Wingnuts, Cones and Forks Alan Robinson, Dstl ISMOR 26, Sep 2009 ©Crown Copyright 2009. Published with the permission of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory on behalf of the Controller of HMSO

Structure Why use planning scenarios ? What else do we need to do ? Some other considerations Disclaimer – my views not, necessarily, those of the MoD! 02 January 2019

Why Use Planning Scenarios ? Prediction is difficult… … especially about the future So why bother with scenario-based planning ? 02 January 2019

Why does MoD use planning scenarios? Coherent set of scenarios that all defence studies can work from Reduces risk of advocacy-based analysis Basing decisions on analysis from a number of scenarios adds confidence to MoD decisions 02 January 2019

UK MoD Planning Scenarios Formally derived from UK Policy Maintained by the Studies Assumptions Group (SAG) Set of scenarios representative of policy In different countries Against different adversaries With different aims Based around the world to give stretching examples of operations the UK wishes to plan for Based on real-world geography 02 January 2019

Using Scenarios DEFENCE POLICY Scenarios Feedback Feedback Planning factors - e.g. concurrency assumptions What defence should plan to achieve? DEFENCE POLICY Scenarios A lot happens in here… Detailed work up of the campaign Force estimation Instantiation in models Will typically involve modelling at multiple-levels… High-level campaign modelling Detailed analysis of vignettes …and a raft of sensitivity analysis Consistent approach to developing scenarios, with buy-in across stakeholders Feedback Feedback Campaign Development Provides a “reference” case campaign and some ideas on key potential variations Analysis/ Evidence 02 January 2019

What else do we need to do ? “SAGWorld” provides a set of reference case scenarios However, we also need to consider Other potential futures Impact of the “real” world Then we can check: How robust our policies and force structure plans are to such alternatives Which alternative futures we want to invest in being able to address… …which we’ll be able to cope with (because of the other things we plan on being able to achieve)… …which will evolve slowly enough that we can adapt to them… …and which we’re prepared to accept as risks. 02 January 2019

Some examples Alternative future scenarios and future worlds Cones, shocks and trends The impact of current operations and policy developments The “wingnut” Using history to help with the future Agile forces, adapting to evolving futures, “forks in the road” Looking for disruptive technologies S&T Trends Defence Implications, Horizon Scanning Building alternative force structures Donuts, risk frameworks 02 January 2019

Cones - Future Scenarios, Future Worlds 0 Years 15 Years 30 Years Divergent Outcomes Social Resource Political Technological TRENDS Military DIMENSIONS Plausible Alternative Shocks Probable Where we are now Where might we be? 02 January 2019

Cones - Future Scenarios, Future Worlds 0 Years 15 Years 30 Years “S A G w o r l d” Where we are now Where might we be? TRENDS DIMENSIONS Plausible Shocks Resource Social Alternative Probable Political Technological Military 02 January 2019

? Illustrative Worlds GLOBAL HARMONY SLOWLY STABILISING PERSISTING THREATS UNDER ATTACK … ? 02 January 2019

? Illustrative Worlds How likely are these worlds ? What scenarios might occur in these worlds? Which scenarios are common to all/many worlds? Which scenarios only occur in unlikely worlds? How do we monitor the evolution of the real world so we know which futures are becoming more/less likely? ? 02 January 2019

The “Wingnut” What is the effect of current deviations from policy ? Plausible What is the effect of current deviations from policy ? Alternative Probable Policy evolution What are the implications of current operations ? Where we are now 02 January 2019

S&T Trends Defence Implications Can be used to spot potential “positive” disruption (what we can do to them) and “negative” disruption (what they might do to us). 02 January 2019

Agile Forces Asks two key questions: Quantifies the key dimensions Are there patterns in the conflicts of the past that can be used to help plan for the future ? How do we assess agility of the force structure to adapt to future eventualities ? Quantifies the key dimensions from strategic trends work 02 January 2019

Agile Forces The future is unlikely to look like a simple extrapolation of the past ‘Futures’ have statistical structure Can begin to explore potential high impact low probability events (‘shocks’) across strategic trends Consistent with Complex Adaptive Systems emergent behaviour Can test ability of force structures to be robust and/or adaptable to shocks and trends Where are the “forks in the road” in terms of future worlds/scenarios we can adapt to meet provided we make appropriate choices in a timely fashion ? 02 January 2019

Some Other Considerations How do we pull all this together… Start with worlds not scenarios 02 January 2019

Scenarios and Worlds It matters less whether alternative future worlds are “right” than That we understand the basis for our planning We are alive to alternative futures and their implications We know the differential impact of different worlds/scenarios We understand how well we can adapt over time as the “real” world unfolds Policy/strategy and resources need to be aligned appropriately Expectation management and risk perception are key 02 January 2019

Some Other Considerations How do we pull all this together… Start with worlds not scenarios Decide what you want to plan to able to do 02 January 2019

Donuts - Possible Force Structure Concepts Under a specific set of assumptions… “Must do” “Should do” “Only if choose to” 02 January 2019

Donuts - Possible Force Structure Concepts (with affordability added) Under a specific set of assumptions… “Must do” “What can we afford to do?” and/or “What can’t we afford not to do?!” 02 January 2019

Some Other Considerations How do we pull all this together… Start with worlds not scenarios Decide what you want to plan to able to do Adopt a consistent risk/effectiveness/resource description 02 January 2019

Where can we take risk? Readiness risk is the most acceptable delays unlikely to have significant implications Concurrency risk is less acceptable may jeopardise UK’s ability to conduct other important operations Operational risk is least acceptable implications for international stability, upholding international obligations, protecting territory Political Risk assessed usually through judgement Risk of damage to the domestic or international reputation of the UK Political risk Unacceptability Readiness Concurrency Operational 02 January 2019

Some Other Considerations How do we pull all this together… Start with worlds not scenarios Decide what you want to plan to able to do Adopt a consistent risk/effectiveness/resource description Articulate the results in a clear fashion Readily assimilated by senior audiences Describing the key assumptions Clearly illustrating the consequences of any potential policy choices 02 January 2019

The Take Home… While (rightly) ensuring we are successful in current ops, how do we also ensure that We don’t lock ourselves into a view of the future that is unlikely to come about ? We temper current operational imperatives with sufficient attention to other potential future eventualities ? We fully consider non-equipment and non-technology aspects ? Consistent use of appropriate worlds/scenarios is one of the keys to success Enables effective alignment of resources, risks and expectations Provides an auditable and explicit framework for planning But… Needs to be dynamic and responsive to evolving futures 02 January 2019

How not to do it… 02 January 2019

Questions, Observations … 02 January 2019