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Malkangiri district is one of the worst LWE affected districts in the country. Maintaining the day to day law and order and ensuring a secured atmosphere.

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Presentation on theme: "Malkangiri district is one of the worst LWE affected districts in the country. Maintaining the day to day law and order and ensuring a secured atmosphere."— Presentation transcript:

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2 Malkangiri district is one of the worst LWE affected districts in the country. Maintaining the day to day law and order and ensuring a secured atmosphere is in itself a major challenge to the police force as well as the district administration. In such circumstances, conducting elections was the most challenging task. Conducting incident free and fair poll depended on the successful and innovative deployment of the forces and providing security to the polling officials as well as the voters. Taking into account the threat perception of the LWEs to disrupt poll process an innovative and unprecedented plan was worked out in consultation with senior officers, CAPF authorities, Dist. Administration and finally all the security personnel’s from the GRs to Senior officers were mobilized and motivated to tactfully handle the challenges. As a result of the successful and effective deployment of the forces no large scale violence took place and the entire election process passed through peacefully with the active participation of the voters.

3 MALKANGIRI MAP ALONG WITH NAXAL AFFECTED AREAS Mahupadar P.S MALKANGIRI MAP ALONG WITH NAXAL AFFECTED AREAS Mahupadar P.S 79 P.S MALKANGIRI MAP ALONG WITH NAXAL AFFECTED AREAS

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5 P.S. LOCATIONS OF MALKANGIRI DIST.

6  Malkangiri District is geographically located in the South-Western Part of Odisha. It shares border with Chhatisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. Movement of large numbers of armed naxal cadres in the bordering areas is reported frequently. As most of the areas are surrounded by hills and dense forests these areas are inaccessible and are safe havens for the naxalites.  In such a situation, mobilization of forces and conducting the election was a daunting task and a major challenge for the police and the district administration. Elections that have been conducted in the past have also witnessed large scale violence and disruptions. However, in comparison to the elections, both general elections and local body elections in the past the General Election-2014 was successfully completed without any untoward incident and increase in the voters turn out. In the last general election of 2009 many incidents of naxal violence were reported. Reports of booth capturing and burning of vehicles used for election purposes were also reported at different places. Similarly, during the local body

7 election which was held in the year 2012, 04 Senior BSF Officials were killed in Naxal violence just one day before the poll and the armed naxal cadres caused violence by looting of ballot boxes, burning of vehicle used for election and disrupted the poll process.  As a run up to the poll process the naxals tried hard to spread violence by targeting the security forces and creating terror among the voters. To put into effect their heinous plan they had planted IED’s along the track where they anticipated the movement of the troops. However, due to meticulous planning and scrupulous adherence to the plan not a single life was lost. Many roads that were mined were avoided and alternative routes were figured out and used. However, in the bordering district Sukuma in Chhattisgarh more than twenty security personnel died due to the land mine blasts in different incidents. These incidents were bound to dampen the spirit of the security forces as well as the voters. However a pro-active intervention by the district police and the district administration through various confidence building measures, awareness campaigning, regular village visit, and community policing initiatives helped in restoring the confidence of the voters who turned out in huge numbers to vote.

8  A security audit was carried out which helped to place in demand the quantum of forces required for the elections. After meticulous analysis considering all the aspects 04 Battalions of BSF which is already in place in the district, 08 teams of Special Operations Group and district force were mobilized. In addition to it 10 extra coys of BSF was also mobilized to dominate strategic core areas.  Route maps were prepared before one month taking into consideration the location of polling booths and intensity of naxal activities with grid reference and made available to all the operational parties. The teams were briefed on routes and other aspects such as patrolling the periphery of the booth, providing security to the voters and the polling officials and escorting them safely after the election.

9  During General Election-2014, Malkangiri district was divided into 36 core areas and BSF, SOG and district police force were utilized with priority given to these 36 core areas. Interstate borders were sealed to check infiltration of naxal cadres either from Chhattisgarh or Andhra Pradesh.  To ensure that the security forces mobilized from outside perform their task without any fault a pre-induction training was given for fifteen days to the forces to familiarize them with the terrain, culture and custom as well as naxal history, ideology and tactics. Case study method was used, photographs, video and films were displayed and observed, various case studies where naxal had ambushed security parties resulting in the loss of lives were discussed to avoid any untoward incidents.  Every CAPF team were provided with a representative of the local Police from the time of their induction till the completion of electoral process so that they could do their duty well because of their knowledge of terrain and local language.

10  CAPFs who were mobilized from outside were inducted at strategic locations viz. Kalimela, M.V.03, Mathili, Sikhpalli, Naikguda, Tunnel Camp etc. to conceal and avoid their unnecessary movement. The above mentioned places are core areas. The forces were stationed at one location and was deployed at the other to conceal their movement.  We adopted a security plan where in the deployed forces would patrol the periphery of the polling booths and touch each of them at least twice a day before the polls. The operational troops were deployed in core areas well in advance before 48 hrs. The operational troops provided a security blanket to both the polling parties and the local police personnel deployed at the booth level.

11 In view of a severe threat perception during the General Election- 2014, a well planned and strategic police arrangement was made utilising the security personnel from CAPF, Special Operation Group, DVF and district police Forces including GRs and HGs. Gazetted officers were placed in charge of supervising the force deployed at different sectors. QRTs were stationed at different locations to intervene in case of any emergency. To monitor all the developments on the poll day a control room was setup at DIB, Malkangiri with VHF and telephone facilities. The control room was functional 24x7 from pre-electoral process to the completion of electoral process. To avoid any incident of land mine blast mobilization of forces were done carefully observing utmost secrecy and concealment. Helicopter services were used to drop the security personnel and the polling officials in the booths located at inaccessible areas.

12  No use of four wheeler on the poll day policy. Normally naxals targets security forces by using IED. To avoid such incidents strong decision was taken that not a single four wheeler will be used for carrying security personnel on poll day. Troops were directed to march o foot and in no circumstances they would use a vehicle. This policy was observed in letter ans spirit. Therefore, not a single IED blast/casualty happened. All the forces were briefed and sensitized well in advance on the precautionary measures and were instructed to observe it in letter and spirit.  Operational plans were chalked out well in advance and it was personally supervised by the SP. Exigency plans such as evacuation of wounded in case of an encounter, replacement of EVM’s in case of destruction and reinforcement of forces in case of any emergency were prepared well in advance and all the resources well put in place. All the officers and men were briefed about their respective jobs.

13 The most challenging task was the safe return of the forces to their respective base camps. There is precedent that the security forces face maximum risk of walking into an ambush or suffering casualty on their return. To ensure that nothing untoward of that sort takes place extreme caution was taken in this regard. And many innovative ideas were applied. For e.g. in Malkangiri there are many Irrigation Canals and to cross the canal there are iron bridges, normally naxal targets security forces on these bridges. To avoid such incidents irrigation department was asked well in advance to stop the canal water flow before polling day for the safe passage of forces. Another innovative plan was worked out whereby the parties would provide ROP’s to each other while returning. The plan worked out very well and all the parties returned safely to their bases.

14  Security Deployment:  The important factors that were taken into consideration while preparing the deployment were the following. ◦ Distance Factor: Thirty six core areas were located in the district taking into account the terrain, accessibility, presence of armed naxal cadres, support of the villagers, possibility of IED’s on the way and the scope of communication with the teams once they are inducted into the core. In order to avoid any communication gap and ensuring re-enforcement in case of any exigency, deployment plan was made in such a way that the other group inducted in another area would be well in a position to reinforce the group.

15 ◦ Tactical Factor: For tactical reasons the deployment of forces to different core areas were done at different dates. For example, in some core areas security forces were deployed on the day previous to the day of polling keeping in mind the distance to be covered, risk involved and terrain to be negotiated. By adopting such measures, it was possible for the security forces to reach to the polling booths and return safely after the completion of the polls.  For tactical reasons the deployment of forces to different core areas were done at different dates. For example, in some core areas security forces were deployed on the day previous to the day of polling keeping in mind the distance to be covered, risk involved and terrain to be negotiated. By adopting such measures, it was possible for the security forces to reach to the polling booths and return safely after the completion of the polls.

16  Achievement:  INCREASE IN THE PERCENTAGE OF VOTING AS COMPARED TO THE VOTING PERCENTAGE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION HELD IN 2009. Malkangiri district, which is considered as one of the hot bed of Maoists activities has shown a remarkable increase of nearly 24 percent in the voter turnout in comparison to the 2009 elections. While in 2009 only 50.5 percent of the voters in the district turned out to cast their votes, this election registered a record turnout of 74.13 percent voters who exercised their franchise. The sharp increase in the voters turn out was despite the Maoist call to boycott the elections. Constituency wise, Chitrakonda assembly constituency registered 73.65 per cent voting. On the other hand Malkangiri assembly constituency recorded 74.51 percent. Elaborate security arrangement, innovative awareness campaign increased the confidence of the voters immensely and thwarted the evil designs of Maoists to subvert the electoral process.  Malkangiri district, which is considered as one of the hot bed of Maoists activities has shown a remarkable increase of nearly 24 percent in the voter turnout in comparison to the 2009 elections. While in 2009 only 50.5 percent of the voters in the district turned out to cast their votes, this election registered a record turnout of 74.13 percent voters who exercised their franchise. The sharp increase in the voters turn out was despite the Maoist call to boycott the elections. Constituency wise, Chitrakonda assembly constituency registered 73.65 per cent voting. On the other hand Malkangiri assembly constituency recorded 74.51 percent. Elaborate security arrangement, innovative awareness campaign increased the confidence of the voters immensely and thwarted the evil designs of Maoists to subvert the electoral process.

17 Despite the Naxal call to boycott the Elections, high percentage of voters casted their votes showing unflinching faith on Democracy.  Despite the Naxal call to boycott the Elections, high percentage of voters casted their votes showing unflinching faith on Democracy.  It is also heartening to note that there wasn’t any loss of life during the entire process despite the extreme threat perception to disrupt the poll process by causing violence. The entire team of Polling parties, candidates and security forces completed the task without any case of violence and bloodletting.

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