1. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 27 Oligopoly

2. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2 Oligopoly u A monopoly is an industry consisting a single firm. u A duopoly is an industry consisting of two firms. u An oligopoly is an industry consisting of a few firms. Particularly, each firm’s own price or output decisions affect its competitors’ profits.

3. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 3 Oligopoly u How do we analyze markets in which the supplying industry is oligopolistic? u Consider the duopolistic case of two firms supplying the same product.

4. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 4 Quantity Competition u Assume that firms compete by choosing output levels. u If firm 1 produces y 1 units and firm 2 produces y 2 units then total quantity supplied is y 1 + y 2. The market price will be p(y 1 + y 2 ). u The firms’ total cost functions are c 1 (y 1 ) and c 2 (y 2 ).

5. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 5 Quantity Competition u Suppose firm 1 takes firm 2’s output level choice y 2 as given. Then firm 1 sees its profit function as u Given y 2, what output level y 1 maximizes firm 1’s profit?

6. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 6 Quantity Competition; An Example u Suppose that the market inverse demand function is and that the firms’ total cost functions are and

7. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 7 Quantity Competition; An Example Then, for given y 2, firm 1’s profit function is

8. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 8 Quantity Competition; An Example Then, for given y 2, firm 1’s profit function is So, given y 2, firm 1’s profit-maximizing output level solves

9. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 9 Quantity Competition; An Example Then, for given y 2, firm 1’s profit function is So, given y 2, firm 1’s profit-maximizing output level solves I.e., firm 1’s best response to y 2 is

10. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 10 Quantity Competition; An Example y2y2 y1y1 60 15 Firm 1’s “reaction curve”

11. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 11 Quantity Competition; An Example Similarly, given y 1, firm 2’s profit function is

12. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 12 Quantity Competition; An Example Similarly, given y 1, firm 2’s profit function is So, given y 1, firm 2’s profit-maximizing output level solves

13. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 13 Quantity Competition; An Example Similarly, given y 1, firm 2’s profit function is So, given y 1, firm 2’s profit-maximizing output level solves I.e., firm 1’s best response to y 2 is

14. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 14 Quantity Competition; An Example y2y2 y1y1 Firm 2’s “reaction curve” 45/4 45

15. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 15 Quantity Competition; An Example u An equilibrium is when each firm’s output level is a best response to the other firm’s output level, for then neither wants to deviate from its output level. u A pair of output levels (y 1 *,y 2 *) is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium if and

16. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 16 Quantity Competition; An Example and

17. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 17 Quantity Competition; An Example and Substitute for y 2 * to get

18. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 18 Quantity Competition; An Example and Substitute for y 2 * to get

19. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 19 Quantity Competition; An Example and Substitute for y 2 * to get Hence

20. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 20 Quantity Competition; An Example and Substitute for y 2 * to get Hence So the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is

21. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 21 Quantity Competition; An Example y2y2 y1y1 Firm 2’s “reaction curve” 60 15 Firm 1’s “reaction curve” 45/4 45

22. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 22 Quantity Competition; An Example y2y2 y1y1 Firm 2’s “reaction curve” 48 60 Firm 1’s “reaction curve” 8 13 Cournot-Nash equilibrium

23. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 23 Quantity Competition Generally, given firm 2’s chosen output level y 2, firm 1’s profit function is and the profit-maximizing value of y 1 solves The solution, y 1 = R 1 (y 2 ), is firm 1’s Cournot- Nash reaction to y 2.

24. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 24 Quantity Competition Similarly, given firm 1’s chosen output level y 1, firm 2’s profit function is and the profit-maximizing value of y 2 solves The solution, y 2 = R 2 (y 1 ), is firm 2’s Cournot- Nash reaction to y 1.

25. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 25 Quantity Competition y2y2 y1y1 Firm 1’s “reaction curve” Cournot-Nash equilibrium y 1 * = R 1 (y 2 *) and y 2 * = R 2 (y 1 *)

26. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 26 Iso-Profit Curves  For firm 1, an iso-profit curve contains all the output pairs (y 1,y 2 ) giving firm 1 the same profit level  1. u What do iso-profit curves look like?

27. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 27 y2y2 y1y1 Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 1 With y 1 fixed, firm 1’s profit increases as y 2 decreases.

28. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 28 y2y2 y1y1 Increasing profit for firm 1. Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 1

29. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 29 y2y2 y1y1 Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 1 Q: Firm 2 chooses y 2 = y 2 ’. Where along the line y 2 = y 2 ’ is the output level that maximizes firm 1’s profit? y2’y2’

30. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 30 y2y2 y1y1 Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 1 Q: Firm 2 chooses y 2 = y 2 ’. Where along the line y 2 = y 2 ’ is the output level that maximizes firm 1’s profit? A: The point attaining the highest iso-profit curve for firm 1. y2’y2’ y1’y1’

31. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 31 y2y2 y1y1 Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 1 Q: Firm 2 chooses y 2 = y 2 ’. Where along the line y 2 = y 2 ’ is the output level that maximizes firm 1’s profit? A: The point attaining the highest iso-profit curve for firm 1. y 1 ’ is firm 1’s best response to y 2 = y 2 ’. y2’y2’ y1’y1’

32. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 32 y2y2 y1y1 Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 1 Q: Firm 2 chooses y 2 = y 2 ’. Where along the line y 2 = y 2 ’ is the output level that maximizes firm 1’s profit? A: The point attaining the highest iso-profit curve for firm 1. y 1 ’ is firm 1’s best response to y 2 = y 2 ’. y2’y2’ R 1 (y 2 ’)

33. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 33 y2y2 y1y1 y2’y2’ R 1 (y 2 ’) y2”y2” R 1 (y 2 ”) Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 1

34. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 34 y2y2 y1y1 y2’y2’ y2”y2” R 1 (y 2 ”) R 1 (y 2 ’) Firm 1’s reaction curve passes through the “tops” of firm 1’s iso-profit curves. Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 1

35. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 35 y2y2 y1y1 Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 2 Increasing profit for firm 2.

36. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 36 y2y2 y1y1 Iso-Profit Curves for Firm 2 Firm 2’s reaction curve passes through the “tops” of firm 2’s iso-profit curves. y 2 = R 2 (y 1 )

37. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 37 Collusion u Q: Are the Cournot-Nash equilibrium profits the largest that the firms can earn in total?

38. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 38 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* Are there other output level pairs (y 1,y 2 ) that give higher profits to both firms? (y 1 *,y 2 *) is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.

39. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 39 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* Are there other output level pairs (y 1,y 2 ) that give higher profits to both firms? (y 1 *,y 2 *) is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.

40. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 40 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* Are there other output level pairs (y 1,y 2 ) that give higher profits to both firms? (y 1 *,y 2 *) is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.

41. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 41 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* (y 1 *,y 2 *) is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Higher  2 Higher  1

42. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 42 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* Higher  2 Higher  1 y2’y2’ y1’y1’

43. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 43 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* y2’y2’ y1’y1’ Higher  2 Higher  1

44. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 44 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* y2’y2’ y1’y1’ Higher  2 Higher  1 (y 1 ’,y 2 ’) earns higher profits for both firms than does (y 1 *,y 2 *).

45. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 45 Collusion u So there are profit incentives for both firms to “cooperate” by lowering their output levels. u This is collusion. u Firms that collude are said to have formed a cartel. u If firms form a cartel, how should they do it?

46. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 46 Collusion u Suppose the two firms want to maximize their total profit and divide it between them. Their goal is to choose cooperatively output levels y 1 and y 2 that maximize

47. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 47 Collusion u The firms cannot do worse by colluding since they can cooperatively choose their Cournot-Nash equilibrium output levels and so earn their Cournot-Nash equilibrium profits. So collusion must provide profits at least as large as their Cournot-Nash equilibrium profits.

48. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 48 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* y2’y2’ y1’y1’ Higher  2 Higher  1 (y 1 ’,y 2 ’) earns higher profits for both firms than does (y 1 *,y 2 *).

49. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 49 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* y2’y2’ y1’y1’ Higher  2 Higher  1 (y 1 ’,y 2 ’) earns higher profits for both firms than does (y 1 *,y 2 *). (y 1 ”,y 2 ”) earns still higher profits for both firms. y2”y2” y1”y1”

50. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 50 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* y2y2 ~ y1y1 ~ (y 1,y 2 ) maximizes firm 1’s profit while leaving firm 2’s profit at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium level. ~~

51. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 51 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* y2y2 ~ y1y1 ~ (y 1,y 2 ) maximizes firm 1’s profit while leaving firm 2’s profit at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium level. ~~ y2y2 _ y2y2 _ (y 1,y 2 ) maximizes firm 2’s profit while leaving firm 1’s profit at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium level. __

52. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 52 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* y2y2 ~ y1y1 ~ y2y2 _ y2y2 _ The path of output pairs that maximize one firm’s profit while giving the other firm at least its C-N equilibrium profit.

53. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 53 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* y2y2 ~ y1y1 ~ y2y2 _ y2y2 _ The path of output pairs that maximize one firm’s profit while giving the other firm at least its C-N equilibrium profit. One of these output pairs must maximize the cartel’s joint profit.

54. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 54 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* y2my2m y1my1m (y 1 m,y 2 m ) denotes the output levels that maximize the cartel’s total profit.

55. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 55 Collusion u Is such a cartel stable? u Does one firm have an incentive to cheat on the other? u I.e., if firm 1 continues to produce y 1 m units, is it profit-maximizing for firm 2 to continue to produce y 2 m units?

56. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 56 Collusion u Firm 2’s profit-maximizing response to y 1 = y 1 m is y 2 = R 2 (y 1 m ).

57. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 57 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y2my2m y1my1m y 2 = R 2 (y 1 m ) is firm 2’s best response to firm 1 choosing y 1 = y 1 m. R 2 (y 1 m ) y 1 = R 1 (y 2 ), firm 1’s reaction curve y 2 = R 2 (y 1 ), firm 2’s reaction curve

58. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 58 Collusion u Firm 2’s profit-maximizing response to y 1 = y 1 m is y 2 = R 2 (y 1 m ) > y 2 m. u Firm 2’s profit increases if it cheats on firm 1 by increasing its output level from y 2 m to R 2 (y 1 m ).

59. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 59 Collusion u Similarly, firm 1’s profit increases if it cheats on firm 2 by increasing its output level from y 1 m to R 1 (y 2 m ).

60. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 60 Collusion y2y2 y1y1 y2my2m y1my1m y 2 = R 2 (y 1 m ) is firm 2’s best response to firm 1 choosing y 1 = y 1 m. R 1 (y 2 m ) y 1 = R 1 (y 2 ), firm 1’s reaction curve y 2 = R 2 (y 1 ), firm 2’s reaction curve

61. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 61 Collusion u So a profit-seeking cartel in which firms cooperatively set their output levels is fundamentally unstable. u E.g., OPEC’s broken agreements.

62. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 62 Collusion u So a profit-seeking cartel in which firms cooperatively set their output levels is fundamentally unstable. u E.g., OPEC’s broken agreements. u But is the cartel unstable if the game is repeated many times, instead of being played only once? Then there is an opportunity to punish a cheater.

63. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 63 Collusion & Punishment Strategies u To determine if such a cartel can be stable we need to know 3 things: –(i) What is each firm’s per period profit in the cartel? –(ii) What is the profit a cheat earns in the first period in which it cheats? –(iii) What is the profit the cheat earns in each period after it first cheats?

64. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u Suppose two firms face an inverse market demand of p(y T ) = 24 – y T and have total costs of c 1 (y 1 ) = y 2 1 and c 2 (y 2 ) = y 2 2.

65. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u (i) What is each firm’s per period profit in the cartel? u p(y T ) = 24 – y T, c 1 (y 1 ) = y 2 1, c 2 (y 2 ) = y 2 2. u If the firms collude then their joint profit function is  M (y 1,y 2 ) = (24 – y 1 – y 2 )(y 1 + y 2 ) – y 2 1 – y 2 2. u What values of y 1 and y 2 maximize the cartel’s profit?

66. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u  M (y 1,y 2 ) = (24 – y 1 – y 2 )(y 1 + y 2 ) – y 2 1 – y 2 2. u What values of y 1 and y 2 maximize the cartel’s profit? Solve

67. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u  M (y 1,y 2 ) = (24 – y 1 – y 2 )(y 1 + y 2 ) – y 2 1 – y 2 2. u What values of y 1 and y 2 maximize the cartel’s profit? Solve u Solution is y M 1 = y M 2 = 4.

68. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u  M (y 1,y 2 ) = (24 – y 1 – y 2 )(y 1 + y 2 ) – y 2 1 – y 2 2. u y M 1 = y M 2 = 4 maximizes the cartel’s profit. u The maximum profit is therefore  M = $(24 – 8)(8) - $16 - $16 = $112. u Suppose the firms share the profit equally, getting $112/2 = $56 each per period.

69. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u (iii) What is the profit the cheat earns in each period after it first cheats? u This depends upon the punishment inflicted upon the cheat by the other firm.

70. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u (iii) What is the profit the cheat earns in each period after it first cheats? u This depends upon the punishment inflicted upon the cheat by the other firm. u Suppose the other firm punishes by forever after not cooperating with the cheat. u What are the firms’ profits in the noncooperative C-N equilibrium?

71. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u What are the firms’ profits in the noncooperative C-N equilibrium? u p(y T ) = 24 – y T, c 1 (y 1 ) = y 2 1, c 2 (y 2 ) = y 2 2. u Given y 2, firm 1’s profit function is  1 (y 1 ;y 2 ) = (24 – y 1 – y 2 )y 1 – y 2 1.

72. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u What are the firms’ profits in the noncooperative C-N equilibrium? u p(y T ) = 24 – y T, c 1 (y 1 ) = y 2 1, c 2 (y 2 ) = y 2 2. u Given y 2, firm 1’s profit function is  1 (y 1 ;y 2 ) = (24 – y 1 – y 2 )y 1 – y 2 1. u The value of y 1 that is firm 1’s best response to y 2 solves

73. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u What are the firms’ profits in the noncooperative C-N equilibrium? u  1 (y 1 ;y 2 ) = (24 – y 1 – y 2 )y 1 – y 2 1. u u Similarly,

74. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u What are the firms’ profits in the noncooperative C-N equilibrium? u  1 (y 1 ;y 2 ) = (24 – y 1 – y 2 )y 1 – y 2 1. u u Similarly, u The C-N equilibrium (y* 1,y* 2 ) solves y 1 = R 1 (y 2 ) and y 2 = R 2 (y 1 )  y* 1 = y* 2 = 4  8.

75. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u What are the firms’ profits in the noncooperative C-N equilibrium? u  1 (y 1 ;y 2 ) = (24 – y 1 – y 2 )y 1 – y 2 1. u y* 1 = y* 2 = 4  8. u So each firm’s profit in the C-N equilibrium is  * 1 =  * 2 = (14  4)(4  8) – 4  8 2  $46 each period.

76. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u (ii) What is the profit a cheat earns in the first period in which it cheats? u Firm 1 cheats on firm 2 by producing the quantity y CH 1 that maximizes firm 1’s profit given that firm 2 continues to produce y M 2 = 4. What is the value of y CH 1 ?

77. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u (ii) What is the profit a cheat earns in the first period in which it cheats? u Firm 1 cheats on firm 2 by producing the quantity y CH 1 that maximizes firm 1’s profit given that firm 2 continues to produce y M 2 = 4. What is the value of y CH 1 ? u y CH 1 = R 1 (y M 2 ) = (24 – y M 2 )/4 = (24 – 4)/4 = 5.  Firm 1’s profit in the period in which it cheats is therefore  CH 1 = (24 – 5 – 1)(5) – 5 2 = $65.

78. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 78 Collusion & Punishment Strategies u To determine if such a cartel can be stable we need to know 3 things: –(i) What is each firm’s per period profit in the cartel? $56. –(ii) What is the profit a cheat earns in the first period in which it cheats? $65. –(iii) What is the profit the cheat earns in each period after it first cheats? $46.

79. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 79 Collusion & Punishment Strategies u Each firm’s periodic discount factor is 1/(1+r). u The present-value of firm 1’s profits if it does not cheat is ??

80. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u Each firm’s periodic discount factor is 1/(1+r). u The present-value of firm 1’s profits if it does not cheat is

81. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u Each firm’s periodic discount factor is 1/(1+r). u The present-value of firm 1’s profits if it does not cheat is u The present-value of firm 1’s profit if it cheats this period is ??

82. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies u Each firm’s periodic discount factor is 1/(1+r). u The present-value of firm 1’s profits if it does not cheat is u The present-value of firm 1’s profit if it cheats this period is

83. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Collusion & Punishment Strategies So the cartel will be stable if

84. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 84 The Order of Play u So far it has been assumed that firms choose their output levels simultaneously. u The competition between the firms is then a simultaneous play game in which the output levels are the strategic variables.

85. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 85 The Order of Play u What if firm 1 chooses its output level first and then firm 2 responds to this choice? u Firm 1 is then a leader. Firm 2 is a follower. u The competition is a sequential game in which the output levels are the strategic variables.

86. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 86 The Order of Play u Such games are von Stackelberg games. u Is it better to be the leader? u Or is it better to be the follower?

87. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 87 Stackelberg Games u Q: What is the best response that follower firm 2 can make to the choice y 1 already made by the leader, firm 1?

88. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 88 Stackelberg Games u Q: What is the best response that follower firm 2 can make to the choice y 1 already made by the leader, firm 1? u A: Choose y 2 = R 2 (y 1 ).

89. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 89 Stackelberg Games u Q: What is the best response that follower firm 2 can make to the choice y 1 already made by the leader, firm 1? u A: Choose y 2 = R 2 (y 1 ). u Firm 1 knows this and so perfectly anticipates firm 2’s reaction to any y 1 chosen by firm 1.

90. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 90 Stackelberg Games u This makes the leader’s profit function

91. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 91 Stackelberg Games u This makes the leader’s profit function u The leader chooses y 1 to maximize its profit.

92. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 92 Stackelberg Games u This makes the leader’s profit function u The leader chooses y 1 to maximize its profit. u Q: Will the leader make a profit at least as large as its Cournot-Nash equilibrium profit?

93. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 93 Stackelberg Games u A: Yes. The leader could choose its Cournot-Nash output level, knowing that the follower would then also choose its C-N output level. The leader’s profit would then be its C-N profit. But the leader does not have to do this, so its profit must be at least as large as its C-N profit.

94. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 94 Stackelberg Games; An Example u The market inverse demand function is p = 60 - y T. The firms’ cost functions are c 1 (y 1 ) = y 1 2 and c 2 (y 2 ) = 15y 2 + y 2 2. u Firm 2 is the follower. Its reaction function is

95. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 95 Stackelberg Games; An Example The leader’s profit function is therefore

96. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 96 Stackelberg Games; An Example The leader’s profit function is therefore For a profit-maximum for firm 1,

97. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 97 Stackelberg Games; An Example Q: What is firm 2’s response to the leader’s choice

98. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 98 Stackelberg Games; An Example Q: What is firm 2’s response to the leader’s choice A:

99. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 99 Stackelberg Games; An Example Q: What is firm 2’s response to the leader’s choice A: The C-N output levels are (y 1 *,y 2 *) = (13,8) so the leader produces more than its C-N output and the follower produces less than its C-N output. This is true generally.

100. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 100 Stackelberg Games y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* (y 1 *,y 2 *) is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Higher  2 Higher  1

101. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 101 Stackelberg Games y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* (y 1 *,y 2 *) is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Higher  1 Follower’s reaction curve

102. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 102 Stackelberg Games y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* (y 1 *,y 2 *) is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. (y 1 S,y 2 S ) is the Stackelberg equilibrium. Higher  1 y1Sy1S Follower’s reaction curve y2Sy2S

103. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 103 Stackelberg Games y2y2 y1y1 y1*y1* y2*y2* (y 1 *,y 2 *) is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. (y 1 S,y 2 S ) is the Stackelberg equilibrium. y1Sy1S Follower’s reaction curve y2Sy2S

104. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 104 Price Competition u What if firms compete using only price-setting strategies, instead of using only quantity-setting strategies? u Games in which firms use only price strategies and play simultaneously are Bertrand games.

105. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 105 Bertrand Games u Each firm’s marginal production cost is constant at c. u All firms set their prices simultaneously. u Q: Is there a Nash equilibrium?

106. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 106 Bertrand Games u Each firm’s marginal production cost is constant at c. u All firms set their prices simultaneously. u Q: Is there a Nash equilibrium? u A: Yes. Exactly one.

107. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 107 Bertrand Games u Each firm’s marginal production cost is constant at c. u All firms set their prices simultaneously. u Q: Is there a Nash equilibrium? u A: Yes. Exactly one. All firms set their prices equal to the marginal cost c. Why?

108. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 108 Bertrand Games u Suppose one firm sets its price higher than another firm’s price.

109. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 109 Bertrand Games u Suppose one firm sets its price higher than another firm’s price. u Then the higher-priced firm would have no customers.

110. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 110 Bertrand Games u Suppose one firm sets its price higher than another firm’s price. u Then the higher-priced firm would have no customers. u Hence, at an equilibrium, all firms must set the same price.

111. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 111 Bertrand Games u Suppose the common price set by all firm is higher than marginal cost c.

112. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 112 Bertrand Games u Suppose the common price set by all firm is higher than marginal cost c. u Then one firm can just slightly lower its price and sell to all the buyers, thereby increasing its profit.

113. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 113 Bertrand Games u Suppose the common price set by all firm is higher than marginal cost c. u Then one firm can just slightly lower its price and sell to all the buyers, thereby increasing its profit. u The only common price which prevents undercutting is c. Hence this is the only Nash equilibrium.

114. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 114 Sequential Price Games u What if, instead of simultaneous play in pricing strategies, one firm decides its price ahead of the others. u This is a sequential game in pricing strategies called a price-leadership game. u The firm which sets its price ahead of the other firms is the price-leader.

115. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 115 Sequential Price Games u Think of one large firm (the leader) and many competitive small firms (the followers). u The small firms are price-takers and so their collective supply reaction to a market price p is their aggregate supply function Y f (p).

116. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 116 Sequential Price Games u The market demand function is D(p). u So the leader knows that if it sets a price p the quantity demanded from it will be the residual demand u Hence the leader’s profit function is

117. © 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 117 Sequential Price Games u The leader’s profit function is so the leader chooses the price level p* for which profit is maximized. u The followers collectively supply Y f (p*) units and the leader supplies the residual quantity D(p*) - Y f (p*).