Access system and radiation monitors session (session 5) Topics and subjects discussed Main issues Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski 5 th February

2 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Laurette Ponce (BE/OP): “How did the LHC access system perform in 2009?” “How did the LHC access system perform in 2009?”  Julie Coupard (EN/MEF): “How should the access system be operated while LHC is not in beam operation?” “How should the access system be operated while LHC is not in beam operation?”  Marc Tavlet (BE DSO to be): “Is there a need for re-sectorization and/or additional interlocks?” “Is there a need for re-sectorization and/or additional interlocks?”  Rui Nunes (GS/ASE): “Impact of safety related requirements and evolutions on LASS and LACS” “Impact of safety related requirements and evolutions on LASS and LACS”  Timo Hakulinen (GS/ASE): “How to achieve satisfactory performances of the access system: stability, efficiency, operation, fluidity?” “How to achieve satisfactory performances of the access system: stability, efficiency, operation, fluidity?”  Doris Forkel-Wirth (DGS/RP): “Arcon/Ramses: current status and operational risks” “Arcon/Ramses: current status and operational risks” Program 2 What went wrong with the access system and procedures? What would we wish to change? What are the current issues? How can/will these issues be addressed? What are the consequences for the access system? What else may have an (indirect) impact on availability of LHC? Radiation monitors

3 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Organizational issues  Sectorization: Justification and implications  Access system performance  How to improve access fluidity  MAD  Radiation monitors Layout 3

4 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski Access organization: responsibilities 4 Planning and coordination Safety coordination J. Coupard

5 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Introduction of the AET (Avis d’Exécution de Travaux): To be put in place before next shutdown To be put in place before next shutdown A streamlined ADI + AOC + … A streamlined ADI + AOC + … One single document including links to VIC, DIMR, locking of equipment, hot work permit, etc… (as needed) One single document including links to VIC, DIMR, locking of equipment, hot work permit, etc… (as needed) Including specific list of people who will intervene, BUT: list that could be edited even after approval of the document Including specific list of people who will intervene, BUT: list that could be edited even after approval of the document Access organization: AET 5 J. Coupard

6 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  BE/OP to give access… Do we need more people qualified/habilitated to give access while not in Operation? Do we need more people qualified/habilitated to give access while not in Operation? Operation of the access system 6 J. Coupard

7 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Current sectorization fulfills the safety functions for which it has been designed: protect people from ionizing radiation  But: No opening of the inter-site doors when in RESTRICTED access mode No opening of the inter-site doors when in RESTRICTED access mode Heavy constraints for people who need to intervene on siteHeavy constraints for people who need to intervene on site Access sectorization as we know it: Access sectorization as we know it: Does not match the newly discovered needs of hardware commissioning: strong access restrictions during powering Phase IIDoes not match the newly discovered needs of hardware commissioning: strong access restrictions during powering Phase II Access system now also used to protect personnel from the risk of major Helium release without having been redesigned Access system now also used to protect personnel from the risk of major Helium release without having been redesigned Need to re-adjust ventilation sectorization to access sectorizationNeed to re-adjust ventilation sectorization to access sectorization Should it include other interlocks?Should it include other interlocks? Current sectorization: Implications 7 M. Tavlet

8 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  During shutdown and hardware commissioning phase circulation through inter-site doors is an issue:  Solution? Go to general mode? Go to general mode? BUT: BUT: Loose patrol: issue for the localization of peopleLoose patrol: issue for the localization of people Some areas will soon remain in restricted or closed mode (for radiation reasons)Some areas will soon remain in restricted or closed mode (for radiation reasons) Circulation through inter-site doors 8 M. Tavlet and J. Coupard

9 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Example:  How to address the issue? Add more access points? Any useful/desirable?Add more access points? Any useful/desirable? Long term need?Long term need? Satisfactory for safety? Risk analysis required!Satisfactory for safety? Risk analysis required! Access restrictions in powering Phase II 9 Access to CMS subject to conditions SD4: Conditions for working at height SD6: Conditions for working at height UX45: Solution for access being investigated M. Tavlet

10 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Need to re-adjust ventilation sectorization to access sectorization Access versus ventilation sectorization Access Point (PAD/MAD) 4. Consequence = Not possible to access US-UA before long air-decay time 2. Cable passages not air tight 3. New “overpressure” door Make cable passages air-tight Add ventilation door next to access point R. Nunes and M. Tavlet

11 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Should the LASS have a new role, i.e. protect people from other risks than radiation? Interlock cold magnets power converters with LASS? Interlock cold magnets power converters with LASS? Currently software interlock (Laurette’s interlock)Currently software interlock (Laurette’s interlock) Interlocks (I) 11 L. Ponce and M. Tavlet

12 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Principle: In addition to the existing procedure In addition to the existing procedure Prevents powering above the Phase I current limit when people are in the zone Prevents powering above the Phase I current limit when people are in the zone Stops the Power Converters of the relevant area when people enter a zone Stops the Power Converters of the relevant area when people enter a zone  Implementation: Uses the Software Interlock System Uses the Software Interlock System To generate the logic (between the access conditions and the current read in the Power Converters)To generate the logic (between the access conditions and the current read in the Power Converters) And to send commands to the power converters via the PICAnd to send commands to the power converters via the PIC Action: in case conditions are not met: Action: in case conditions are not met: A global REMOVE Power Converter permit of the relevant sector is sent… causing a Slow Power AbortA global REMOVE Power Converter permit of the relevant sector is sent… causing a Slow Power Abort  Issue: Long chain of different software modules to connect the signals  Question: Move towards a HW link between the LASS signals and the Power Interlock Controller for a long term solution? LASS-Power Converters Interlock 12 L. Ponce

13 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Should the LASS have a new role, i.e. protect people from other risks than radiation? Interlock cold magnets power converters with LASS? Interlock cold magnets power converters with LASS? Currently software interlock (Laurette’s interlock)Currently software interlock (Laurette’s interlock) Needs further investigationNeeds further investigation Is there a real need for this interlock (in the long term?) Is there a real need for this interlock (in the long term?) Needs risk analysisNeeds risk analysis New interlock for fresh air supply? New interlock for fresh air supply? Interlock ventilation doors (new over pressure doors) with LASS? Interlock ventilation doors (new over pressure doors) with LASS? Interlocks (II) 13 R. Nunes and M. Tavlet

14 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  LACS: Electro-mechanical problems on MAD, PAD, doors: Electro-mechanical problems on MAD, PAD, doors: Impact in 2009:Impact in 2009: Mainly a problem during HWC period, after a long shutdown Mainly a problem during HWC period, after a long shutdown Most problems solvedMost problems solved Key distributors: Key distributors: Impact in 2009:Impact in 2009: Blocking possibility to switch back from access mode to beam mode Blocking possibility to switch back from access mode to beam mode Currently: much improved situation but still some mechanical problemsCurrently: much improved situation but still some mechanical problems Simultaneous opening of both PAD doors: patrol drop Simultaneous opening of both PAD doors: patrol drop New software implemented just on time for beam operationNew software implemented just on time for beam operation But still occasional patrol dropsBut still occasional patrol drops  LASS: Only few changes since 2008, validated by the successful DSO tests Only few changes since 2008, validated by the successful DSO tests Connection with EIS-beam to be revisited to allow testing flexibility Connection with EIS-beam to be revisited to allow testing flexibility Access system performance 14 L. Ponce

15 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  August 1 st, 2009 till January 23 rd, 2010: Total accesses: (average 1033 / day) Total accesses: (average 1033 / day) Accesses in Restricted access mode: (average 191 / day) Accesses in Restricted access mode: (average 191 / day)  Busiest day for operators: January 14 th, 2010: Accesses in Restricted access mode: 670 keys taken Accesses in Restricted access mode: 670 keys taken Access system performance: Statistics (I) 15 T. Hakulinen

16 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  User waiting times from call to operators to access: Subjective estimates based on experienceSubjective estimates based on experience Still needs a proper distribution for analysisStill needs a proper distribution for analysis Best case: < 1 min (no rush, ADI ok, system ok) Best case: < 1 min (no rush, ADI ok, system ok) Normal: 1 – 5 min (normal operator load) Normal: 1 – 5 min (normal operator load) Worst case: 30 min – ∞ (big rush, multiple access points at the same time, technical problems) Worst case: 30 min – ∞ (big rush, multiple access points at the same time, technical problems) Normal procedure: Normal procedure: 1: user calls and gives ADI – 2: operator checks ADI in EDH – 3: operator gives key to user – 4: user enters zone1: user calls and gives ADI – 2: operator checks ADI in EDH – 3: operator gives key to user – 4: user enters zone Repeat until all users passedRepeat until all users passed Experienced operator performance: ~1 min / call Experienced operator performance: ~1 min / call Access system performances: Statistics (II) 16 T. Hakulinen

17 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Technical improvements and bug fixes: Correction of persistent software bugs and new ergonomics of the console windows Correction of persistent software bugs and new ergonomics of the console windows Solving network problems (IT issue) Solving network problems (IT issue) Biometry on badge (to avoid dependence on network) Biometry on badge (to avoid dependence on network)  Change of RESTRICTED access procedure: Allowing multiple key distribution for a group entering together, i.e. separating the safety token delivery from the PAD entrance cycle. Allowing multiple key distribution for a group entering together, i.e. separating the safety token delivery from the PAD entrance cycle.  Organization and technical change: Additional filter (valid AET) applied on the access requests: Additional filter (valid AET) applied on the access requests: Access request not treated if no valid AETAccess request not treated if no valid AET How to improve access fluidity? 17 T. Hakulinen

18 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  Detection of personnel in Material Access Devices: Ongoing issue since 2008 Ongoing issue since 2008 Improvements in place. BUT: Improvements in place. BUT:  Sensitivity versus rate of false detections is an issue  At the limit of what is possible with the approach taken. Pending actions: Making the personnel detection process fail-safe Making the personnel detection process fail-safe Fine-tuning (but is it really possible any further?) and acceptance Fine-tuning (but is it really possible any further?) and acceptance Technological redundancy… Technological redundancy…  Change strategy? Remote human video control on demand / compensatory measures (guards on sites) Remote human video control on demand / compensatory measures (guards on sites) Explore different areas of technology (redundant system) Explore different areas of technology (redundant system) MAD 18 L. Ponce and R. Nunes

19 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski  RAMSES system for LHC: proven reliable Decentralized system and autonomous (internal battery) Decentralized system and autonomous (internal battery) Detector-alarm units operate autonomously: continues to operate even if the rest of RAMSES failsDetector-alarm units operate autonomously: continues to operate even if the rest of RAMSES fails Areas well covered with monitor stations Areas well covered with monitor stations In case of failure: single channel fails: radiation monitoring ensured by remaining channelsIn case of failure: single channel fails: radiation monitoring ensured by remaining channels  ARCON system for LHC injectors: In case of failure: several channels fail: whole area without radiation monitoring! In case of failure: several channels fail: whole area without radiation monitoring! Major issue: spares missing! Major issue: spares missing! Operational risk: faulty ARCON equipment: beam stop for 1-3 days Operational risk: faulty ARCON equipment: beam stop for 1-3 days To be phased out and replaced by RAMSES: To be phased out and replaced by RAMSES: First phase (RAMSES-light, for the LHC injectors) before end of next shutdownFirst phase (RAMSES-light, for the LHC injectors) before end of next shutdown Radiation monitors 19 D. Forkel-Wirth

20 5 th February 2010 Magali Gruwé and Tomasz Ladzinski No problem* with personnel safety but issues with availability of the LHC  LACS: Ongoing issues Ongoing issues Improvements expected (for fluidity) Improvements expected (for fluidity)  Safety issues: *Ongoing (never ending?) MAD issue *Ongoing (never ending?) MAD issue Working group to be started to address: Working group to be started to address: Possible new sectorization (needs and risk analysis)Possible new sectorization (needs and risk analysis) Possible additional interlocks (needs and risk analysis)Possible additional interlocks (needs and risk analysis)  Operational risks: ARCON to be phased out ARCON to be phased out Conclusions (summary of summary) 20