Presentation on theme: "Oligopoly Games An Oligopoly Price-Fixing Game"— Presentation transcript:
1Oligopoly Games An Oligopoly Price-Fixing Game A game like the prisoners’ dilemma is played in duopoly.A duopoly is a market in which there are only two producers that compete.Duopoly captures the essence of oligopoly.Figure 13.8 on the next slide describes the demand and cost situation in a natural duopoly.A Cartel Game. The prisoner’s dilemma to a cartel game on pages 291–295 has been carefully designed to get the maximum payoff from the knowledge your students have of the perfect competition and monopoly results of the two preceding chapters and to introduce them to game theory in a setting that is as close to the previously studied settings as possible.1. The natural duopoly setting ensures that there is a zero profit equilibrium that corresponds to perfect competition and monopoly profit equilibrium.2. Instead of just asserting a payoff matrix, the numbers in the matrix come directly from monopoly profit-maximizing and competitive outcomes. You need to do a bit of work (and so do your students) to generate the payoff numbers, but the whole story hangs together so much better when the student can see where the numbers come from and can see the connection between the oligopoly set up and those of competition and monopoly.3. Start with Figure 13.8 (page 291) and after you’ve explained the cost and demand conditions shown in the figure, ask the students what they think the price and quantity will be in this industry. There will be differences of opinion. This diversity of opinion motivates the need for a model of the choices the firms make.4. The game is set up so that the competitive equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium. You might want to emphasize that this outcome is efficient even though it is not the best joint outcome for the firms.
2Oligopoly GamesPart (a) shows each firm’s cost curves. Part (b) shows the market demand curve.
3Oligopoly GamesThis industry is a natural duopoly. Two firms can meet the market demand at the least cost.
4Oligopoly GamesHow does this market work? What is the price and quantity produced in equilibrium?
5Oligopoly GamesSuppose that the two firms enter into a collusive agreement. A collusive agreement is an agreement between two (or more) firms to restrict output, raise price, and increase profits. Such agreements are illegal in the United States and are undertaken in secret. Firms in a collusive agreement operate a cartel.
6Oligopoly Games The possible strategies are: Comply Cheat Because each firm has two strategies, there are four possible outcomes:Both complyBoth cheatTrick complies and Gear cheatsGear complies and Trick cheats
7Oligopoly GamesThe first possible outcome—both comply—earns the maximum economic profit, which is the same as a monopoly would earn.
8Oligopoly GamesTo find that profit, we set marginal cost for the cartel equal to marginal revenue for the cartel. Figure 13.9 shows this outcome.
9Oligopoly GamesThe cartel’s marginal cost curve is the horizontal sum of the MC curves of the two firms and the marginal revenue curve is like that of a monopoly.
10Oligopoly GamesThe firms maximize economic profit by producing the quantity at which MCI = MR.
11Oligopoly GamesEach firm agrees to produce 2,000 units and each firm shares the maximum economic profit.
12Oligopoly GamesWhen each firm produces 2,000 units, the price is greater than the firm’s marginal cost, so if one firm increased output, its profit would increase.
13Oligopoly GamesFigure shows what happens when one firm cheats and increases its output to 3,000 units. Industry output rises to 5,000 and the price falls.
14Oligopoly GamesFor the complier, ATC now exceeds price. For the cheat, price exceeds ATC.
15Oligopoly GamesThe complier incurs an economic loss. The cheat earns an increased economic profit.
16Oligopoly GamesEither firm could cheat, so this figure shows two of the possible outcomes. Next, let’s see the effects of both firms cheating.
17Oligopoly GamesFigure shows the outcome if both firms cheat and increase their output to 3,000 units.
18Oligopoly GamesIndustry output is 6,000 units, the price falls, and both firms earn zero economic profit—the same as in perfect competition.
19Oligopoly Games You’ve now seen the four possible outcomes: If both comply, they make $2 million a week each.If both cheat, they earn zero economic profit.If Trick complies and Gear cheats, Trick incurs an economic loss of $1 million and Gear makes an economic profit of $4.5 million.If Gear complies and Trick cheats, Gear incurs an economic loss of $1 million and Trick makes an economic profit of $4.5 million.The next slide shows the payoff matrix for the duopoly game.
26Oligopoly Games Other Oligopoly Games An R & D Game The Nash equilibrium is where both firms cheat.The quantity and price are those of a competitive market, and the firms earn normal profit.Other Oligopoly GamesAdvertising and R & D games are also prisoners’ dilemmas.An R & D GameProcter & Gamble and Kimberley Clark play an R & D game in the market for disposable diapers.The R&D Game. This example really happened. You can flesh out the time line of developments in this industry at
27Repeated Games and Sequential Games A Repeated Duopoly GameIf a game is played repeatedly, it is possible for duopolists to successfully collude and earn a monopoly profit.If the players take turns and move sequentially (rather than simultaneously as in the prisoner’s dilemma), many outcomes are possible.In a repeated prisoners’ dilemma duopoly game, additional punishment strategies enable the firms to comply and achieve a cooperative equilibrium, in which the firms make and share the monopoly profit.The repeated prisoners’ dilemma and punishmentThe interesting fact about this extension of the prisoners’ dilemma is that punishment strategies can support a cooperative equilibrium and lead to maximum (monopoly) profit and an inefficient allocation of resources.
28Repeated Games and Sequential Games One possible punishment strategy is a tit-for-tat strategy, in which one player cooperates this period if the other player cooperated in the previous period but cheats in the current period if the other player cheated in the previous period. A more severe punishment strategy is a trigger strategy in which a player cooperates if the other player cooperates but plays the Nash equilibrium strategy forever thereafter if the other player cheats.
29Repeated Games and Sequential Games Price wars might result from a tit-for-tat strategy where there is an additional complication—uncertainty about changes in demand. A fall in demand might lower the price and bring forth a round of tit-for-tat punishment.
30Repeated Games and Sequential Games A Sequential Entry Game in a Contestable MarketIn a contestable market—a market in which firms can enter and leave so easily that firms in the market face competition from potential entrants—firms play a sequential entry game.Entry gameThe textbook uses the simplest possible example to illustrate the sequential entry game in a contestable market. It doesn’t explicitly explain the backward induction method of solving such a game, but it implicitly uses that method. You might want to be explicit.
31Repeated Games and Sequential Games Figure shows the game tree for a sequential entry game in a contestable market.
32Repeated Games and Sequential Games In the first stage, Agile decides whether to set the monopoly price or the competitive price.
33Repeated Games and Sequential Games In the second stage, Wanabe decides whether to enter or stay out.
34Repeated Games and Sequential Games In the equilibrium of this entry game, Agile sets a competitive price and earns a normal profit to keep Wanabe out. A less costly strategy is limit pricing, which sets the price at the highest level that is consistent with keeping the potential entrant out.