1. Dualism: epiphenomenalism
Philosophy of Mind
Dualism:
epiphenomenalism

2. Today’s aim
To explain and evaluate epiphenomenalist property dualism

3. Booklets, p.30
The problems facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including the causal redundancy of the mental, the argument from introspection and issues relating to free will and responsibility

4. What is epiphenomenalist dualism?
Epiphenomenalism is a response to the interaction problem
What was the interaction problem?

5. What is epiphenomenalist dualism?
Epiphenomenalism asserts that events in the brain and body produce events in the mind, but that those mental events have no causal influence on what happens in the brain and body.
They are mere ‘epiphenomena’ – ineffectual by-products of the operation of physical brain processes.
The light striking your retina causes you to have the experience of seeing the cheeseburger (which is clearly related to your body), and further brain events cause you to form the desire to eat it (which is related to your mind), but that desire itself is not what causes you to proceed to eat it.
The experience, the desire and everything else that goes on in your mind have no effects at all; what causes your actions are just further, purely material, unconscious brain processes.

6. Is this a convincing idea?
Why epiphenomenalism must be wrong

7. Three main problems – p.31 The causal redundancy of the mental
The argument from introspection
Issues relating to free will and responsibility
For each problem:
What is it?
Does it successfully show that epiphenomenalism is wrong?

8. The causal redundancy of the mental
Epiphenomenalism claims that mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties, but they don’t make any causal difference to the world.
They are ‘causally redundant’.
We can object, however, that this is very counter-intuitive. It seems obvious that mental properties, e.g. how pain feels, cause other mental and physical events.

9. The argument from introspection
Suppose I am in pain. How do I know that I am in pain?
The obvious answer is that my belief that I am in pain is caused by my pain itself.
I can tell that I am in pain just from introspection.
But epiphenomenalism must deny this, because, as a mental state, pain doesn’t cause anything.
Likewise, it seems that when I say what I think, what I say is caused by what I think.
But epiphenomenalism must deny this. Both my belief that I feel pain and saying what I think are caused by physical processes and not by pain or thought themselves.

10. The argument from introspection
This seems wrong and it has a serious implication.
It threatens our knowledge of our mental states.
If my thoughts and feelings don’t cause my beliefs about my mind, then I would have those same beliefs about my mind even if I didn’t think or feel as I do!
According to epiphenomenalism, it is physical processes that cause my beliefs about my mind.
So as long as the same physical processes occur in my brain, my beliefs about my own mind will be the same whatever mental states I have.
My beliefs about my mind, therefore, are unjustified and unreliable.
So I can’t know my own mind.

11. Issues relating to free will and responsibility
A third objection is that we need mental causation in order to be free and take responsibility for our actions.
In order to be free and responsible for what you do, you need to be able to choose what to do, and then do it because you choose to do it.
Epiphenomenalism claims that your ‘choice’ is simply an effect of a brain process, and not a cause of anything. So is there any sense in which you genuinely choose what to do, or do what you do because you choose to?

12. How convincing are these criticisms of epiphenomenalism?

13. Example question
What is epiphenomenalism? (3 marks)

14. Glossary of key terms Add to your glossary:
Physical and metaphysical possibility
The problem of causal interaction
Occasionalism
Parallelism
Epiphenomenalism
The causal redundancy of the mental
The argument from introspection
Issues relating to free will and responsibility

15. Interactionist dualism

16. Epiphenomenalist dualism

17. 12 mark questions
What are the similarities and differences between interactionist dualism and epiphenomenalist dualism?
What are the similarities and differences between substance dualism and property dualism?

18. 12 mark questions

19. Homework
Log into Moodle and click on A2 Advanced Philosophy – Homework and Assignments
Look at the fourth block that says
4. The issues of causal interaction for versions of dualism and the problems facing epiphenomenalism
Look at / read at least three links.
At least one of them must be an article or website rather than just a YouTube link.
Feel free to look at more links than this if you like.
Make two mind maps – one for each key argument.