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Desert Storm Lsn 25.

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Presentation on theme: "Desert Storm Lsn 25."— Presentation transcript:

1 Desert Storm Lsn 25

2 The Middle East

3 Background Majority of region administered by Britain until post-WWII.
Long-standing disputes between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq argues Kuwait is an Iraqi province. Iraq mobilized and prepared for invasion in 1961 immediately after Kuwait was granted independence by Britain. Iraq wants Kuwait to forgive debts Iraq owes from Iran-Iraq War. Kuwait actually owes Iraq for “defending” it against Iran. Iraq accuses Kuwait of overproduction of oil/theft of Iraqi oil.

4 The Road to War March US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducts a Command Post Exercise with a Iraqi invasion scenario. July 25 - US Ambassador April Galaspie tells Iraq that their dispute with Kuwait is not a US matter Aug 2 - Iraq invades Kuwait. Aug 7 - Two squadrons of USAF F-15s are first US forces to arrive in Saudi Arabia. Aug 9 - First elements of 82nd Abn arrive in Saudi Arabia. Aug 25, UN authorizes use of force. Oct 31 - President Bush gives go ahead for two corps offensive and authorizes doubling of force. Nov 29 - UN Resolution 678 authorizes all force needed to expel Iraq if they are not out by Jan 15, 1991.

5 Combat Operations Jan 17, 1991 - Air war begins
Feb 23 - Ground war begins Feb 28 - Cease fire takes effect March th ID fights last engagement of the war March 3 - Schwarzkopf accepts Iraqi surrender at Safwan

6 US Army Doctrine: AirLand Battle
Tenets Agility Initiative Depth Synchronization Stresses synchronization of ground maneuver with artillery and air support Implicitly assumes possession of air superiority Attacks enemy in depth

7 AirLand Battle and Maneuver Warfare
“The object of all operations is to impose our will upon the enemy… To do this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction, follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery and continue operations aggressively to achieve the higher commander’s goals. The best results are obtained when powerful blows are struck against critical units or areas whose loss will degrade the coherence of enemy operations in depth.” FM 100-5, Operations (May 1986), p. 14

8 AirLand Battle and Desert Storm
Our will Powerful blow Air superiority Off balance and unexpected direction Critical units Depth

9 “Our will” UN mandate was to liberate Kuwait, not to remove Saddam
Essential to keep the coalition together Wanted to maximize US technological advantage

10 Initial Concept: One corps

11 Final Concept: Two corps (“powerful blow”)

12

13 Comparison Mass Maneuver One corps vs two corps Frontal vs flank
Original plan likely to result in higher casualties “… if we are serious about ejecting them [Iraq] from Kuwait what we need is more forces to be able to execute a proper campaign” “Lucky War,” Swain, p. 81 Maneuver Frontal vs flank Importance of deception and secrecy

14 Shaping Operations Create and preserve conditions for the success of the operation FM 3-0, p. 4-23 Air operation Deception operation Operational Framework for the Offense

15 Air War (“air superiority”)
100k sorties in 6 weeks. Initial Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and Stealth strikes focused on air defense sites, creating gaps that facilitated the remainder of the air campaign. Combined manned bombing, UAVs, and propaganda. Cut supplies bound for Iraqi forces in Kuwait from 20k tons per week to 2k tons per week. Deep operations

16 Deception (“off balance”)
Two MEBs afloat on amphibious shipping. Exercise/rehearsal conducted in Oman in January. Media allowed to film and report. SEALs make their presence known on Kuwaiti beaches. 5th MEB lands on D+1 to perpetuate the ruse and become sector reserve. Saddam must commit forces (estimated at four divisions) to protect his flank against an amphibious assault, creating a gap (or at least weakening a surface) to the Allies front.

17 The Shift Westward

18 Results of the Air War and Deception (“unexpected direction”)
With no Iraqi air to fly reconnaissance, the Coalition forces secretly shift west (away from where the Iraqis expect the amphibious attack to occur

19 Center of Gravity Those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight Destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct path to victory Once identified, the center of gravity becomes the focus of the commander’s intent and operational design FM 3-0, p. 5-7

20 Decisive Point A geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack Keys to attacking or protecting centers of gravity Shape operational design and allow commanders to select objectives that are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable FM 3-0, p. 5-7

21 Centers of Gravity Decisive Point (“critical units”) Enemy
Saddam Hussein Friendly The coalition Decisive Point (“critical units”) Enemy Republican Guards

22 Maneuver

23 The Ground War Iran Euphrates Tigris Hafir al Batin Kuwait City As Samawah An Nasiriyah Al Basrah Khafji Persian Gulf Busayyah Saudi Arabia Iraq Third Army XVIII Airborne Corps VII Corps JFC East North MARCENT xxx xxxx Republican Guards Iraqi Defenses Massive air and artillery bombardments prior to D-Day reduced front line forces to less than 50% strength and reserves to 50-75%. Feb 23 - Iraqis begin torching oil wells. Feb 24 - Ground campaign kicks off. Emphasized speed and maneuver. VII Corps will be the decisive operation with the mission to destroy the enemy’s decisive point, the Republican Guards. XVIII Abn Corps will be the shaping operation with the mission to isolate the battlefield

24 Situation, 23 February 1991 Iraq Iran Saudi Arabia Tigris As Samawah
Euphrates Tigris Hafir al Batin Kuwait City As Samawah An Nasiriyah Al Basrah Persian Gulf Busayyah Saudi Arabia Iraq T AD N AL M H 51 52 17 10 6 E 2 D 15 11 19 20 28 25 48 26 49 12 47 27 16 30 36 29 14 18 7 1 3 21 US Third Army XX FR 101 24 III 82 UK JFN JFE Marine XVIII Airborne Corps VII Corps JFC East X North MARCENT xxx xxxx 5

25 Situation, 24 February 1991 Iraq Iran Persian Gulf Saudi Arabia
25 Iran Euphrates Tigris Hafir al Batin Kuwait City As Samawah An Nasiriyah Al Basrah Persian Gulf Busayyah Saudi Arabia Iraq US Third Army XVIII Airborne Corps VII Corps JFC East North MARCENT xxx xxxx 49 N AL AD H M 52 T 12 47 27 28 48 26 E 51 10 6 17 2 D 21 15 11 19 1 3 18 5 29 14 7 36 16 30 20 JFE XX Marine X JFN UK III 24 101 82 FR

26 Situation, 25 February 1991 Iraq Iran Persian Gulf Saudi Arabia Tigris
Euphrates Tigris Hafir al Batin Kuwait City As Samawah An Nasiriyah Al Basrah Persian Gulf Busayyah Saudi Arabia Iraq US Third Army XVIII Airborne Corps VII Corps JFC East North MARCENT xxx xxxx JFE XX 1 Marine X 2 JFN UK 3 III 24 101 82 6 FR 27 47 12 T 52 17 21 19 11 15 D 10 51 E M H AD AL N 49

27 Situation, 26 February 1991 Iraq Iran Persian Gulf Saudi Arabia
Euphrates Tigris Hafir al Batin Kuwait City As Samawah An Nasiriyah Al Basrah Persian Gulf Busayyah Saudi Arabia Iraq JFC East US Third Army XVIII Airborne Corps VII Corps North MARCENT xxx xxxx XX 6 FR 82 101 24 III 3 2 1 UK 47 12 T 17 52 M H 49 N AL AD E JFN Marine JFE X 51 10

28 Situation, 27 February 1991 Iraq Iran Persian Gulf Saudi Arabia Tigris
Hafir al Batin Kuwait City As Samawah An Nasiriyah Al Basrah Persian Gulf Busayyah Saudi Arabia Iraq JFC East XVIII Airborne Corps xxx US Third Army VII Corps North MARCENT xxxx JFE XX 1 Marine X 2 JFN 6 10 52 51 M H N AL AD UK III 3 24 101 FR 82

29 Situation, 28 February 1991 Iraq Iran Persian Gulf Saudi Arabia Tigris
Hafir al Batin Kuwait City As Samawah An Nasiriyah Al Basrah Persian Gulf Busayyah Saudi Arabia Iraq JFC East XVIII Airborne Corps xxx US Third Army VII Corps North MARCENT xxxx JFE XX 1 Marine X 2 JFN UK III 3 24 AD AL 101 6 FR 82

30 Opening Moves 1st ID begins breaching operations
24 ID moves north largely unopposed 3rd Bde -101st Abn Div inserts 155 miles from its AA to the Euphrates Valley, cutting off an Iraqi main line of withdrawal or reinforcement

31 Immediate Success VII Corps begins turning east
Schwarzkopf becoming increasingly frustrated by what he perceives as an overly cautious and slow VII Corps advance 24th ID begins running wild in Iraqi rear

32 Envelopment

33 Victory Iraqi forces in full scale retreat
Being interdicted from a partial encirclement

34 Air Assault Operations (“depth”)
While this is all going on, the 101st Airborne Division is fighting the deep battle “The Air Force and armor were the thunder of Desert Storm, while the 101st was the lightning.” (Norman Schwarzkopf)

35 Deep Area The deep area is an area forward of the close area that commanders use to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close area. The deep area relates to the close area not only in terms of geography but also in terms of purpose and time.

36 XVIII Airborne Corps Missions
Penetrate approximately kilometers to the Euphrates River, cut the Iraqi lines of communication (LOC) along Highway 8 to Baghdad, isolate Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO), and help destroy the theater reserve - the Republican Guards Forces Command (RGFC)

37 Division Missions 101st Abn Div (Air Aslt) 24th Infantry Division
Penetrate rapidly by air assault to the Euphrates River, cut the LOC between Baghdad and Iraqi forces in the KTO, destroy all enemy forces along those routes, and turn east to block north of Al-Basrah. 24th Infantry Division Attack through Iraqi forces in their zone to the Euphrates River, then turn east to destroy RGFC forces trapped in the KTO.

38

39 Air Assault Division Area of Operation
NEW YORK 120 Km (75 Miles) Williamsport, PA EA Thomas New York, NY AO Eagle 250 Km (154 Miles) PENNSYLVANIA Philadelphia, PA FOB Viper FOB Cobra Harrisburg, PA 150 Km (93 Miles) 150 Km (93 Miles) TAA Campbell Washington D.C. 914 Km (567 Miles) KENTUCKY Nashville, TN Camp Eagle II

40 Feb 26 By Feb 26, the XVIII Airborne Corps had interdicted the LOC in the Euphrates River Valley, blocked reinforcement of Iraqi forces in the KTO, and completed the envelopment of Saddam Hussein's forces in southern Iraq and Kuwait.

41 Feb 27 IRAQ IRAN SAUDI ARABIA
At 12:00, the first XVIII Airborne Corps and 101st attack helicopter battalions closed on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Viper, 200 km east of FOB Cobra which had been secured by the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division assaulting at 10:00. AS-SAMAWAH SAUDI ARABIA IRAQ KUWAIT CITY IRAN AO EAGLE OBJ COBRA TAA CAMPBELL EUPHRATES RIVER JALIBAH NEUTRAL ZONE EA THOMAS TALLIL AN-NASIRIYAH 150 Km HIGHWAY 8 121 Km VIPER BASRAH 250 Km

42 Feb 27 Attack helicopter battalions destroyed vehicles on and across the Al-Basrah causeway. With the last escape route now cut, most of Iraqi units were caught between advancing forces of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the VII Corps and the Euphrates River.

43 Feb 27 However much of the Hammurabi Division escaped intact
Throughout the fighting Schwarzkopf had been pressing VII Corps commander Frederick Franks to pursue faster while Franks felt he still had enemy in contact to deal with The two never effectively communicated and a gap in the encirclement was the result Franks and Schwarzkopf would provide conflicting versions of events in their post-war writings

44 Ceasefire Cessation of hostilities declared was declared at 8:01 a.m. on Feb 28 Many would later argue that the US should have pressed on to Baghdad but there would have been several problems with that The UN mandate was to liberate Kuwait, not replace Saddam The coalition would have likely fractured over this expanded mission More US casualties would have been inevitable The US would have then been saddled with responsibility for governing Iraq

45 Review Ground war emphasized mass, speed, and maneuver
Still largely a linear battlefield Iraqi Freedom would be much more nonlinear and trade mass for speed Renewed Air Force arguments about the relative superiority of air power Technology, low casualties, short war would lead to increased demands for use of military Importance of media Felt somewhat used Would lead to embedded journalists in Iraqi Freedom Limited objective (liberate Kuwait) left Saddam in power and the Republican Guards largely in tact Set stage for Iraqi Freedom

46 Legacy of Desert Storm Won with an operational concept that sought in a single climatic operation to destroy the enemy’s center of gravity In 100 hours of combat, American forces destroyed or captured more than 3,000 tanks, 1,400 armored carriers, and 2,200 artillery pieces The “Great Wheel” swept over and captured almost 20,000 square miles of territory Only 140 soldiers died in direct combat Erased the “Vietnam Syndrome” Scales, Certain Victory, p

47 Next MOOTW: Beirut, Weinberger Doctrine, Somalia


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