Moral Realism and the Challenge of Skepticism Chapter Thirteen: Moral Realism and the Challenge of Skepticism Moral Realism This theory claims that moral facts exist and are part of the fabric of the universe: they exist independently of our thoughts about them

Terms Nonnaturalism: a theory held by nonnaturalistic moral realists who ground moral values in nonnatural facts about the world Moral skepticism: a denial that moral values are objectively factual Moral nihilism: holds that there are no moral facts, no moral truths, and no moral knowledge.

Mackie’s Moral Skepticism Argues “there are no objective values”, there are no objective moral truths His view is not about the meaning of moral statements but about objective facts, about whether there are any factually right or good actions.

Arguments from Relativity, Queerness, and Projection Mackie offers three arguments for his skeptical position: 1. Argument from relativity: there is no universal moral code to which all people adhere to 2. Argument from queerness: the implausiblity of supposing that such things as values have an independent existence

Arguments from Relativity, Queerness, and Projection 3. Argument from projection: aims to show that belief in objective value is the result of psychological tendencies to project subjective beliefs to the outside world

Harman’s Moral Nihilism Defends an extreme Moral Nihilism, morality is simply an illusion Disanalogy thesis: moral principles cannot be tested by observation in the same way that scientific theories can. We choose our moral values not because of the way the world is, but because of the way we were brought up into this world.

Criticism: Scientific and Moral Observation are Analogous There is no strong disanalogy between scientific and moral observation May not be able to be tested in the same way as empirical theories but they can be tested

A Defense of Moral Realism Moral Facts about Happiness and Suffering Universal and Supervenient Properties Noncognitivism and Moral Realism