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Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 1 450 GeV Commissioning Machine Protection Needs to be commissioned to: Prevent damage with the used, higher.

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Presentation on theme: "Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 1 450 GeV Commissioning Machine Protection Needs to be commissioned to: Prevent damage with the used, higher."— Presentation transcript:

1 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 1 450 GeV Commissioning Machine Protection Needs to be commissioned to: Prevent damage with the used, higher intensities at injection Prepare for the next phases of commissioning The commissioning of the MPS needs to be well defined and procedures agreed upon BEFORE we get there Good example JW note for CNGS commissioning: Interlocked Equipment of the CNGS and LHC Transfer Lines, edms 714582 Took about 8 months to get this all written down and agreed For LHC @ injection: can not be treated in one presentation All MP systems should be active from the start of operation with and without beam Avoid masking interlocks for start up Systems need to be verified once they are obligatory = their protection is required Need a reliable limitation of LHC and SPS intensity!

2 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 2 First tests without beam Commissioning of MPS and connected equipment First test in the laboratory Followed by equipment test in the machine Followed by hardware Commissioning Equipment tests under normal operating conditions Interface between systems A maximum of functions should be tested without beam Individual equipment, interface between systems, Post Mortem analysis, Sequencer, Safe Beam Parameters, etc. Also if they can only be tested partially without beam, the partial tests should be done as soon as possible Copy JU Cham06

3 3 Discussion : first pilot @ 450 GeV Some very central systems will be tested and ready to go: The Beam Interlock System Key beam interlock clients: Vacuum Access Powering interlock system Dump system Critical BLMs Experiments (*) Un-maskable input signals to the BIS Does not mean that those systems are 100% operational – e.g. Dump System (*) The experiments request un-maskable inputs, they must therefore be ready during the machine checkout with all other un-maskable inputs ! From JW Cham06

4 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 4 Systems to Commission The core of the system The Beam Interlock System (BIS) The LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS) All the systems connected to it BLM QPS – PIC – WIC FMCM Injection system Collimator System …. Related systems Hardware Safe Beam Parameters Beam Presence Flag Software Post Mortem system Management of critical settings Software Interlock System Sequencer

5 Beam Energy Tracking Beam Dumping System 4 x DCCT Dipole Current (4/5, 5/6, 6/7, 7/8) RF turn clock Powering Interlock System Quench Protection Power Converters Discharge Switches AUG UPS Cryogenics essential circuits auxiliary circuits Safe LHC Parameters Beam Current Monitors Current Energy SafeBeam Flag Required also for safe beam SPS Extraction Interlocks TL collimators Timing PM Trigger BLMs aperture BPMs for Beam Dump LHC Experiments Collimators / Absorbers NC Magnet Interlocks Vacuum System RF + Damper dI/dt beam current BLMs arc BPMs for dx/dt + dy/dt dI/dt magnet current Operators Software Interlocks Screens Machine Protection System and connected equipment Injection Kickers LHC Beam Interlock System Access Safety System Beam Dump Trigger Required for unsafe beam

6 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 6 Procedures Need to check that previous diagram is complete + Need to define the subsystems Have to agree upon checks to be performed on these systems for the different phases Phases also to be defined in more detail Check interplay between the different systems First outline on the next slides, based on Chamo06 presentations

7 7 Stages for Machine Protection Comm. before first beam First pilot 10 12 protons43 bunches156 bunches936 bunches 0.45 / 7 TeV SAFE at 450 GeV Hardware commissioning Machine checkout Beam commissioning 43 bunch operation ?75ns ops25ns ops I Install Phase II and MKB 25ns ops II Stage I IIIII IVNo beamBeam Just SAFE at 7 TeV From JW Cham06

8 System Commissioning before beam possible ? First pilot beam10^12 43 bunches 1.7 10^12 156 bunches 6 10^12<N<1.4 10^13 936 bunches >5 10^13 Powering interlock systemYES Beam interlock systemYES Safe distribution of energyYES Safe beam flagPARTIAL Beam presence flagPARTIAL Safe distribution of modeYES Safe distr. of squeezing factorPARTIAL Beam interlocks SPS to LHCYES Injection protectionNO Access systemYES Vacuum systemYES Magnet current change monitorYES BLMs, collimators & aperturesPARTIAL BLM in the arcsPARTIAL Collimators and beam absorbersNO Beam position change monitorsNO Fast beam current decay monitorsNO Transverse feedbackNO RFNO ExperimentsPARTIAL Beam Dumping SystemPARTIAL TCDQ / TCSNO BPM for BDSNO Injection See V. Kains presentation ! From JW Cham06

9 9 System Commissioning before beam possible ? First pilot beam10^12 43 bunches 1.7 10^12 156 bunches 6 10^12<N<1.4 10^13 936 bunches >5 10^13 Post-mortemPARTIAL Software Interlock SystemPARTIAL Critical settings managementYES SequencerPARTIAL Critical software Injection Checks will need to be repeated when going up in intensity!

10 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 10 Phases As taken from LHC-Com web pages Beam at 450 GeV safe up to of 1e12 p+, with nominal emittance Phase 1 1 x 1, 1e10 p/ bunch: safe 43 x 43, 3e10 p/bunch: int. in one beam = 1.3e12 p+ Above the safe threshold: MP system needs to be commissioned at the first step of intensity increase Will need to be (partly) re-checked for intensity dependent effects at the following sub stages Check again at 156 bunches Check again …intermediate… ? Check again at 936 bunches Check again at 2808 bunches Will need to repeat (part of) the check when operating conditions change Optics (squeeze ) Emittance Polarities of the magnets of the experiments Ion operation

11 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 11 Different Systems Can only commission one system at a time. Proposed logical order of commissioning: 1. Injection System a) But needs some collimation 2. Beam Dumping System a) But needs some collimation, BLMs and BPMs 3. Other Systems – expected or unexpected beam dependence (BPMs, FMCM, noise pick-up in general) 4. BLM System 5. Collimation System

12 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 12 Injection System Special injection BIC Check all the inputs – can this be done completely without beam? additional input: SPS safe beam intensity, SPS intensity, LHC beam presence, LHC beam intensity, LHC energy TL collimation system Mainly after the TI 8 TED, so can not be tested independently of the LHC 7 collimators per line (momentum TCDI at start of the lime) 6 betatron collimators in last 300 m TCDIs need beam for setting-up TCDI beam commissioning needs LHC beam permit

13 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 13 Injection System ctd. Check setting of active element. These settings (MCS) and read backs will now need to be interlocked. Verify interlocking. magnet currents with ROCS surveillance and Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor Septa, kickers (voltage and timing) Check position of protection elements TDI, TCLIs, TCDD Alignment with beam, use transmission measurements Check that BLM readings in this area as expected TCLIs enhance performance of TDI. TCLIs are needed above 50% of nominal injected intensity and can be commissioned later

14 V. Kain AB/OP14 Systems concerned (3) Passive Protection: TDI-TCDD-TCLI 4.25 m long TDI, mask TCDD and auxiliary collimators TCLI to protect against MKI failures –setting for TDI-TCLI 6.8 to protect LHC at 7.5 –need beam for setting-up From VK Cham06 Inject and Dump Mode very useful: needs to be commissioned

15 V. Kain AB/OP15 Systems concerned (6) Software Software interlocking system (SIS) Trajectories, screen positions, MCS, maximum allowed injection intensity … Management of Critical Settings (MCS) Remote management of interlock settings in a secure way (needs SIS) MKI, MKE, TDI, TCLI, TCDI, ROCS, BLMs, BPCE, MSE First version for extraction/transfer tests 2006. Single client. Extraction/transfer/injection data analysis and diagnostics Shot-by-shot beam quality check to allow next extraction/injection Analysis after abnormal situation e.g. interlock (post mortem) First versions planned for CNGS commissioning/Sector Test. LHC injection sequencer setting-up of TDI/TCDD/TCLI inject & dump From VK Cham06

16 V. Kain AB/OP16 Timeline: Systems required for different commissioning stages installed & prototype test needed, but may not be fully available installed & fully operational beam 1 beam 2 20062007 Need almost everything

17 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 17 Beam Dump System Check and optimise settings of active elements MKD, MSD, MKB Check amplitude and fine timing (2 x 15 individual MKD systems) Optimisation requires local HARDWARE changes! Check interlocking of these settings, BPM interlock LSS6 Check and optimise settings of protection elements TCDQ and TCS (partial commissioning required, setting at ± 10 ) Dependence of collimator system and orbit feedback Check apertures MSD, MKD, TCDS, TCDQ, TCS, TCDQM Check that BLM readings agree with expectations Check Post Mortem, commissioning of the extraction lines (TD) IPOC, XPOC Interlock on PM ! Check re-triggering with beam (sweep across TCDS, TCDQ)? Commissioning of abort gap watchdog Present MKB system limits LHC max intensity at full energy to half nominal but full intensity up to 2 TeV See BG Cham06

18 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 18 BIC Systems Injection BIC Ring BIC Can all be tested without beam? Additional tests with beam? Want to see the whole chain working emc

19 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 19 BPM System Check dependence of beam position on measured beam intensity Number of bad BPMs acceptable? Special attention: Interlocked BPMs in dump area Test dumping beam for different orbits in dump area, part of tests LBDS Stability of beams, especially collimator area Will need a working orbit feedback

20 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 20 BLM System Check dependence of measured beam losses on beam intensity All linear? Agrees with models? Differences understood? If not: acceptable? Test a beam dump initiated by a BLM, triggered by beam loss? Procedures of adjusting BLM thresholds (MPWG)

21 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 21 Collimators See talk Ralph Collimators interaction with Injection system collimators Beam dumping system collimators Beam loss monitors (for setting up) Beam position monitors (for setting up) Orbit feedback Interaction with optics Beta beat Need global coordination

22 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 22 Safe Beam Flag Need to check the proper functioning of the safe beam flag In this stage only intensity dependence

23 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 23 Systems not discussed in detail Further QPS tests? RF phasing with LBDS, max f rf dI/dt beam current Screens out Software interlocks

24 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 24 Conclusions and Discussion The Machine Protection System is complicated, already at injection Many tests can be done before beam operation (esp. BIC) Main systems identified BIC, Injection, LBDS, BLMs, Collimators Other systems….(MCS, QPS, FMCM, dI/dt, Software interlocks, Sequencer) Many cross links between systems This presentation is useless without follow-up Soon! Sub-groups? Detailed and agreed upon procedures will be required Start with overview tables as presented at Chamonix by JW and VK Define more details By the people responsible for equipment or systems Plus check links between the different systems Document procedures and check consistency (see next talk: LHCCWG Web Follow Up) Documentation of test results required Profit from experience of Hardware Commissioning?

25 Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 25 Conclusions and Discussion, ctd. How do we move between the different phases of MPS commissioning? Use sequencer to be sure not to run outside the bounds of commissioned operating conditions? Is this safe enough? Operation in certain mode allowed, depending on Intensity, Energy, Squeeze, Ions,… Who is looking after the sequencer, what will it do? Use Safe Beam Parameter system to create interlock when intensity x energy is outside the commissioned region? ICFA-HB2006 workshop end of this month Session on commissioning MP Systems Experience from other labs

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