The threat posed by drones to Europe’s armed forces Technical Analysis, Regional and Global Implications Tal Inbar Head, Space Research Center The Fisher Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies, Israel Brussels, November 20, 2018 FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

Disclaimer This presentation is based exclusively on unclassified open source information The views presented represent the author and do NOT necessarily represent an official Israeli governmental position;

The threat – and some countermeasures needed The threat of drones and UAV should be understood by the forces on the ground, and lead to changes in the situational awareness and the concept of operations. To cope with drone and UAV threats, we should switch from “national” (or theater) aerial defense to bringing the countermeasures to the units at the TACTICAL and OPERATIONAL levels. (In a way, back to classic AA capabilities).

The threat – and some countermeasures needed We have to distinct between the threats in peacetime and war. During peacetime we could work with drone (and UAV) manufacturers – in terms of regulations, technical means to make the vehicles inoperative at specific areas etc., creating UTM database – to name few options. We should understand the threat and its various tiers – and to tailor a suitable technological solution for each tier. Counter Drone and UAV capabilities needs unorthodox thinking. One possible solution is to create a dedicated Air-to-Air UAV for the purpose of keeping the sky clean of hostile UAVs and drones.

Seized ISIS munitions for quadcopters, Syria (October 2017) 3D printed tail and body Fragmentations

Tail – from badminton ball From improvisation….. Tail – from badminton ball Plastic tube 40 mm grenade

Fuse taken from mortar bombs To serial production Fuse taken from mortar bombs Standardization – unified body and tail. Some are 3d printed, some molded

Tube for holding bomblet ISIS operated armed quadcopter Tube for holding bomblet Camera

ISIS operated armed quadcopter

ISIS operated armed quadcopter Tank Military vehicle Bomblet

Explosion od the bomblet and a destruction of military vehicle ISIS operated armed quadcopter Explosion od the bomblet and a destruction of military vehicle

insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018

Fuse taken from mortar bomb insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018 Fuse taken from mortar bomb

Fuse (taken from mortar shell) Improvised munition for UAV insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018 Fuse (taken from mortar shell) Improvised munition for UAV 3D printed tail and body Fragmentation Remains of fuse

insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018

insurgents attack on Hemimim AFB, Syria, January 2018 Damaged Russian Su-24

Armed Quadcopter, Syria RPG warhead

ISIS made armed drone, Iraq ATGM

Original Houthi infographics The Houthi UAV force Original Houthi infographics

“Qasef” UAV – Iranian Ababil

“Qasef” UAV – Iranian Ababil

Original Iranian Ababil 2

October 2016 display in Tehran Iran’s advanced UAV More than 20 types of UAVs could ne identified in Iranian use. Iran officially admits it copied US and Israeli vehicles that fell in Iran. October 2016 display in Tehran Original US MQ-1 Original US RQ 170

Iran’s advanced UAV Note the defying banner – “from US and Israel to Iran” Original US MQ-1 “Predator” displayed by Iran on October 1, 2016

Iran’s advanced UAV Shahed 109, an Iranian “clone” if Israel’s Hermes 450, operated in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. ~24 hours endurance

Iran’s advanced UAV “Stealth” , Armed Iranian UAV, operated from Syria against Israel. One vehicle was shot down over Israel on 2017.

This UAV was put in to action on 2018 over targets in Iraq Iran’s advanced UAV This UAV was put in to action on 2018 over targets in Iraq

Conclusions and Future prospects The threat is real. The wide availability and low cost of UAS platforms make them an attractive purchase for terrorists or criminals adding aerial capability to illicit activities. In their unmodified state, UAS platforms can create a public nuisance, interfere with aircraft or airspace operations, collect information that can be utilized for illicit purposes, and be employed as a kinetic weapons.

Conclusions and Future prospects Moreover, the use of unmanned systems adds a new layer of complication in the investigative process, as automation and increased standoff distances provide perpetrators a shield of anonymity. In the event of a plot failure, this anonymity reduces the risk of capture, leaving terrorists or criminals "free to strike another day.".

Counter drones strategies Identification Prevention Mitigation

Counter-swarm capabilities: still an unanswered challenge

New threat: cheap drones with greater lethality ATGM Bombs A/G missile 40 mm grenade launcher A/G rockets

Are we ready for the challenges?

talinbar@fisherinstitute.org.il Tal Inbar @inbarspace Thank you for your attention! talinbar@fisherinstitute.org.il Tal Inbar @inbarspace