1. Concepts in the Light of Evolution Session 2 Reza Maleeh Institute of Cognitive Science University of Osnabrück smaleeh@uos.de University of Osnabrueck1

2. Animal Concepts Are Not Identical with Human Concepts Consider the concept of ‘leg’ Centipedes Quadrupeds Spiders Humans University of Osnabrueck2 Functional Similarity

3. Animal Concepts Are Not Identical with Human Concepts University of Osnabrueck3 Analogously, we can identify behaviour in animals similar enough to the human behaviour that prompts us to say that humans possess concepts, so it is natural to say that these animals possess concepts too. Wordless creatures may, in this view, have concepts. Possession of words is not a necessary criterion for identifying possession of concepts (Hurford, 2007, p. 10). Is having similar behaviour sufficient ?

4. Possession of words is not a necessary criterion for identifying possession of concepts University of Osnabrueck4 You may have separate concepts for five different kinds of weeds without having words for them.

5. Is having similar behaviour sufficient? When I come home from work and my dog rushes out to greet me, wagging his tail and jumping up and down, why exactly is it that I am so confident that he is conscious and indeed that there is a specific content to his consciousness, he is happy to see me? The usual answer given to this question is that because his behavior is so much like that of a happy person I can infer that he is a happy dog. But that seems to me a mistaken argument (Searle, 2004, p. 38). University of Osnabrueck5

6. Is having similar behaviour sufficient? What is so special about the real dog? I think the answer is that the basis on which I am confident that my dog is conscious and has a specific content to his consciousness is not simply that his behavior is appropriate, but that I can see that the causal underpinnings of the behavior are relatively similar to mine. He has a brain, a perceptual apparatus, and a bodily structure that are relevantly similar to my own: these are his eyes, these are his ears, this is his skin, there is his mouth (Searle, 2004, p. 38). University of Osnabrueck6

7. Is having similar behaviour sufficient? It is not just on the basis of his behavior that I conclude that he is conscious, but rather on the basis of the causal structure that mediates the relation between the input stimulus and the output behavior (Searle, 2004, pp. 38 & 39). University of Osnabrueck7

8. The Same Goes for Intentionality and Consciousness University of Osnabrueck8  The brand of Intentionality & Consciousness applicable to non-humans is more limited than applicable to humans.  We attribute the notions ‘Intentionality’ and ‘Consciousness’ to animals because of their similar Causal structures and Functions (in addition to their showing predicted behaviour). Functional Similarity

9. Hampton (2001): the best we can do in such investigations is to define rigorously the behaviour accompanied by a given mental process and see if the animals show it. Functional Similarity 9

10. Davidson: No Language, No Beliefs University of Osnabrueck10 [C]an the dog believe of an object that it is a tree? This would seem impossible unless we suppose the dog has many general beliefs about trees: that they are growing things, that they have leaves or needles, that they burn. There is no fixed list of things that someone with the concept of a tree must believe, but without many general beliefs, there would be no reason to identify a belief as about a tree. (Davidson 1982, p. 3) Oops! Infinite regress!

11. Criticism of Davidson’s Idea University of Osnabrueck11 How could the allegedly prior beliefs ‘about trees’ have been acquired unless the creature knew, while acquiring them, that it was dealing with a tree or trees? How many general beliefs does it take?

12. Again Davidson and Concepts University of Osnabrueck12 For Davidson, ‘abstraction’ is not produced via ‘abstracting’ (by mind). ‘Concepts themselves are abstractions and so timeless’ (Davidson 2001a, p. 123)

13. Hurford: University of Osnabrueck13 This is in line with Fodor (1998) except for one requirement: ‘Concepts are public; they’re the sorts of things that lots of people can, and do, share’ (Fodor 1998, p. 28) I will use the term ‘concept’ to indicate a certain subpart of a state of mind.

14. Fodor’s Requirements for Having Concepts Fodor’s other conditions are that concepts are: (1) mental particulars, (2) categories, (3) compositional, and (4) often learned University of Osnabrueck14

15. An Operational Rule: University of Osnabrueck15 The capitalized word, like ROCK, stands for whatever goes on in an animal’s brain when it recognizes, or thinks about, things roughly coextensive with what we would call a rock.

16. Physical, sensory information-processing stages in a nervous system (Roederer, 2005, p. 141) 16 Type 1 of information representation in the nervous system: spatio-temporal distribution of neural signals. Type 2: changes in the synaptic architecture during their use.

17. Evolutionary Succession: From Proto- Concepts to Linguistic Concepts Regular and systematic behaviour in connection with a thing Sufficient condition Possession of Language Sufficient condition A cat has a proto-concept of its habitual prey Example Generalization Free access and control over mental states 17 Necessary condition Necessary condition Proto-Concepts Pre-Linguistic Concepts Linguistic Concepts

18. Oh No! Again, Do You Want to Quote Davidson? University of Osnabrueck18 Yes! It’s important, believe me! [having a concept] is not just a matter of being natively disposed, or having learned, to react in some specific way to items that fall under a concept; it is to judge or believe that certain items fall under the concept. If we do not make this a condition on having a concept, we will have to treat simple tendencies to eat berries, or to seek warmth and avoid cold, as having the concepts of a berry, or of warm, or of cold. I assume we don’t want to view earthworms and sunflowers as having concepts. This would be a terminological mistake, for it would be to lose track of the fundamental distinction between a mindless disposition to respond differentially to members of a class of stimuli, and a disposition to respond to those items as members of that class. (Davidson 2004, pp. 137–138)

19. Hurford’s Respond: University of Osnabrueck19 As long as terms such as judge and believe and the preposition as in the last sentence here are not necessarily tied to language, I can agree. Like Davidson, I don’t want to attribute the concept of a fly-like object to a Venus flytrap, because a flytrap has no brain. From an evolutionary point of view, it is useful to distinguish, as Davidson apparently does not, between sunflowers and earthworms, between plants and animals with brains. Any animal with a brain has the rudiments of a system which can evolve to play host to concepts, whereas a plant does not. Proto-concepts and concepts are instantiated in brains. Plants (and sea sponges and jellyfish) don’t have brains. I wonder if Davidson was aware of Darwin’s discussion of intelligence in earthworms (Darwin 1881).

20. Evolutionary Succession: From Proto- Concepts to Linguistic Concepts Regular and systematic behaviour in connection with a thing Sufficient condition Possession of Language Sufficient condition A cat has a proto-concept of its habitual prey Example Generalization Free access and control over mental states 20 Necessary condition Necessary condition Proto-Concepts Pre-Linguistic Concepts Linguistic Concepts

21. An Operational Rule for Concept Attribution University of Osnabrueck21 We will appeal to the idea of scales of complexity, one for induction (generalization and abstraction) and one for ‘freewill’ (metacognition), on which researchers can practically agree whether some behaviour is more or less complex than some other.

22. Wittgenstein University of Osnabrueck22 Wittgenstein (1953, p. 223): ‘If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.’

23. Kanzi University of Osnabrueck23 Kanzi, 25, male

24. University of Osnabrueck24

25. Kanzi 25

26. Kanzi 26

27. Kanzi 27

28. Alex 28

29. Language Game University of Osnabrueck29 So, one can say that, in Wittgenstein’s terms, a particular form of life, or language game, has evolved between Kanzi and the humans he deals with.

30. Language Game University of Osnabrueck30 A language game (also called secret language or ludling) is a system of manipulating spoken words to render them incomprehensible to the untrained ear. Language games are used primarily by groups attempting to conceal their conversations from others. A common example is Pig Latin, which is used all over the globe.

31. Language Game University of Osnabrueck31 To form the Pig Latin form of an English word the initial consonant sound is transposed to the end of the word and an ay is affixed (for example, trash yields ash-tray and plunder yields under-play).

32. Wittgenstein’s Language Game University of Osnabrueck32 Wittgenstein used the term "language-game" (Sprachspiel) to designate forms of language simpler than the entirety of a language itself, "consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven“. (PI 7)The concept was intended "to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life" (PI 23).

33. Wittgenstein’s Language Game University of Osnabrueck33 The term 'language game' is used to refer to: Fictional examples of language use that are simpler than our own everyday language. (e.g. PI 2) Simple uses of language with which children are first taught language (training in language). Specific regions of our language with their own grammars and relations to other language-games. All of a natural language composed of a family of language- games.

34. Wittgenstein’s Language Game University of Osnabrueck34 The classic example of a language-game is the so-called "builder's language" introduced in §2 of the Philosophical Investigations: “ The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar" "slab", "beam". A calls them out; — B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. (PI 2.)” Later "this" and "there" are added (with functions analogous to the function these words have in natural language), and "a, b, c, d" as numerals. An example of its use: builder A says "d — slab — there" and points, and builder B counts four slabs, "a, b, c, d..." and moves them to the place pointed to by A. The builder's language is an activity into which is woven something we would recognize as language, but in a simpler form. This language-game resembles the simple forms of language taught to children, and Wittgenstein asks that we conceive of it as "a complete primitive language" for a tribe of builders.

35. Wittgenstein’s Interpretation University of Osnabrueck35 ‘There is a game of “guessing thoughts”.’ (1953, p. 223)

36. Hurford’s Reply University of Osnabrueck36 This is what we all do, our guesses being well-informed by confident knowledge of a common code, of a shared set of background assumptions, and the relevant context of situation. We are very good at it.

37. Dennett 37