1. 1  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL Safety Performance Review Radu CIOPONEA Performance Review Unit EUROCONTROL

2.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 2 Why is safety performance review useful? n The PRC process is composed of performance measurement, consultation and recommendations n The PRC is only interested to measure indicators which can provide useful indications to steer performance n Performance measurement can give indications on the efficiency of service provision, n It also gives indications on the effectiveness and adequacy of regulations.

3.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 3 Safety review State models in best practices n The role of CAAs varies across Europe n There are different ways of sharing tasks between the CAA, the ANSP and an AAIB (where one exists) –Active CAA: investigating and overseeing body; –Controlling CAA: regulations and oversight; –Regulatory CAA: pure regulatory body. n Regulation and oversight are very important for all

4.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 4 Safety data flow in best practices n Human reporting remains the only reliable reporting. –Some States don’t have any Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System for ATCOs to report safety occurrences n Automated tools are a good complement to human reporting n Severity classification should be determined for all incidents –Presently “expert judgment” is used and harmonisation is missing n In some States causal factors are only available for serious incidents n Very few data available on risk exposure (traffic). –Nb. of IFR flights known, but not OAT and VFR flights.

5.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 5 EUROCONTROL and the EU n EUROCONTROL has presently 35 Member States n The EU has 25 States, soon to be 27; n Both organisations want to measure safety; n EUROCONTROL has devised a number of Safety Regulatory Requirements, one of which deals with safety reporting and safety review in ATM; n The EU has issued a Directive (European law) for the same purpose (applies to the whole of aviation); n Together, the EU and EUROCONTROL will need to review ATM safety without duplication or omissions; n Most probable compromise: EUROCONTROL will review ATM safety for all its Member States, rather for all ECAC Member States (virtually the whole geographical Europe)

6.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 6 Factual Information Assessment for Investigation Initial Severity Assessment Requirement for immediate action Final Severity and Risk Assessment Report and Exchange Preliminary Report Follow-up Lesson Dissemination Final report No delay 96 hours maximum As quickly as practically possible As prescribed ASAP No delay Reconstruction & Analysis Causal Factors, Conclusions & Recommendations Notification -Pilots -ATCOs -Automated tools -TCAS via Mode S Performance Review As prescribed NationalProcess

7.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 7 -Pilots -ATCOs -TCAS via Mode S Factual Information Assessment for Investigation Initial Severity Assessment Requirement for immediate action Final Severity and Risk Assessment Report and Exchange Preliminary Report Follow-up Lesson Dissemination Final report No delay 96 hours maximum As quickly as practically possible As prescribed ASAP No delay Reconstruction & Analysis Causal Factors, Conclusions & Recommendations Notification Performance Review As prescribed 1 2 … n - Mandatory Flow - Voluntary Flow EuropeanProcess -Automated tools

8.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 8 Suggested safety monitoring framework Service provision Voluntary Fast response Confidential Regulated flow Mandatory Regulator confidential Protection for reporting individuals Incident reports ANS Co-operative processes High Level Performance Indicators Mandatory reporting EC Dir. 94/56 & 03/42 Monitoring encouraged ICAO annex 13 European Common Data base Public information Performance Monitoring, Recommendations Severity + Risk Exposure (develop) National Investigation Processes DetectionandReporting ASMT TCAS ATCO Pilots

9.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 9 Initial scope for safety review n Focus on what ANS can influence (provide added value to safety) rather than considering ATM as a contributing factor –ATM can reduce the risk of accidents –ATM, Navigation and Surveillance can reduce the risk of CFIT –MET can reduce the risk of weather-related accidents n PRC Safety performance review will only use validated data n Key Indicators are still to be developed n Initial KPIs: –Airprox –RWY incursions n A limited number of States with mature systems are involved at this stage; n Importantly, the FAA is also involved, which is likely to make the system consistent globally.

10.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 10 Extended scope for safety review n Data collection process must be improved; n Need to harmonise severity and risk exposure at European level –Same standards applied by all (e.g. SRC standards) or –Use of legislation / mandatory regulation n More KPIs to be developed; n Risk model and risk exposure are important elements; n Safety targets must be thoroughly developed and validated; n No detailed target possible until system is mature; n EUROCONTROL strategic target: number of accidents and serious or risk-bearing incidents to remain constant with traffic increase

11.  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL 11 Possible way ahead for PRC n Yearly high-level indicators (European breakdown) – Public Access –Safety events in airspace (separation infr. + inadequate separations) weighted on risk exposure data –Safety events on the runway (serious RWY incursions. + inadequate separations) weighted on risk exposure data n PRC detailed Safety Performance Review – Access restricted to professionals –Use of ESARR 2 data –More issues (near CFIT + MET related) –Analysis on causal factors –Meaningful operational breakdown (European level): –Controlled / Uncontrolled airspace –Complex / simple runway lay out –Etc. n In a not-so-distant future: State-by-State breakdown and benchmarking

12. 12  Copyright 2005 EUROCONTROL ? Questions? Thank you!