Slide 1 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Fuel decontamination at Ringhals 1 with the new decontamination process ICEDEC™ E. Fredriksson, R. Ivars, A. Rosengren Westinghouse Västerås, Sweden G. Granath Ringhals AB Väröbacka, Sweden

Slide 2 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” ICEDEC  Ice decontamination Fuel decontamination by abrasion with ice particles

Slide 3 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Background Many reactors had average radiation levels far above recommendations äMandose reduction required Many ALARA remedies already taken  New approach needed!

Slide 4 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Background contd. Attack the origin of the radiation - the fuel crud äThe main part of the radiation originates from cobalt –Co-60

Slide 5 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Development of the fuel decontamination technique ICEDEC  Developed by Westinghouse Atom in co-operation with Ringhals 1 Feasibility studies Loop performance tests 1998 Fuel integrity tests 1998 Pilot plant tests with synthetic loose crud 1998 Evaluation and preparation for full-scale testing Full-scale tests of spent fuel 2001 Decontamination of two year-old fuel 2001 äThe fuel was put back in core for further irradiation

Slide 6 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Criteria Criteria for development of a fuel decontamination method: Remove the fuel crud without risking the fuel integrity. The method should be non chemical The oxide-layer on the fuel cladding should not be affected. Prevent the removed crud from reaching the pool water.

Slide 7 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” ICEDEC  Sketch of the system n

Slide 8 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” BWR ICEDEC  Fuel container Pump Ice feeder Special filter: -Dimensions as a BWR fuel assembly -High radiation resistance

Slide 9 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” ICEDEC 

Slide 10 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” ICEDEC  filter unit Four parallel filter modules äfiltering in two steps –two sections each, 10  m, 1  m One filter module in series with the others  0,5  m Outer dimensions as a fuel assembly Optional: Ion exchange module äMixed bed resins

Slide 11 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” ICEDEC  filter unit contd. Capacity: 5 kg crud Corresponding to approximately 150 two-year-old fuel assemblies

Slide 12 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Decontamination tests Ringhals Spent fuel (five-year-old) äVerification tests Two-year-old fuel äDecontamination of fuel for further irradiation

Slide 13 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Verification tests Procedure, process parameters (flow, pressure…) Fuel integrity äfuel inspections before and after decontamination Filter efficiency Decontamination efficiency äcrud sampling äon-line gamma detection ägamma scanning

Slide 14 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Decontamination of two-year-old fuel Decontamination at Ringhals 1, June 2001 Fuel inspection before and after decontamination Decontamination efficiency äcrud sampling äon-line gamma detection

Slide 15 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” ICEDEC  Sketch of the system

Slide 16 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Process verification studies

Slide 17 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Process verification studies contd. The crud was only removed when ice particles was fed to the fuel assembly The decontamination ceased within 10 sec after ice feeding was stopped äEasy to manage the decontamination process Decontamination and dismounting of equipment free from complications Mandoses as for normal fuel services 

Slide 18 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Fuel integrity - inspection programme Fuel inspection - aim Visual inspection of sub-assemblies, sub channels ämechanical integrity of the fuel Gamma scanning äspacer displacements Oxide thickness measurement ädepth of the decontamination procedure Crud sampling äamount of removed crud

Slide 19 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Results of the fuel inspection Details to be published in Jahrestagung Kerntechnique, Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology, May 2002, Germany

Slide 20 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Visual inspection Normal behaviour both before and after the decontamination The rods remained in contact with the bottom tie plate All components, such as spacers, compression springs, nuts and tie plates were free from any defects

Slide 21 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Inspection of five-year-old fuel Bottom plate before decontamination Bottom plate after decontamination

Slide 22 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Inspection of five-year-old fuel contd. Spacer six before decontamination, Spacer six after decontamination

Slide 23 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Inspection of five-year-old fuel contd. Top plate before decontamination Top plate after decontamination

Slide 24 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Inspection of two-year-old fuel Spacer two before decontamination Spacer two after decontamination

Slide 25 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Spacer displacements Two-year old-fuel: No spacer displacement was shown Five-year-old fuel:The lowest spacers had moved upwards to the mechanical stop äThe first fuel assembly tested before conditions such as flow and pressure had been established äRegarded as normal behaviour owing to relaxed spring forces in spent fuel spacers

Slide 26 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Oxide measurements Only the loose crud was removed - the cladding oxide remained intact

Slide 27 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Crud sampling Brush and grind (loose and tenacious crud) sampling before and after decontamination - detection of Co-60 Amount of loose crud: ä2-year old fuel: % ä5-year-old fuel: 7-9 % Decontamination factor loose crud: ä2-year-old fuel: 42% (brushing), 46 % (grinding) ä(5-year-old fuel: 100 %)

Slide 28 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” On-line activity Activity measurements (total gamma activity) of removed activity from the fuel Decontamination factor loose crud ä2-year-old fuel: 53 %

Slide 29 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Gamma scanning Decontamination fraction ä difficult to evaluate due to high background radiation Possible spacer displacements äJahrestagung Kerntechnique, Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology, May 2002, Germany Filter modules ä> 85 % of the activity originated from Co-60  > 80 % of the activity trapped in the 10  m filter

Slide 30 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Filter efficiency Water sampling of circulating water before and after filter unit (Co-60 gamma activity) äEfficiency % –Colloids and particels < 0,5  m pass through äHighest at high activity

Slide 31 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Loose /tenacious crud Zircalo y ZrO 2 Fuel crud tenaciou s loos e What is the ”real” definition of loose crud? How much of the loose crud is released to the reactor water and thus causing activity build-up?

Slide 32 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Fuel integrity - Conclusions ICEDEC  maintains the fuel integrity Only the loose crud is removed No negative effect on the cladding oxide or the mechanical parts of the fuel is obtained

Slide 33 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” ICEDEC  - future Improving DF Improving filter efficiency Developing ICEDEC  for PWR Fuel decontamination by ICEDEC  in Oskarshamn ?

Slide 34 3rd EC/IAEA/ISOE Workshop on ”Occupational Exposure Management in Nuclear Power Plants” Reason for not chosing ultrasonic cleaning Risk for PCI Gap measure: Cold: 70 µm (2,8 microns) Hot. 20 µm (0,8 microns)