1. Iraq Failing to Disarm Quality of Information Check Colin Powell: “The material I will present to you come from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some are the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.”

2. Agenda Introduction Accuracy source review Identify information sources that appear most critical or compelling Check for sufficient corroboration of critical reporting Ensure that any recalled reporting is identified and flagged by other analysts Reexamine previously dismissed information in light of new facts or circumstances that cast it in a different light. Consider whether ambiguous information has been intercepted and caveated properly Indicate a level of confidence that analysts can place in sources.

3. Accuracy Source Review Phone call between two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq’s Republican Guard. Phone call between an officer from the Republican Guard Headquarters issuing an instruction to an officer in the field Paper evidence from Iraqi nuclear scientist homes Hard drives of computers in Iraqi weapons facilities replaced Satellite Images Iraqis have never accounted for all of the biological weapons they admitted they had. Eyewitness accounts of biological weapons factories on wheels and on trains.

4. Identify information sources that appear most critical or compelling Satellite Images- “Inside that facility are special guards and special equipment” – Decontamination vehicle – Cleaned bunkers before U.N. officials arrived Phone calls between Iraq’s Republican Guard about modified vehicles and eyewitness accounts that they exist. Iraqi Nuclear Scientist – 2k pages of documents, some related to Iraq’s nuclear program Human sources that Iraqis moved hard drives and weapons of mass destruction to keep them from inspectors

5. Check for sufficient corroboration of critical reporting Confirmation that the biological truck and train factories exist: phone calls and eyewitnesses Confirmation of Nuclear bomb program: Iraqi nuclear scientist home search, human resources, regime only allowed interviews with inspectors with the presence of an Iraqi official. Iraqis have never accounted for all biological weapons, no records of destroying weapons, covert attempts to acquire aluminum tubes, magnets

6. Ensure that any recalled reporting is identified and flagged by other analysts Multiple analysis tools: Phone calls Satellite images Human sources Paper trails Saddam Hussein- never accounted for weaponry U.N. Inspectors

7. Consider whether ambiguous information has been intercepted Telephone conversations – Forbidden ammo clean up Paper evidence – some related to nuclear program. Human sources

8. Indicate a level of confidence that analysts can place in sources Thank You!