1. TSP 155-H-03971 Integrate Critical Thinking Skills Derived from Military History Methodologies into the Advanced Training and Education of Subordinate Officers, Warrant Officers, and Non-Commissioned Officers Task Title

2. TSP 155-H-03972 Terminal Learning Objective l Action: Apply knowledge of combined arms warfare, advanced battle analysis, and the staff ride to the professional development of subordinate officers, warrant officers and non- commissioned officers. l Conditions: Given study materials for this lesson and a source for obtaining research materials. l Standard: * Selects correct definition of: »combined arms warfare. »advanced battle analysis. »the staff ride. * Identifies the purposes for the study of the evolution of combined arms warfare, advanced battle analysis, and the staff ride. * Outlines a recommended approach for studying combined arms warfare. * Develops an advanced battle analysis that meets four of five established criteria. * Plans a staff ride that meets one-hundred percent of established criteria.

3. TSP 155-H-03973 Combined Arms Warfare British Major Gerald Gilbert (1907): “We have gotten into the fashion of talking of cavalry tactics, artillery tactics, and infantry tactics. This distinction is nothing but a mere abstraction. There is but one art, and that is the tactics of the combined arms.”

4. TSP 155-H-03974 Combined Arms Warfare What is Combined Arms? l From FM 100-5: Simultaneous application of combat arms, CS, & CSS toward a common goal. l Goal is to confuse, demoralize, & destroy the enemy with the coordinated impact of combat power. l Entails coordination, simultaneity, & synergy between all battlefield functions.

5. TSP 155-H-03975 Combined Arms Warfare Importance of Combined Arms to You! To effectively participate in the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), you must know how combined arms warfare has evolved, especially in the twentieth century, in the U.S. Army & other Western armies.

6. TSP 155-H-03976 Combined Arms Warfare Western Combined Arms, 1600-1914 (I) l Interplay of three constants: » Mobility. » Protection. » Offensive power. l Calculated process: » Procure weapons. » Understand & disseminate doctrine. » Train troops. » Apply the above three in battle.

7. TSP 155-H-03977 Combined Arms Warfare Western Combined Arms, 1600-1914 (II) l 1690s-1820s: » Smooth-bore musket, socket bayonet, & linear battlefield predominated. » Direct-fire smoothbore artillery & massed cavalry seldom decisive. l First & second waves of technology, 1827- 1900: » Greater technology culminated in advent of machine gun, internal combustion engine, & radiotelegraph. » Required greater combined effort by all arms. l Most European nations relied on massed armies & reservists.

8. TSP 155-H-03978 Combined Arms Warfare Western Combined Arms, 1600-1914 (III) l Organization & Doctrine to 1914: » Cavalry--Preferred mounted reconnaissance, security, & pursuit operations. » Combat Engineers--Performed technical, mobility, & countermobility missions. » Infantry--Focused on attacking, always! » Artillery--Preferred direct over indirect fire. l Little to no combined arms doctrine or training.

9. TSP 155-H-03979 Combined Arms Warfare World War I (WWI)--Introduction Efforts to break the tactical stalemate of the Western Front & restore maneuver there in particular resulted, in part, in the early development of combined arms warfare.

10. TSP 155-H-039710 Combined Arms Warfare WWI--Artillery & Coordination l Mass artillery fire most obvious solution to tactical stalemate. l Considerable problems implementing: » Artillery inexperience in indirect precision fire. » Coordinating infantry & artillery in attack. » C2 limited by technology.

11. TSP 155-H-039711 Combined Arms Warfare WWI--Problem of Penetration l Penetration of enemy front line trenches easier to achieve than exploit. l Full exploitation required combination of attrition, new weapons, & new infantry tactics.

12. TSP 155-H-039712 Combined Arms Warfare WWI--Flexible Defense l By 1917, Germans developed defense against penetrations based on three principles: » Flexibility. » Decentralized control. » Counterattack. l Allies, attacked seldom by Germans, took longer to reach same conclusion.

13. TSP 155-H-039713 Combined Arms Warfare WWI--Technological Change l New weapons developed to achieve penetration: » Gas. » Airplane. » Truck. » Tank. l First mass use of tanks by British at Cambrai in 1917. » Penetration achieved but not exploited due partly to lack of combined arms tactics. » Germans developed effective antitank doctrine.

14. TSP 155-H-039714 Combined Arms Warfare WWI--Resurgence of Infantry l Infantry regained ability to seize & hold terrain. l French led way in 1915 with new infantry weapons. l German rebirth of tactical offense reached zenith with “Hutier Tactics.” » Based on bypassing strong points & attacking weak ones. l “Hutier Tactics” partly formed foundation of later German blitzkrieg.

15. TSP 155-H-039715 Combined Arms Warfare WWI--Return of Mobility, 1918 l German 1918 offensives “a blitzkrieg without tanks.” l German infiltration tactics summarized: » Bruckmueller artillery preparation. » Combined arms storm battalion. » Bypass centers of resistance. » Disorganize enemy rear area. l Resulting attrition, demoralization, & lack of clear strategic objectives led to German 1918 failure.

16. TSP 155-H-039716 Combined Arms Warfare WWI--Organizational Results l Infantry organizations, weapons, & tactics all changed considerably. l Lone exception was U.S. Army infantry division : » Retained four-regiment structure. » Increased size of rifle company in 1917.

17. TSP 155-H-039717 Combined Arms Warfare WWI--Summary l Logistics & manpower presented problems. l Detailed planning & coordination necessary. l Advancing on battlefield difficult at best. l Allies learned to combine weapons effectively. l German combined arms methods most adaptable.

18. TSP 155-H-039718 Combined Arms Warfare Interwar Period (IP)--Introduction l General revulsion during IP to warfare & all things military. l Defense budgets chronically tight & rapidly changing technology too expensive. l Confusion & contention in military circles regarding development of mechanized warfare.

19. TSP 155-H-039719 Combined Arms Warfare IP--Great Britain: “Hasten Slowly” l Led world in 1918 in armored equipment & doctrine. l Lost lead over next 20 years. » Tight defense budgets. » Commitments to costly imperial defense. » Change opposed by military conservatives. l Creation of permanent “Mobile Division” during 1930s belied drift in mechanization.

20. TSP 155-H-039720 Combined Arms Warfare IP--Germany: “Strike Concentrated, Not Dispersed” l Tradition since 1860s favored maneuver warfare. l Did not fully accept blitzkrieg until 1940. l Guderian most influential mechanization proponent. l Luftwaffe close air support critical. l Tradition of combined arms integration continued.

21. TSP 155-H-039721 Combined Arms Warfare IP--France l German threat focused French on elaborate defenses: » Maginot Line most obvious form. l Doctrine centered on defense and infantry. l Some officers offensive minded: » LTC Charles de Gaulle most recognizable. l Army still militia-based and unready for WWII.

22. TSP 155-H-039722 Combined Arms Warfare IP--Soviet Union: “Deep Battle” l Russian CW focused Red Army on maneuver art. l 1920s-30s Tukhachevsky developed “Deep Battle.” » Essentially combined arms warfare. l 1930s Stalinist purges delayed doctrinal & force structure development. l Red Army in shambles 1939-40 & unready for German challenge.

23. TSP 155-H-039723 Combined Arms Warfare IP--United States l Square division & infantry primacy into 1920s. l 1935 CSA GEN Craig review led to adoption of triangular division. » Followed earlier Pershing-Conner combined arms ideas. l Field artillery developments outpaced those in armor or aviation. » Developed massed fires on targets of opportunity.

24. TSP 155-H-039724 Combined Arms Warfare IP--Summary l Fiscal restraints & traditional infantry- artillery dominance prevailed. » Red Army was partial exception. l Long-range bombing developments retarded close air support. l 1939-41 German success unique & transitory.

25. TSP 155-H-039725 Combined Arms Warfare World War II (WWII)-- Axis Advance, 1939-42-Introduction l Mechanized combined arms warfare came of age in WWII. l Dominance of infantry declined. l Antiblitzkrieg developments also prevailed. l End of purely ground operations.

26. TSP 155-H-039726 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Poland, 1939 l Germany defeated Poland in 17 days. l German commanders still not committed to blitzkrieg. l Problems of supply, maintenance, & suitability of German armor developed. l Experience began evolution of German panzer division to combined arms orientation.

27. TSP 155-H-039727 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--German Advance, 1940 l 1940 German defeat of France seemed to validate blitzkrieg concept. l Germans massed mechanized forces at critical points. l French & British employed thin, linear defense. l German superiority in combined arms warfare evident.

28. TSP 155-H-039728 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--British Response, 1940-42 l British reassessed training & doctrine after fall of France. l Revamped training produced commanders, staffs, & units abler to employ combined arms. l Royal Armoured Corps instituted doctrinal & organizational changes. » 1942 armoured division trimmed by one brigade.

29. TSP 155-H-039729 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--War in the Desert, 1940-42 l German intervention negated British defeat of & pursuit of Italians into Libya. » Quality of German equipment & combined arms evident. l 1942 British began revamping training & organization in desert. » Gen. Montgomery led effort. l Fall 1942 Battle of Alamein featured results of retraining effort.

30. TSP 155-H-039730 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--German Advance into Russia, 1941 l Purges left Red Army in disarray despite 1940- 41 reform efforts. » Combined arms mechanized formations reintroduced. l 1941 German Army at peak performance & invasion of Soviet Union heyday of blitzkrieg. » Scale of invasion prompted Hitler to dilute strength of panzer divisions.

31. TSP 155-H-039731 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Soviet Response, 1941-42 l Soviet 1941 defensive operations obviated Deep Battle. l 1942-43 Soviet reforms in doctrine & organization produced six combined arms tank armies. » Spearheaded all following Soviet offensives. l Deep Battle closely resembled German blitzkrieg. » Founded on concepts of penetration, exploitation, & encirclement.

32. TSP 155-H-039732 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Summary, 1939-42 l Success of German blitzkrieg waning. l British and especially Soviet combined arms now ascending. l Criticality of logistics, technology, & defense-in-depth emerging.

33. TSP 155-H-039733 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Complexity of Total War, 1942-45-Introduction U.S. & Soviet involvement made production & technology as important as battlefield maneuver.

34. TSP 155-H-039734 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--American Response, 1941-44 l U.S. declared participant in war following Pearl Harbor. l Beginning Mar 1942, Army reformed infantry division. » Intent was to conduct maneuver warfare & facilitate strategic deployment. l Army also reformed armored division. » Intent was smaller, more balanced division. » Followed British & German examples.

35. TSP 155-H-039735 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Antitank Technology l Two ways to defeat armored vehicles. » Kinetic or chemical energy weapons. l By Apr 1942, U.S. Army had developed hand-held “bazooka.” » Fired rocket-driven, shaped-charge warhead.

36. TSP 155-H-039736 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Tank Surrogates l U.S. “tank destroyer” was most original surrogate. » Looked like & often mistaken as tank. l U.S. tank destroyer battalion developed from early divisional antitank battalion. » Was combined arms force but unbalanced. l Soviets & especially Germans also developed tank surrogates.

37. TSP 155-H-039737 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Tank Design & Production l Germans used many designs & variations. l Americans & Soviets standardized & mass produced a few basic designs. l U.S. Army MBT was M4 Sherman. » Excellent compromise between reliability, mobility, armor protection, & gun power.

38. TSP 155-H-039738 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--SIGINT & Communication l SIGINT in effect another “arm.” l ULTRA most effective for strategic intelligence. l German SIGINT most effective at tactical level. l Tactical radio commo & tactical SIGINT bases for controlling mechanized ops.

39. TSP 155-H-039739 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Soviet Concepts & Practices, 1943-45 l Held initiative after Jul 1943 Battle of Kursk. l Emphasized rapid penetration, encirclement, exploitation, & pursuit. » Intent to negate coherent German defense. l Favored narrow breakthrough fronts. » Produced high casualties. l Used combined arms “forward detachment” to seize German outposts & spearhead advance.

40. TSP 155-H-039740 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--German Decline, 1943-45 l 1942 onward attrition eroded both infantry & panzer divisions. » Balanced panzer division remained effective in tactical defense. l After 1943 hard pressed to halt or contain Soviet offensives.

41. TSP 155-H-039741 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--U.S. Concepts & Practices, 1943-45 l Initial combat with Axis forces disappointing. l Often had to relearn combined arms lessons. » Effective combined arms teams from Normandy on. » Massive air superiority critical. » Specialized units frequently dispersed.

42. TSP 155-H-039742 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Air-Ground (Non)Cooperation l Interservice rivalry & misunderstanding in U.S. Army & U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) relations. l AAF operated largely independently & gave close air support low priority. » Minimal cooperation was field expedient. » Formal air-ground doctrine & training developed late war. l Similar challenges for German & British forces.

43. TSP 155-H-039743 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Air Trans & Air-Landing Forces l Involved moving supplies & non-parachute troops in theaters. l Most often used in lean Asian conditions. » British used aerial supply and trans to defeat Japanese infiltration tactics. » 1945 British advance in Burma featured air transport. l Limited use by other nations.

44. TSP 155-H-039744 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Airborne Operations l Appeared to be effective way of bypassing prepared defenses. l 1941 German airborne capture of Crete. » Unsupported & great cost in men & equipment. l Obstacles to use of airborne divisions. » Expensive, elite forces with poor mobility & firepower. l Shortage of British & U.S. combat troops led to overuse of airborne forces.

45. TSP 155-H-039745 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Amphibious Operations l Most complex of WWII operations. » Always joint & often combined in nature. » Foreshadowed future war. l U.S. Marine Corps developed tactical doctrine during interwar period.

46. TSP 155-H-039746 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Unconventional Warfare l Guerrillas perceived to be dependent on supply & training of conventional forces. l Communist politics of some guerrilla forces also suspect to Allies.

47. TSP 155-H-039747 Combined Arms Warfare WWII--Summary l German Army experience indicative. » Initial training, doctrine, & equipment advantages eroded. l Still, accumulated U.S. & Soviet combined arms skills needed to defeat Germans. l Many practical combined arms warfare lessons lost after war.

48. TSP 155-H-039748 Combined Arms Warfare Combined Arms after 1945 (A45)-- Introduction l Two postwar challenges to mechanized combined arms warfare seemed to obviate traditional land combat everywhere. » Nuclear weapons. » Guerrilla insurgencies.

49. TSP 155-H-039749 Combined Arms Warfare A45--Soviet Army, 1945-66: Decline of Conventional Forces l 1945-53: Further refined conventional forces for European conflict. » Lacked nuclear weapons. l 1953-66: Soviets decided future war to be nuclear & conventional. » Ground forces & combined arms secondary to nuclear-equipped arms. » Supremacy of Strategic Rocket Forces.

50. TSP 155-H-039750 Combined Arms Warfare A45--Rebirth of Soviet Combined Arms after 1967 l Rebirth followed Premier Khrushchev’s 1964 ouster. l Centered on likelihood of conflict including conventional force combat. l By mid-1970s back to combined arms doctrine & organization.

51. TSP 155-H-039751 Combined Arms Warfare A45--U.S. Army: Demobilization to Korea l Field commanders generally unsatisfied with organization & equipment. l Numerous combined arms organizational changes to infantry & armored divisions. l Most changes stillborn by postwar fiscal austerity.

52. TSP 155-H-039752 Combined Arms Warfare A45--Korean Conflict l U.S. Army force structure & doctrine unready for June 1950 start of Korean War. l 1951 stabilization of front introduced war of attrition. » Few opportunities thereafter for maneuver attacks. l Helicopters new area of air-ground ops.

53. TSP 155-H-039753 Combined Arms Warfare A45--In Search of a Mission: U.S. Army Organization from Triangle to ROAD l Korean War increased budget & size of U.S. forces. l Postwar reorganization produced “pentomic” ID. » 5 battle groups to function on atomic or non- atomic battlefield. l Kennedy adm. commitment to flexible response led to adoption of ROAD. » Division to task organize as needed. » More flexible than Pentomic structure.

54. TSP 155-H-039754 Combined Arms Warfare A45--Air Assault l 1962 U.S. Army Howze Board studied aviation to improve tactical mobility of ground forces. » 1963-65 11th Air Assault Div. (Test) experimented with helicopter mobility. » Army integrated helicopter into force structure & tactics. » U.S. Air Force protested Army close air support. l 1965 1st Cav. Div. entered Vietnam War. » Closely integrated helicopter & ground forces. » Operated without defined frontline.

55. TSP 155-H-039755 Combined Arms Warfare A45--Battle of Lam Son 719 l 1971 battle involved U.S. & ARVN operation into Laos against NVA logistical base. l Prepared NVA air & ground defenses stronger than expected. l ARVN commander abandoned ground advance. » Air assaults next month accomplished mission. l Demonstrated vulnerability of helicopters to prepared air defense. » Especially so for high-flying helicopters.

56. TSP 155-H-039756 Combined Arms Warfare A45--NATO Powers l 1960s on European NATO armies focused on defense. l Britain, France, & W Germany accepted combined arms concept. l British retained WWII structure but experimented with infantry & armoured divisions. l French made combined arms organic to battalion. l W Germans integrated mounted infantry with armor.

57. TSP 155-H-039757 Combined Arms Warfare A45--From Home Defense to Blitzkrieg: Israeli Army to 1967 l Expert practitioner of highly mechanized combined arms warfare. l 1948 war, Israeli forces amateurish confederation. l 1956 war, C of S Dayan’s reforms focused on U.S. & German WWII combined arms principles. » Victory convinced Dayan of armored force superiority in maneuver war. l 1967 war, relied on tank-fighter bomber team.

58. TSP 155-H-039758 Combined Arms Warfare A45--Israel: Failure of Combined Arms, 1967-73 l Israel continued tank-fighter bomber dominance over balance of arms. l Egypt analyzed previous mistakes, adjusted forces, & with detailed plan attacked in 1973. l Israel overcame difficulties & won with improved solutions. l Israeli Army experience parallel to WWII German Army. » Effectiveness of blitzkrieg declined over time as enemies adjusted.

59. TSP 155-H-039759 Combined Arms Warfare A45--Aftermath of 1973 l 1973 Arab-Israeli War in particular carefully studied by professional soldiers. l U.S. Army adjusting doctrine & force structure to Soviet threat in Europe. l Lessons of 1973 sometimes obscure. » Clear that all weapons & arms now vulnerable.

60. TSP 155-H-039760 Combined Arms Warfare A45--Summary l Compatible organization & equipment needed to ensure protection & movement over terrain. l Arms & aviation need to train to fight together.

61. TSP 155-H-039761 Combined Arms Warfare Combined Arms Summary--1914-73 l Pre-1914 firepower deprived early WWI armies of battlefield mobility. l Rest of war centered on combined arms as means of restoring mobility. l Various factors hampered interwar combined arms. l 1939-41 German victories defined blitzkrieg as mechanized combined arms standard. » U.S. & Soviet developments ended German domination. l Atomic bomb questioned land combat. l Combined arms reemerged 1960s-70s. » Israelis most skillful practitioners.

62. TSP 155-H-039762 Combined Arms Warfare Combined Arms--Trends & Principles l Combined arms & services at ever-lower levels of organization. » Doctrine as guiding light. » Aviation included in process. l Defense in depth one of key components. » U.S. Army’s “Active Defense” much maligned.

63. TSP 155-H-039763 Combined Arms Warfare U.S. Army Combined Arms Since 1973 (S73) (I) l Doctrine: » Emergence of offensive & joint-service AirLand Battle. l Equipment: » Combat materiel upgraded with Big Five. l Organization: » Division 86 & Army of Excellence. l Training: » Individuals & units tested in realistic combined arms exercises.

64. TSP 155-H-039764 Combined Arms Warfare S73 (II) l Army fulfilled DePuy-Starry vision of quality force for high-intensity central European war. l 1989-91 end of Cold War & partial demobilization of force. l Grenada & Panama did not fully test AirLand Battle & “new” Army.

65. TSP 155-H-039765 Combined Arms Warfare Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) (I) l 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. l U.S. Army ending 20-year, post-Vietnam reform. l U.S.-led UN coalition to liberate Kuwait. » Planning & preparation from defensive to offensive in Fall 1990. l U.S. forces under CENTCOM. » 550K personnel & 2K combat aircraft. » Ready to attack January 1991. l Combined arms philosophy permeated ARCENT.

66. TSP 155-H-039766 Combined Arms Warfare ODS (II) l Desert Storm campaign commenced January 1991. l Month-long air op. focused on C2 & interdiction. » 270K U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps to jump off. l Elegant CENTCOM plan of campaign. » Incorporated classical “fix and flank” concept. l Late February 100-hour blitzkrieg ground op. achieved UN mandate to liberate Kuwait. » Proof of post-Vietnam revival of U.S. Army.

67. TSP 155-H-039767 Combined Arms Warfare ODS (III) l ODS demonstrated quality of U.S. Army doctrine, equipment, training, & leadership. » Ground op. reflected combined arms warfare aspects of ALB. l Big Five gave Army significant materiel advantage over Iraq. l 1/4 of all Army & USMC casualties from fratricide.

68. TSP 155-H-039768 Combined Arms Warfare Digitizing the post-Cold War Army, 1991-98 (I) l Despite ever-smaller post-Cold War appropriations, U.S. Army is determined to: » maintain technological edge. » reduce fratricide. l Goal is to: » achieve “situational awareness.” » enhance combat potential of combined arms team.

69. TSP 155-H-039769 Combined Arms Warfare Digitizing the post-Cold War Army, 1991-98 (II) l 1992 hands-on work began with LAM & Battle Labs. » 1994 AWE Desert Hammer first in series. l EXFOR is 4th ID. » Plan for brig. through corps AWEs to build Army XXI. l 1997 brig.-sized Task Force XXI AWE at NTC. » 1/4 ID combined arms team as Army microcosm. l November 1997 AWE as CPX. » Corps AWE scheduled FY02. l Battlefield dominance through omniscience & omnipotence.

70. TSP 155-H-039770 Combined Arms Warfare Teaching About the Evolution of Combined Arms Warfare to Subordinates Leaders l Knowledge of CAW provides context for participating in RMA. l Professional Development provides opportunities for studying CAW.

71. TSP 155-H-039771 Combined Arms Warfare Bibliography Basic sources lead to advanced sources, which lead to deeper insight & professionalism.

72. TSP 155-H-039772 Combined Arms Warfare Check on Learning: Evolution of Combined Arms Warfare

73. TSP 155-H-039773 Advanced Battle Analysis Military History and the Conduct of Battle

74. TSP 155-H-039774 Advanced Battle Analysis What is Advanced Battle Analysis? An advanced method used by the U.S. Army to provide a systematic approach to the study of battles, campaigns, and other operations, and for critical thinking about military problems.

75. TSP 155-H-039775 Advanced Battle Analysis Advanced Battle Analysis Steps l Define the subject. l Review the strategic setting. l Review the operational/tactical situation. l Describe the action. l Assess the significance of the action.

76. TSP 155-H-039776 Advanced Battle Analysis Employing Advanced Battle Analysis l Tailor analysis to organizational mission. l Draw on Army History Program resources. l Use student handouts if desired. l Several formats available.

77. TSP 155-H-039777 Advanced Battle Analysis Conducting Advanced Battle Analysis l Step 1:Define the Subject. l Step 2:Review the Strategic Setting. l Step 3:Review the Operational/Tactical Situation. l Step 4:Describe the Action. l Step 5:Assess the Significance of the Action.

78. TSP 155-H-039778 Advanced Battle Analysis Describe Advanced Battle Analysis to Subordinate Leaders l Appropriate to school or unit setting. l Capitalize on level of student training or experience.

79. TSP 155-H-039779 Advanced Battle Analysis Check on Learning: Advanced Battle Analysis

80. TSP 155-H-039780 The Staff Ride

81. TSP 155-H-039781 The Staff Ride Staff Ride Planning

82. TSP 155-H-039782 The Staff Ride What is a Staff Ride?

83. TSP 155-H-039783 The Staff Ride Staff Ride : Not a Tour and Not a TEWT!

84. TSP 155-H-039784 The Staff Ride Phases of a Staff Ride Phase 1: Preliminary Study. Phase 2: Field Study. Phase 3: Integration.

85. TSP 155-H-039785 The Staff Ride Staff Ride Planning Methodology Step 1: Select a Site. Step 2: Develop Instructor & Support Teams. Step 3: Prepare for Preliminary Study. Step 4: Prepare for Field Study. Step 5: Prepare for the Integration Session.

86. TSP 155-H-039786 The Staff Ride Staff Ride Planning Methodology: Select a Site.

87. TSP 155-H-039787 The Staff Ride Staff Ride Planning Methodology: Develop Instructor & Support Teams.

88. TSP 155-H-039788 The Staff Ride Staff Ride Planning Methodology: Prepare for Preliminary Study.

89. TSP 155-H-039789 The Staff Ride Staff Ride Planning Methodology: Prepare for Field Study.

90. TSP 155-H-039790 The Staff Ride Staff Ride Planning Methodology: Prepare for Integration.

91. TSP 155-H-039791 The Staff Ride How to Teach Staff Ride Planning Methodology

92. TSP 155-H-039792 The Staff Ride Check on Learning: Staff Ride Planning

93. TSP 155-H-039793 Terminal Learning Objective l Action: Apply knowledge of combined arms warfare, advanced battle analysis, and the staff ride to the professional development of subordinate officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. l Conditions: Given study materials for this lesson and a source for obtaining research materials. l Standard: * Selects correct definition of: »combined arms warfare. »advanced battle analysis. »the staff ride. * Identifies the purposes for the study of the evolution of combined arms warfare, advanced battle analysis, and the staff ride. * Outlines a recommended approach for studying combined arms warfare. * Develops an advanced battle analysis that meets four of five established criteria. * Plans a staff ride that meets one-hundred percent of established criteria.