1. The problem of other minds Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. The threat of solipsism How can we know that other minds exist? We experience our minds directly, but it seems that we can only know of other people’s behaviour –This may be a particular problem for substance dualism – is a mind ‘attached’ to the body? Solipsism: my mind is the only mind (or thing) that exists

3. The argument from analogy I have a mind. I know from experience that my mental states cause my behaviour. Other people have bodies similar to mine and behave similarly to me in similar situations. Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause as my behaviour, viz. mental states. Therefore, other people have minds.

4. Objection You cannot make an induction based on one case –Cp. This dog has three legs. Therefore, all dogs have three legs.

5. Analogy II This behaviour has a mental cause. That behaviour has a mental cause. That third behaviour (etc.) has a mental cause. Therefore, many behaviours have a mental cause (I know this from my own experience). Other people exhibit the same types of behaviour as cited above. Therefore, those behaviours also have mental causes. Therefore, other people have minds.

6. Clarification The behaviour isn’t picked out as mine, but as a type of behaviour, e.g. raising an arm –Science generalizes from cases we have observed to ones we haven’t –This isn’t analogy, but causal inference It is possible that the behaviour we infer from is exceptional. But the argument isn’t meant to be a proof Objection: the belief that other people have minds isn’t a hypothesis at all

7. What is necessary for us to be able to ascribe mental states to ourselves? We must be able to ascribe them to others as well –Children can only learn to name and report their mental states through interaction with others –Other people must therefore be able to identify the expression of mental states in our behaviour –The child learns how to ascribe mental states to itself and others at the same time On ascribing mental states

8. Implications The problem of other minds dissolves: there can be no knowledge of oneself as a mind without presupposing that there are other minds Our knowledge of other minds isn’t inferred from knowledge of what causes our own behaviour Substance dualism ascribes mental states to a different substance from physical states – but we have to be able to ascribe mental states to people