LHC Beam Energy Beam Losses and Damage Potential Beam Absorbers, Beam Dump and Collimators Beam Interlock System Conclusion

LHC Beam 1 LEIR CPS SPS Booster LINACS 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 Beam 1 Beam 2 Top energy/GeV Circumference/m Linac 0.12 30 PSB 1.4 157 CPS 26 628 = 4 PSB SPS 450 6’911 = 11 x PS LHC 7000 26’657 = 27/7 xSPS LEIR CPS SPS Booster LINACS LHC 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 Ions protons Beam 1 Beam 2 TI8 TI2 Note the energy gain/machine of 10 to 20 – and not more ! The gain is typical for the useful range of magnets !!! 3

LHC Powering in 8 Sectors 5 Powering Sector: 154 dipole magnets & about 50 quadrupoles total length of 2.9 km 4 6 DC Power feed LHC Octant 3 DC Power 7 27 km Circumference Powering Subsectors: long arc cryostats triplet cryostats cryostats in matching section 2 8 Sector 1

LHC cycle: charging the magnetic energy beam dump energy ramp coast coast 7 TeV start of the ramp injection phase preparation and access 450 GeV L.Bottura

Outline Energy stored in the LHC magnets LHC Dipole Magnets Power Interlock Controllers Quench Protection System Energy stored in the LHC beams LHC Beam Energy Beam Losses and Damage Potential Beam Absorbers, Beam Dump and Collimators Beam Interlock System Conclusion

Energy stored in LHC magnets : where Most energy is stored in the magnetic field of the dipoles B = 8.33 Tesla I = 11800 A L = 0.108 H

Energy stored in LHC magnets Energy is proportional to volume inside magnet aperture and to the square of the magnet field E dipole = 0.5  L dipole  I 2dipole Energy stored in one dipole is 7.6 MJoule For all 1232 dipoles in the LHC: 9.4 GJ

The energy stored in the magnets corresponds to .. an aircraft carrier at battle-speed of 55 km/h

The energy stored in the magnets corresponds to .. 10 GJoule corresponds to… the energy of 1900 kg TNT the energy of 400 kg Chocolate An important point to determine : How fast can this energy be released?

Powering Interlock Controller PLC-based Powering Interlock Controllers (PIC) are used to manage the interlock signal between the power converters and the quench protection system. The PIC also interfaces to the Beam Interlock System and will request a beam dump if the electrical circuit that fails is considered to be critical for beam operation. Discharge Switches Cryogenics Powering Interlock System Quench Protection Power Converters AUG UPS

Quench A Quench is the phase transition of a super-conducting to a normal conducting state. Quenches are initiated by an energy in the order of mJ Movement of the superconductor by several m (friction and heat dissipation) Beam losses Failure in cooling To limit the temperature increase after a quench The quench has to be detected The energy is distributed in the magnet by force-quenching the coils using quench heaters The magnet current has to be switched off within << 1 second

Energy extraction system in LHC tunnel Switches - for switching the resistors into series with the magnets Resistors absorbing the energy

If it does not work… During magnet testing the 7 MJ stored in one magnet were released into one spot of the coil (inter-turn short) P.Pugnat

Challenges for quench protection Detection of quench for all main magnets 1600 magnets in 24 electrical circuits ~800 others Detection of quench across all HTS current leads 2000 Current Leads Firing heater power supplies, about 6000 heater units Failure in protection system False quench detection: downtime of some hours Missed quench detection: damage of magnet, downtime 30 days Systems must be very reliable

Outline Energy stored in the LHC magnets LHC Dipole Magnets Power Interlock Controllers Quench Protection System Energy stored in the LHC beams LHC Beam Energy Beam Losses and Damage Potential Beam Absorbers, Beam Dump and Collimators Beam Interlock System Conclusion

Energy stored in the beams 25 ns Stored beam energy: Proton Energy  Number of Bunches  Number of protons per bunch Proton Energy: 7 TeV In order to achieve very high luminosity: Number of bunches per beam: 2808 Number of protons per bunch: 1.05 ×1011 3×1014 protons / beam Stored energy per beam: 362 MJoule

Stored energy comparison Increase with respect to existing accelerators : A factor 2 in magnetic field A factor 7 in beam energy A factor 200 in stored energy

A proton injected into the LHC will end its life… In a collision with an opposing beam proton The goal of the LHC ! On the LHC beam dump At the end of a fill, be it scheduled or not. On a collimator or on a protection device/absorber The collimators must absorb protons that wander off to large amplitudes to avoid quenches.

Beam induced damage test The effect of a high intensity beam impacting on equipment is not so easy to evaluate, in particular when you are looking for damage : heating, melting, vaporization …  Controlled experiment: Special target (sandwich of Tin, Steel, Copper plates) installed in an SPS transfer line. Impact of 450 GeV LHC beam (beam size σx/y ~ 1 mm) Beam 25 cm

Results…. A B D C 1012 protons ~ 0.3% of the total intensity Shot Intensity / p+ A 1.2×1012 B 2.4×1012 C 4.8×1012 D 7.2×1012 Melting point of Copper is reached for an impact of  2.5×1012 p. Stainless steel is not damaged, even with 7×1012 p. Results agree with simulation A B D C Based on those results the MPWG has adopted for the LHC a limit for safe beams with nominal emittance @ 450 GeV of: 1012 protons ~ 0.3% of the total intensity Scaling the results yields a limit @ 7 TeV of: 1010 protons ~ 0.003% of the total intensity

Beam absorber Beam Energy Tracking Beam Dumping System DCCT Dipole Current 1 Current 2 RF turn clock The beam dump block is the ONLY element of the LHC that can safely absorb all the beam! All other absorbers in the LHC (collimators and protection devices) can only stand partial losses – typically up to a full injected beam, i.e. equivalent to the energy stored in the SPS at 450 GeV.

IR3, IR6 and IR7 are devoted to protection and collimation ! LHC Layout IR3, IR6 and IR7 are devoted to protection and collimation ! Beam dump blocks IR5:CMS experiment IR4: Radio frequency acceleration IR6: Beam dumping system IR3: Momentum Collimation (normal conducting magnets) IR7: Collimation (normal conducting magnets) IR8: LHC-B experiment IR2: ALICE experiment IR1: ATLAS experiment Injection Injection

IR3, IR6 and IR7 are devoted to protection and collimation ! LHC Layout IR3, IR6 and IR7 are devoted to protection and collimation ! Beam dump blocks IR5:CMS experiment IR4: Radio frequency acceleration IR6: Beam dumping system beam absorber (graphite) about 8 m IR3: Momentum Collimation (normal conducting magnets) IR7: Collimation (normal conducting magnets) concrete shielding IR8: LHC-B experiment IR2: ALICE experiment IR1: ATLAS experiment Injection Injection

Collimators at 7 TeV, squeezed optics 56.0 mm Collimators at 7 TeV, squeezed optics 1 mm Ralphs Assmanns EURO +/- 6 sigma = 3.0 mm Beam +/- 3 sigma Example: Setting of collimators at 7 TeV - with luminosity optics Very tight settings  orbit feedback !!

Beam Interlock System and Inputs Protection for the entire machine against beam incidents. Interface to all parties involved in protection, including powering interlock systems and injectors (SPS). Microsecond reaction times.

Collimators / Absorbers Beam Interlock System and Inputs Safe LHC Parameters Beam Current Monitors Current Energy SafeBeam Flag Protection for the entire machine against beam incidents. Interface to all parties involved in protection, including powering interlock systems and injectors (SPS). Microsecond reaction times. Beam Energy Tracking Beam Dumping System DCCT Dipole Current 1 Current 2 RF turn clock Injection Kickers SPS Extraction Interlocks TL collimators LHC Beam Interlock System Access Safety Beam Dump Trigger Timing PM Trigger BLMs aperture BPMs for Beam Dump LHC Experiments Collimators / Absorbers NC Magnet Interlocks Vacuum System RF + Damper dI/dt beam current BLMs arc BPMs for dx/dt + dy/dt dI/dt magnet current Operators Software Interlocks Screens Powering Interlock System Quench Protection Power Converters Discharge Switches AUG UPS Cryogenics essential circuits auxiliary circuits

Architecture of the BEAM INTERLOCK SYSTEM Beam-1 / Beam-2 are Independent! 20 Users per BIC Half maskable Half un-maskable - fast reaction time (~ ms)

Safe LHC parameters Safe Beam Flags required by Beam Interlock Controllers, to permit masking of selected interlock channels, in particular during commissioning Aperture kickers, to disable kickers when there is no “safe” beam Beam Presence Flags required by SPS extraction, to permit extraction of high intensity beam only when there is circulating beam in the LHC

Outline Energy stored in the LHC magnets LHC Dipole Magnets Power Interlock Controllers Quench Protection System Energy stored in the LHC beams LHC Beam Energy Beam Losses and Damage Potential Beam Absorbers, Beam Dump and Collimators Beam Interlock System Conclusion

Conclusions There is no single “Machine Protection System”: LHC Machine Protection relies on several systems working reliably together Safe operation of the LHC start at the SPS, via extraction into TT40/TI8 and TI2, via the transfer lines, via LHC injection etc. Safe operation of the LHC requires a culture: as soon as the magnets are powered, there is the risk of damage due to the stored magnet energy as soon as the beam intensity is above a certain value (…that is much less than 0.1% of the full 7 TeV beam), there is the risk of beam induced damage safe operation of the LHC relies not only on the various hardware systems, but also on operational procedures and on the controls system (“software interlocks”)

Machine protection at the LHC Machine protection activities of the LHC are coordinated by the LHC Machine Protection Working Group (MPWG), co-chaired by R. Schmidt & J. Wenninger. http://lhc-mpwg.web.cern.ch/lhc-mpwg/ Since 2004 the MPWG is also coordinating machine protection at the SPS (ring & transfer lines).