1. © Michael Lacewing The Mind-Body Identity Theory Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Metaphysics of mind Substance: needs no other thing to exist Dualism: there are two sorts of substance, mind (or soul) and matter –Mental properties are properties of a mental substance Materialism: there is just one sort of thing, matter –Mental properties are properties of a material substance

3. Mental properties Substances can have different sorts of properties Property dualism: mental properties are not physical properties Type identity theory: mental properties are physical properties Hmm…

4. Mental causation Causation requires things to ‘happen’. ‘Things happening’ are events. A cause and its effect are both events, changes at a time (or over time) in the properties of objects. Like picking up the remote control

5. Reduction Ontological reduction: the things in one domain (e.g. mental things) are identical with some of the things in another domain. Reduction: this makes the ‘reduced’ domain more intelligible

6. Multiple realizability Mental properties cannot be identical to physical properties because the same mental property can be ‘realized by’ different physical properties, e.g. the brain states that relate to pain are different in different species, but pain is the same mental state.

7. Token identity theory Mental events are physical events. Mental properties are not physical properties. Mental properties are closely tied to physical properties: if exactly the same physical property occurs in different events, the same mental property will occur.

8. Properties and causes Events cause their effects in virtue of certain properties and not others. Is it because of its physical properties or because of its mental properties that a mental event causes its effects?

9. Picturing the problem  ‘Ow!’  Mental event, e.g. pain = Physical event, e.g. in brain But physical property explains effect