Track circuit reliability assessment for preventing railway accidents

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Forklift Safety.
Advertisements

Terje Andersen 06 May 2011 Analysis of past derailments Information from data bases, investigation reports and surveys.
Presenters: Steve Gigliotti Laura McMullen Marcus Smith.
Andy Rowland Head of Propositions BT Global Services January 2010 IRSE Seminar - Fibre Acoustic Monitoring.
Transport and Climate Change Different Policy Scenario in France Maurice GIRAULT Ministère de l'Equipement, des Transports et du Logement, France I - Passenger.
Estimating Tree Failure Risk Along Connecticut Utility Right-of-Ways Helen Poulos Wesleyan University Ann Camp Yale School of Forestry and Environmental.
ABS(Antilock braking system)
R A I L T R A C K Presentation to Liability Underwriters Group Conference 4 September 2002 Ian Thompson Head of Insurance & Risk Management Railtrack PLC.
Infrastrucure presentation VZNERRAC PLENARY 11 Railway Infrastructure for the Twenty First Century John Amoore Network Rail and ERRAC.
Workshop on Infrastructures Sustainable Infrastructure for Efficient Mobility: the Key Challenges Luc Bourdeau ECTP Secretary General Industrial Technologies.
Industrial Automation
GUIDING LIGHTS TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION TO THEIR GLOBAL LOCOMOTIVE DRIVER TRAINING SIMULATOR PROGRAMM PROVIDING THE WORLDS MOST ADVANCED RAIL SIMULATION.
Frequency analysis and scenario development
SMS Operation.  Internal safety (SMS) audits are used to ensure that the structure of an SMS is sound.  It is also a formal process to ensure continuous.
ea technology Effective Condition Assessment of MV Switchgear
The negative impact of certain technical aspects on safety in the right-hand traffic Andrzej Bogdanowicz – Ministry of Infrastructure.
Protecting the Public, Astronauts and Pilots, the NASA Workforce, and High-Value Equipment and Property Mission Success Starts With Safety Believe it or.
Job Safety Analysis (JSA)
Railway Operations: Issues and Objectives Capacity management Infrastructure planning Timetable preparation Management of day-to-day movement of trains.
Changing risk in the liberalised rail freight market Ian Lake – Railway Safety Commission.
1 Review and Assessment of the Korea Rail ’ s Safety Performance using Risk Assessment Models International Railway Safety Conference 2009, Sweden Chan-Woo.
Increasing of level crossing safety. Protecting modes of level crossings on MÁV network.
Page 1 3rd Annual Conference on Systems Engineering Research Approach to Identify the Defense Elements within a Transport System Alain Cointet Paris Mass.
Isolation Lock-Out Room Johns River Quarry Site Contact: Blake Ardrey, Quarry Manager, BCM, Johns River Quarry Phone:
ASPEC Damaging Energies New Staff Induction What is this course about? This course is designed to talk through the major damaging energies on site. It.
Detector Derailment Device (&) Frenado (Braking) Automatic Train
Low Power and Shutdown PSA IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country.
An introduction to… Lockout Tagout. Aim Every year thousands of workers get killed or injured while performing repairs or maintenance on industrial equipment.
HIGH SPEED RAIL ASSESSMENT NORGE
Gasunie is one of the biggest gas infrastructure companies in Europe. Within the company, we give safety the highest priority; it forms the basis of our.
Title: Road vs. Rail… A shift towards rail Date: 16 Nov 2015.
1 Address: UIC Safety Database (SDB) System and Results.
Road and rail safety. Look at the next slides and try to guess what each picture is of as it is revealed. The three pictures will show the most important.
NOISE POLLUTION & THERMAL POLLUTION
Office of Rail Regulation
Guide for the application of the CSM design targets (CSM-DT)
Getting Prepared: Policy Implications for Transportation Planning
Guide for the application of the CSM design targets (CSM-DT)
Sustainable maintenance of high-speed lines with mixed traffic
Public Conference December
Guide for the application of CSM design targets (CSM DT)
IRSC 2005 Cape Town - South Africa 9 – 14 october 2005
ANNEX 4 : EXAMPLE STANDARDISED LEVEL CROSSING SYSTEM
ANTI-COLLISON AND BRAKING SYSTEM
ANTI COLLISION SYSTEM FOR TRAINS.
Communications in Railway Centralized Traffic Control Systems
8 Managing Risk (Premium).
Instrument Maintenance
ANTI LOCK BRAKING SYSTEM
Quality Assurance applied to Accelerator Safety
ELECTRIC TRACTION SYSTEM
IRSC 2017 Hong-Kong.
Gasunie is one of the biggest gas infrastructure companies in Europe
Maintenance Strategies for Turnouts
Increasing Asset Lifecycle through the application of Innovative Technology
OVERVIEW: POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL (ptc)
Air Carrier Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (CASS)
Important Maintenance Tips for Brakes
The Safety Technologies to Consider While Buying a New Car.
Reviewing differential speeds: potential route linespeed improvements
MAHARANA PRATAP ENGG. COLLEGE SENSOTRONIC BRAKE CONTROL
Workshop on Accelerator Operations
Final Conference in Paris Exploitation plan
Winch Signalling System
Rail Safety Summit 1st November 2018 Ian Prosser CBE
Towards Suistanable Development - TSD 2018
Hazards Analysis & Risks Assessment
Presentation of the Company
Rules of the Road Chapter 11
INDIA ENERGY CONGRESS - EFFICIENT ENERGY ON 31ST JAN., 2007
Presentation transcript:

Track circuit reliability assessment for preventing railway accidents Pr. Jean-Luc WYBO European University of CYPRUS JLW CONSEIL S.A.S.

Track circuits role in railway safety Railway safety is based on 3 main components: Technology, Organization and Human Resources Technology: trains, infrastructure and signaling systems Safety is ensured by design, surveillance and maintenance Track circuits: a common and essential component Used to determine the location of trains and ensure safe traffic Used to trigger safety devices: stop signals, level crossings Track circuits reliability depends on the contact wheel-rail Some factors contribute to pollute the contact Leaves in autumn, chemical compounds, sand, oxidation Other factors contribute to clean the contact Heavy rolling stock, electrical current, frequency of trains Traffic evolution in the recent years raises concerns Less freight traffic and lighter passenger trains decrease TC reliability

Causes of Track Circuit malfunctions Several sources were used to identify the main parameters that influence Track Circuits reliability: Sources of knowledge to understand malfunctions’ causes: Studies’ results from SNCF and different countries (NL, GB, BE) Analysis reports of past accidents in which TC malfunctions were cited Sources of data to identify TC malfunctions’ occurrences (time & location) Records of TC automatic Surveillance systems Data log of computerized switching systems TC reliability is a balance between polluting and cleaning Several sources of pollution create an isolating layer Vegetation leaves, chemical compounds, sand, oxides The climatic conditions and the rail profile degradation make pollution worse Traffic characteristics influence rail cleaning Tonnage, frequency, electric traction, time distribution TC reliability also depends on the TC type and train type Some TCs use less sensitive technology or cover long distances Some trains don’t shunt reliably (disk brakes, narrow wheel contact)

Main parameters driving TC reliability 1 (++) 2 (+) 3 (-) 4 (--) Pollution due to vegetation (leaves on rails, mainly in autumn) None Low High Very high Industrial of agricultural pollution on rails Pollution imported from outside the track circuit Sanding of rails by trains Never Seldom Often Very often Rail oxidation Very low Rail profile degradation Climatic conditions reducing contact quality (wind, humidity, fog, …) No Moderate Daily tonnage passing on the track (Tons) >15000 >3000 >1000 <=1000 Number of trains per day >20 >12 >6 <=6 Type of trains’ source of energy All electric Mostly electric Mostly thermic All thermic Type of trains: light (passengers) vs. heavy (freight) All freight Mostly freight Mostly passengers All passengers Timely distribution of traffic (along the day, along the week) Non-stop Mainly continuous Some interruptions Often disrupted Existing failure/malfunction cases for this track circuit type Very few Some Many Proportion of trains known as “weakly shunting” <20% <50% <80% >80%

TC Reliability model

Potential severity of TC failure Track Circuits are used in different configurations Each configuration corresponds to one or several accident scenarios Each accident scenario has an average severity Assessed from analysis of past accidents Local context influences the potential severity of accidents Aggravating/reducing factors (speed, traffic, dangerous goods, …) Values at stake (number of passengers, financial impacts, …) Potential severity is evaluated by: Identifying the type of TC’s exploitation mode Identifying the accident scenario with the highest severity Evaluating the effect of local context

TC failure potential severity model

Risk assessment model Risk assessment supports decisions for resource allocation Risk is represented by the combination of possibility and severity levels The Risk Matrix associates a priority level to every combination From 1 (situation OK) to 4 (urgent need of risk reduction measures)

TC malfunction risk reduction Preventive measures can improve reliability Remove vegetation along the tracks to prevent leaves falling on rails Organize circulation of heavy trains after traffic interruptions Increase time constant of TC receivers Wash rails frequently using high pressure water jets Install cleaning brushes on wheels Equip weakly shunting trains with TC assisters Replace low sensitivity TCs by more recent technologies Add complementary devices (shunting pedals for level crossings) Replace TC systems by other more reliable technologies Few protective measures can reduce severity Manage less reliable circulations using a more controlled way Replace level crossings by tunnels or bridges

Assess risk reduction measures efficiency Every risk reduction measure is described by: The context in which it can be applied The parameter(s) on which it has a reduction effect A Confidence index assessed from the analysis of historical data This confidence index determines the amount of reduction Resources needed to set up the measure (initial, periodic) Risk reduction is determined Reduction is applied to all parameters influenced by measures Reliability and severity models are applied with reduced values Reduced risk level is put in the risk matrix to assess priority level It is important to keep in mind initial risk level To explain the role of measures and ensure their presence To be prepared to the failure of risk reduction measures

Conclusion and prespectives The reliability of train detection using track circuits can be assessed using a small number of parameters Potential severity of the consequences of TC failure depends on how it is used and the context in which is is placed TC’s risk of failure combines Reliability and potential severity and depends on local context The models presented here allow SNCF managers to choose the most appropriate risk reduction measures by: Using a national-level evaluation of risk-reduction barriers Using a common method to assess reliability, severity and risk Choosing the reduction measures fitted to every TC’s local context