1. General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts
Lsn 2 and 3

2. Agenda Key Theorists Principles of War Elements of Operational Design
Forms of Maneuver
METT-TC
Strategy
Strategic Leadership

3. Key Theorists
Clausewitz
Jomini

4. Clausewitz Carl von Clausewitz Prussian officer born in 1780
Resigned his commission in 1812 and joined the Russian Army to fight Napoleon
Ideas on war were heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard von Scharnhorst
Died in 1831 and his wife published his On War in 1832

5. Clausewitz War is neither an art nor a science
It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by other means.
A form of social intercourse
War is like a wrestling match
It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”
But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between two independent wills.

6. Clausewitz
Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to rational policy
Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military, and the government”
Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance, friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the abstract
Argued one should focus his military efforts against the enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”)
Very important concept in American military doctrine

7. Jomini
Antoine-Henri Jomini ( ) was a Swiss military theorist who sought to interpret Napoleon
Published the Summary of the Art of War in 1838
Became the premier military- educational text of the mid- nineteenth century and greatly influenced Civil War generals
“Many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War in the other” (General J. D. Hittle)
Product of the Enlightenment

8. Jomini Very geometrical and scientific approach to war
Stressed interior lines
“those adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose them a greater force.”

9. Interior Lines
The benefits of interior lines could be gained either by central position or superior lateral communications
Interior
Lines
Exterior

10. Principles of War

11. Principles of War
British military officer J. F. C. Fuller developed a list of principles based on the works of Clausewitz and Jomini for use by the British Army in World War I
The US Army modified them and published its first list in 1921
Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of force
Maneuver
Unity of command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity

12. Objective
When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. Commanders need to appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them.
Ensure that all actions contribute to the goals of the higher headquarters.
Example: The Emancipation Proclamation changed the Federal objective of the war from merely restoring the Union to also ending slavery.

13. Offensive
Offensive operations are essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary for success, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments.
Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation.
Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results; it is the essence of successful operations.
Example: Lee’s two invasions of northern territory represented offensive strategies.

14. Mass
Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the situation.
Time: applies the elements of combat power against multiple targets simultaneously
Space : concentrates the effects of different elements of combat power against a single target
Example: Grant had a huge advantage in mass over Lee toward the end of the war.

15. Economy of Force
Commanders never leave any element without a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all elements should have tasks to perform.
Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to achieve superiority in the decisive operation.
Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces.
Example: The South decided to make the west an economy of force theater in spite of the arguments of the Confederate Western Concentration Bloc (Beauregard, Longstreet, et al)

16. Maneuver
As both an element of combat power and a principle of war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of leadership, firepower, information, and protection as well.
Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly
Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with them.
Example: Chancellorsville represented the classic envelopment while Fredericksburg and Pickett’s Charge showed the costliness of the frontal attack.

17. Unity of Command
Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective.
Develops the full combat power of a force
Usually requires giving a single commander authority
Example: Grant and Porter cooperated as an army-navy team at Vicksburg.

18. Security
Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security protects and preserves combat power.
Does not involve excessive caution
Measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat
Example: Fears for the security of Washington influenced Lincoln’s decision-making during the Peninsula Campaign.

19. Surprise
Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary is unprepared.
It is only necessary that the enemy become aware too late to react effectively.
Contributions to surprise include speed, information superiority, and asymmetry.
Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea put the Confederates on the “horns of a dilemma” because Sherman’s true destination was unknown.

20. Simplicity
Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late.
Clear and concise plans cut down on misunderstandings
Example: Grant’s orders to Sherman in the Atlanta Campaign are classic in their simplicity and clarity.

21. Elements of Operational Design

22. Elements of Operational Design
Synergy
Simultaneity and depth
Anticipation
Balance
Leverage
Timing and tempo
Operational reach and approach

23. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Forces and functions
Arranging operations
Centers of gravity
Direct versus indirect
Decisive points
Culmination
Termination

24. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Synergy
Seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentrations in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties
Example: Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign relieved pressure on Lee outside of Richmond.
Simultaneity and depth
Place more demands on adversary forces than can be handled both in terms of time and space
Example: It was not until the end of the war that Grant brought a grand strategy to the Federal effort that pressured the Confederacy and Lee simultaneously from all directions.

25. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Anticipation
Remain alert for the unexpected and opportunities to exploit the situation
Example: Grant failed to anticipate the Confederate attack at Shiloh and will be surprised and defeated the first day.
Balance
Maintain the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness
Example: Trying to defend its entire territory proved impossible for the Confederacy and led it to develop an “offensive-defensive” strategy.

26. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Leverage
Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat power across all dimensions
Example: Grant’s numerical advantage allowed him to maintain constant pressure on Lee in
Timing and tempo
Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary
Example: The speed of Sherman’s March to the Sea thwarted any meaningful resistance.

27. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Operational reach and approach
The distance over which military power can mass effects and be employed decisively
Example: The superior Federal Navy allowed the North to blockade the South.
Forces and functions
Focus on defeating either adversary forces or functions, or a combination of both
Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea targeted Confederate functions of war-making ability and will at the same time Grant’s Overland Campaign targeted Lee’s forces.

28. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Arranging operations
Achieve dimensional superiority by a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations
Phases: Deter/engage, Seize initiative, Decisive operations, Transition
Example: Grant’s preliminary attempts, his maneuver, his assaults on Vicksburg, and ultimately the siege combined to produce a logical line of operation.
Centers of gravity
Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight
Destroying or neutralizing adversary centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory
Example: McClellan fought as if Richmond was the Confederate center of gravity rather than Lee’s army.

29. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Direct versus indirect
To the extent possible, attack centers of gravity directly, but where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength seek an indirect approach
Example: Longstreet unsuccessfully tried to convince Lee to threaten Washington or Baltimore by a turning movement rather than continuing the offensive at Gettysburg.
Decisive points
Usually geographic in nature, but can sometimes be key events or systems
Give a marked advantage to whoever controls them
Keys to attacking protected centers of gravity
Example: By securing the flank at Little Round Top, Chamberlain saved day for the Federals at Gettysburg.

30. Elements of Operational Design (cont)
Culmination
Point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender or the defender no longer can preserve his force
Example: Lincoln was very frustrated that Meade did not pursue Lee after Gettysburg but decisive battles were elusive in the Civil War because of culmination.
Termination
Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the military force was committed, which then allows transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader goals
Example: The end of the Civil War led to Reconstruction.

31. Forms of Maneuver

32. Forms of Maneuver The five forms of maneuver are the envelopment,
turning movement,
infiltration,
penetration, and
frontal attack.

33. Envelopment

34. Envelopment
The envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions.
Envelopments avoid the enemy front, where he is protected and can easily concentrate fires.
Single envelopments maneuver against one enemy flank; double envelopments maneuver against both. Either variant can develop into an encirclement.
Example: Chancellorsville

35. Turning Movement

36. Turning Movement
A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat.
A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus "turning" him out of his defensive positions.
Turning movements typically require greater depth than other forms of maneuver.
Example: Peninsula Campaign

37. Infiltration

38. Infiltration
An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires
Typically, forces infiltrate in small groups and reassemble to continue their mission.
Infiltration rarely defeats a defense by itself. Commanders direct infiltrations to attack lightly defended positions or stronger positions from the flank and rear, to secure key terrain to support the decisive operation, or to disrupt enemy sustaining operations.
Example: ?

39. Penetration

40. Penetration
A penetration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system.
Commanders direct penetrations when enemy flanks are not assailable or time does not permit another form of maneuver. Successful penetrations create assailable flanks and provide access to enemy rear areas.
Because penetrations frequently are directed into the front of the enemy defense, they risk significantly more friendly casualties than envelopments, turning movements, and infiltrations.
Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea

41. Frontal Attack

42. Frontal attack
The frontal attack is frequently the most costly form of maneuver, since it exposes the majority of the attackers to the concentrated fires of the defenders.
As the most direct form of maneuver, however, the frontal attack is useful for overwhelming light defenses, covering forces, or disorganized enemy resistance.
It is often the best form of maneuver for hasty attacks and meeting engagements, where speed and simplicity are essential to maintain tempo and the initiative.
Commanders may direct a frontal attack as a shaping operation and another form of maneuver as the decisive operation.
Example: Fredericksburg

43. METT-TC

44. METT-TC Mission Enemy Terrain and Weather Troops and Equipment Time
Civilians

45. Mission
Seize Vicksburg in order to control the Mississippi River and separate the Confederacy in two

46. Enemy Pemberton Pemberton fell under Johnston’s Department of the West
Five divisions totaling 43,000 effectives
Pemberton fell under Johnston’s Department of the West
Represented some potential for a relief force
No ironclads and only a few wooden gunboats

47. Terrain
Vicksburg located astride the railroad that linked Shreveport, LA (and thus the three states west of the river) to the eastern transportation network
Line of bluffs that dominated the river favored defense
Northeast and west of Vicksburg was wetland that would inhibit offensive movement

48. Troops
Army
Grant had a maneuver force of ten divisions (44,000 effectives)
Navy
Porter’s Mississippi River Squadron had about 60 combat vessels of which 20 to 25 would support the Vicksburg operation at any one time

49. Time Pemberton had ample time to prepare his defense
Grant needed to attack before his supplies ran out and before Johnston could reinforce
Once the siege began, time benefited the offense

50. Civilians About 5,000 lived in Vicksburg
Pemberton was responsible for their well-being
Other civilians along the Mississippi River posed a guerrilla threat to the Federal Navy
Potential source of intelligence

51. Strategy

52. Strategy
Strategy is the pursuit, protection, or advancement of national interests through the application of the instruments of power
Instruments of power (DIME)
Diplomatic
Informational
Military
Economic

53. Strategy
Strategy is about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests
Strategy = Ends (objectives) + Ways (course of action) + Means (instruments)
Ways to employ means to achieve ends

54. Strategy: Confederates at Vicksburg
End
Deny Federal use of the Mississippi River
Way
Interdict river traffic at Vicksburg
Mean
Pemberton’s force at Vicksburg

55. Traditional Military Strategies
Attrition
The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel
Exhaustion
The gradual erosion of a nation’s will or means to resist
Annihilation
Seeks the immediate destruction of the combat power of the enemy’s armed forces

56. Strategic Leadership

57. Strategic Leadership Skills
Interpersonal Skills
Communicating
Using Dialogue
Negotiating
Achieving Consensus
Building Staffs

58. Strategic Leadership Skills
Conceptual Skills
Envisioning
Developing Frames of Reference
Dealing with Uncertainty and Ambiguity

59. Strategic Leadership Skills
Technical Skills
Strategic Art
Leveraging Technology
Translating Political Goals into Military Objectives

60. Strategic Leadership Skills
Interpersonal Skills
Communicating
“When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition, and the like, could succeed. When you got below, and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now which to make the personal acknowledgement that you were right and I was wrong.”
Lincoln to Grant

61. Strategic Leadership Skills
Interpersonal Skills
Using Dialogue
Pemberton preferred to command behind the scenes and had little direct communication with his soldiers or subordinate commanders
Negotiating
Grant and Porter were able to achieve Army-Navy cooperation in the absence of a hierarchical command relationship
Achieving Consensus
Pemberton’s superiors, Davis and Johnston, did not achieve consensus on the proper strategy and gave Pemberton conflicting guidance
Building Staffs
Grant received great benefit from his logistical staff that kept him resupplied after he “cut loose” from his base

62. Strategic Leadership Skills
Conceptual Skills
Envisioning
Success at Raymond convinced Grant to shift his decisive point from the Confederate railroads to Jackson, which allowed him to isolate Vicksburg from reinforcements.
Developing Frames of Reference
Pemberton brought from Charleston a dictum that he must not do anything to leave Vicksburg vulnerable.
Dealing with Uncertainty and Ambiguity
This was Pemberton’s chief failure. He was continually left guessing by Grant’s diversions and maneuver and was always a couple steps behind.

63. Strategic Leadership Skills
Technical Skills
Strategic Art
Control of the Mississippi would separate the Confederacy into two halves and controlling Vicksburg would give the North control of the Mississippi
Leveraging Technology
At the time of the Vicksburg Campaign, the Confederacy had no ironclads. The Federal Mississippi River Squadron included thirteen ironclads.
Translating Political Goals into Military Objectives
The Anaconda Plan was rejected as a military strategy because it failed to meet the political objective for a quick, offensive war.

64. Writing Requirement 2,000 to 2,500 word battle or campaign analysis
You pick the battle or campaign
Can be one we discussed in class or another, but I must approve it
On Lsn 14, bring in your introductory paragraph
Lsn 15 will be a writing workday (no class)

65. Analytical Writing
GRE Analytical Writing Measure assesses the applicant's ability to
articulate complex ideas clearly and effectively
examine claims and accompanying evidence
support ideas with relevant reasons and examples
sustain a well-focused, coherent discussion
control the elements of standard written English

66. Thesis
“a position or proposition that a person advances and offers to maintain by argument"
Webster’s Dictionary

67. Writing Style
Put the recommendation, conclusion or reason for writing -- the “bottom line” -- in the first paragraph, not at the end. (BLUF)
Use the active voice.
Write for your audience, but, in general, keep it simple
Use short sentences (an average of 15 or fewer words).
Understand the words you use
Write paragraphs that average 6 to 7 sentences in length.
Use correct spelling, grammar, and punctuation.

68. Organization: “M1A1 Paper”
Intro… tell them what you’re going to tell them
Body… tell them
Conclusion… tell them what you told them

69. Example
Introduction
Robert E. Lee defeated George McClellan in the Peninsula Campaign because of the superior Confederate intelligence system. This advantage manifested itself in terms of synthesis, analysis, and collection. In terms of synthesis, Lee was able to assemble John Magruder’s initial panicky reports and develop a reconcentration of forces in response. In terms of analysis, McClellan’s exaggerated estimates of Confederate troop strength led him to be cautious when he should have pressed his advantage. In terms of collection, Jeb Stuart’s cavalry gave Lee had an intelligence gathering asset that McClellan could not match. Lee’s superior intelligence system allowed him to act faster and more accurately than McClellan could and gave Lee a decisive advantage on the Peninsula.

70. Example Para 2 Para 3 Para 4 Analysis (McClellan’s exaggerations)
Synthesis (Magruder’s reports)
Para 4
Collection (Stuart)

71. Example
Conclusion
The key factor in the Confederate victory in the Peninsula Campaign was superior intelligence. McClellan was cautious by nature and his inaccurate magnifications of the Confederate troop strength made him more so. Especially at this point in the war, Confederate cavalry was far superior to its Federal counterpart, and Stuart’s ride around McClellan’s army informed Lee of a vulnerability he could exploit. Finally, Lee had the personal ability to assemble complex and disorganized data into a solution and he used this skill to make sense of Magruder’s initial panicky reports. In all respects, intelligence gave the Confederates an advantage and Lee turned this advantage into victory on the Peninsula.

72. Next
Civil War Causes and Initial Strategies