DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop 2017 Bob Lowrie

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Presentation transcript:

Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams DOE Accelerator Safety Workshop 2017 Bob Lowrie AECOM N&E Technical Services Senior Technical Advisor FRIB ES&H Deputy Manager August 2017

Outline Facility for Rare Isotope Beams (FRIB) at Michigan State University (MSU) project status Hazard identification, postulated event scenarios, and control selection Approach to assure that the person responsible for each system owns the safety basis and the safety controls associated with their area of responsibility Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams

Facility for Rare Isotope Beams A DOE-SC National User Facility Funded by DOE–SC Office of Nuclear Physics with contributions and cost share from Michigan State University Serving nearly 1,400 users Key feature is 400 kW beam power for all ions Separation of isotopes in-flight provides Fast development time for any isotope All elements and short half-lives Fast, stopped, and reaccelerated beams https://frib.msu.edu/ Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams

FRIB Hazard Identification and Control FRIB’s hazards and controls are not unique and are consistent with other similar facilities, but a key to success is that the evaluation is comprehensive The approach to identifying hazards, identifying potential event scenarios, and selecting controls is based on a proven process used by AECOM N&E TS at a broad range of facilities, including nuclear facilities, accelerators, and other non-nuclear facilities N&E TS has a number of tools and techniques available to facilitate hazard evaluation and control selection Used an interview and feedback approach which fit the MSU and FRIB working environment A key factor is the experience of the safety professional leading the discussion This approach to performing and documenting the hazard and event evaluation, control selection, and control effectiveness evaluation establishes a benchmark against which project evolution could be measured and project design and operational safety could be evaluated at any time Hazard evaluation and postulated event development was initiated early to guide design and updated as the design evolved Recently updated to account for commissioning and operational specifics and to support the SAD Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams

Hazard Analysis Organization Facility breakdown Conventional Facilities Driver Linac Target and Experimental Areas Cryogenic Systems All event types are addressed E-1 Fire E-2 Explosion E-3 Loss of Containment/Confinement E-4 Direct Radiological/Chemical Exposure E-5 Cryogenic Events E-6 External Events E-7 Natural Phenomena CFH Conventional Hazards (Standard Industrial Hazards) Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams

Documentation for Each Event Event number and event category Event description Causes Assumptions and initial conditions Unmitigated impact on systems Initiating event frequency Unmitigated consequences (Radiological, Chemical, Cryogenic ODH) Safety function Method of detection Preventive features – attributes (engineered and administrative) Mitigative features – attributes (engineered and administrative) Credited engineered and administrative controls (CECs and CACs) Planned analysis, assumption validations, and risks/opportunities Mitigated consequences Notes Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams

Hazards are Documented and Controlled Hazards and postulated event scenarios are documented in the Hazards Analysis (HA) Current assessment includes 185 event scenarios (not all requiring controls), 24 credited engineered controls and 19 credited design features Adequacy of the credited controls are documented in the Preliminary Safety Assessment Document (PSAD) and Safety Assessment Document (SAD) Follows the basic format of ANSI N43.1 Radiation Safety for the Design and Operation of Particle Accelerators Required elements for protection in Safety Basis documentation Initial Conditions protected Credited design features Credited engineered controls Credited administrative controls The PSAD and HA provide the basis for the Safety Assessment Document (SAD), Accelerator Safety Envelope (ASE), and Operational Safety Envelope (OSE) evolution through the rolling commissioning process Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams

Control Account Managers (System Owners) and Line Management Responsible for Safety Control Account Managers (CAMs) suggest controls in accordance with requirements ESH&Q analyzes the hazards and verifies capability of the controls to satisfy the identified safety function CAMs document and assure their systems will perform the required safety function ESH&Q uses Hazards Analysis (HA) and Preliminary Safety Assessment Document (PSAD) to collect, document and verify the hazards and mitigations Highly interactive and ongoing process, hazard identification and analysis based on meetings with division directors and system owners System owner credited safety control assurance declaration and FRIB acceptance is captured in the CAM assurance document for that system Hazard owner either owns the credited control or agrees with control owner on the appropriate control for the hazard CAM assurance declaration prepared by control owner Concurrence provided by project office Chief engineer, ESH&Q manager, ES&H deputy manager Concurrence provided by other stakeholders Interfacing systems and CAMs that also use the control for their hazard Approval provided by division director Project acceptance provided by project manager Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams

CAM Assurance Document Content Each credited engineered active and passive control (CEC) Hazard and events affecting design Each event from the HA is listed and the requirements for the CEC associated with that event are identified Associated controls (CECs and CACs) required to satisfy the safety function are listed Credited safety requirements Succinct statement of the safety function is provided Functional performance requirements are provided to assure that each of the identified event scenarios are addressed System description and hazard mitigation assurance Prepared by the system owner as their assurance to the project that their design would satisfy the identified safety function and functional performance requirements Validated by as-built documentation following completion and testing Open items and unmitigated hazards Used throughout design process as a communication tool as design evolves Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams

Achieved Beneficial Occupancy on 24 March 2017 Initial Oxygen and Argon non-accelerated beams transported April and May 2017 Hazard Assessment Methodology Applied at the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams