1. Commentary & Extensions: Sugiyama’s “Orchestra of Treaties” Conference “Post-2012 Climate Policy Options: European Perspectives”, 04-05 Sept. 2003, HWWA, Hamburg Detlef Sprinz PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research & University of Potsdam http://www.sprinz.org

2. Overview Sugiyama’s Perspective Extensions Conclusions

3. Sugiyama’s Perspective “Kyoto Plus” is not Feasible Main argument: Adversarial negotiations Main Proposal Leaders shall lead Specialized treaties for committed countries only

4. Sugiyama’s Perspective Commentary Q: Why Are There No Unconditional Frontrunners? Three options Resign yourself to infeasibility of substantial improvement over business-as-usual Optimize Kyoto setup –Small negotiation setting with delegated decision-making authority (not like the EU in The Hague) –Binding agreements with strong sanctioning system –Real penalties that do not violate endogeneity challenges –Overall: Coordinated transition to low carbon future “Overcome” Kyoto –Orchestra of treaties -> Sugiyama and others

5. Extensions Two Options Top-Down Agree among core countries on ambitious version of Art. 2 UNFCCC in general policy equilibrium Negotiations on distribution of burdens (and rights) between countries and over time – both mitigation and adaptation, using, e.g. cost minimum with side-payments Strong sanctioning mechanisms with pre-delegated assets at risk of no-nonsense judicial procedure

6. Extensions Bottom-Up Compose a map of political and economically feasible contributions to emission reduction and adaptation efforts across time, countries, and political sub-units Use iterative procedure of repositioning in view of full information regime (incl. uncertainties) No external sanctioning needed, all sanctioning is within political jurisdictions (e.g., EU, Germany, Japan, India)

7. Extensions Additional Options: What We Should Know More About Frontier of Country Commitments (see “bottom up”) Likely outcome of negotiations given actual positions Modeling political decisions (use actual positions) –Replicate past agreements –Predict foreseeable future (e.g., Art. 2 UNFCCC) –Simulate alternatives to Kyoto Protocol (e.g., some of the “orchestra” members)

8. Extensions Build a Long-Term Insurance Fund Stabilize policy in Annex II countries –Expenses for mitigation and adaptation projects Provide compensation for unavoided actual damages

9. Conclusions Kyoto Protocol May Have Been the Only Show in The Hague, But the Venue Has Changed Wide Array of Options for Further Development of Global Climate Regime Decentralized Options Are a Clear Candidate, But May Lead to Amorphous Picture

10. Additional Information Webpage: http://www.sprinz.org Luterbacher, Urs, and Detlef F. Sprinz, eds. 2001. International Relations and Global Climate Change. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Sprinz, Detlef. 2001. Climate Change After Marrakech: The Role of Europe in the Global Arena. German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, 2(6). Jaeger, Carlo C., Detlef F. Sprinz, and Klaus Hasselmann. 2003. Wer soll das bezahlen? [Who Shall Pay For It?]. Die Zeit 8/2003.