2. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA TOA EOA SCOA MDW DOA FOA Ex
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
TOA
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian War
Doctrine and Theory after Civil War
Philippines,
Meuse-Argonne 1918
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/ GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
EOA
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy: The Founders
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
SCOA
MDW
Justice of War and Justice in War
Justice in War: Civilians on the Battlefield
Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas
Justice in War: Emerging Technologies
Justice in War: PoWs and Detainees
Mahan talks about what an Operational Artist needs to begin practicing his craft. The Op Artist needs to understand a few basic principles and a few precedents from history. Once these are mastered, the student is ready to begin a lifetime of learning.
To prepare the student for mastering principles, SAMS focuses on theory (TOA) and doctrine. To prepare the student with precedents, SAMS focuses on history (EOA). As theory is applied to history, an understanding develops concerning the nature of war and the relationship of strategy (SCOA) and the moral domain (MDW) has on conceptual planning (DOA). To prepare the student to begin practicing, exercises are used as well as conceptual discussions about future contexts (FOA).
DOA
Intro to ADM I-III
Understand Op Env I-III
Understand Op Problem I-IV
Develop Op Approach I-III
Practice ADM I-IV
Context for Future
Scenario Planning
Past Futures
Deter and Defeat Aggression
WMDs and Deterrence
Theorizing TOA
Stability and COIN Ops
Providing a Stabilizing Presence
Design of Op Art
Humanitarian Missions
Space and Cyberspace
Strat Context of and Evolutions of Op Art
Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
AirSea Battle and Power Projection
DARPA and Beyond
FOA Ex
Intro (River Crossing)
Deploy/Employ (Haiti)
Staff Ride (Vicksburg)
Practicum (Arab - Israel ‘73)
MSTP (Amphib Asslt)
Campaign Planning Ex (SWB)
Capstone

3. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA TOA
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
TOA
Block 1:
T101: Nature and Purpose of Military Theory I
- Maclean, Norman. Young Men & Fire
T102: Nature and Purpose of Military Theory II
- Maclean, Norman. Young Men and Fire
- Reynolds, Paul Davidson. A Primer on Theory Construction
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War
T103: Theory of Theory I
- Gaddis, John Lewis. The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past
T104: Theory of Theory II
- Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
T105: Theory of Operational Art I
- Schneider, James J. Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundation of the Operational Art
- Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory
- Swain, Richard M. "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army."
- Kelly, Justin and Mike Brennan, “The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art,”
T106: Theory of Operational Art II
- Harrison, Richard W. Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson.
- Isserson, G.S. “The Evolution of Operational Art,”
- Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought.
Enabling Learning Objective (ELO) 1 (Lessons )
Action: Analyze scientific method and theory development
Condition: Provided historical and contemporary references on theory, method, military theory, and operational art
Standard:
• Explain the characteristics and practical usefulness of theory
• Describe the scientific method and principles of theory development
• Assess the similarities and differences between methods used in the humanities and the social sciences
• Analyze the processes of normal science and scientific revolutions
• Describe the early development of the theory of operational art in the Soviet Union and the U.S. Army
The purpose of TOA is to explain the relevance and usefulness of theory in planning and conducting Operational Art.
TOA consists of three blocks of instruction: Theory, Context, and Military Theory.
The Theory block looks at the characteristics and usefulness of theory (Maclean), describes the scientific method and theory development (Reynolds), compares and contrasts theory to history (Gaddis), looks at normal science and scientific revolutions (Kuhn), and looks at the development of operational art in the U.S. and Soviet Union (Schneider, Isserson).
The second block, Context, looks at the intellectual context of theory (Gat, Clausewitz, Jomini, Echevarria, Calhoun), the impact of culture on theory (Lynn, Porter), describes Chinese military theory in context of cultural influences (Ames, Griffiths on Sun Tzu), and past and present American military theory (Linn, Echevarria).
The third block, Military Theory, looks at traditional military theory in modern context (Bousquet), relationship b/t US military theory to technology and systems theory (Osinga/Boyd), emergence of ideology (Daase, Heuser, Schmitt, Biddle), geography and civil war (Kalyvas, Herbst), and military/systems theory to planning and strategy (Mintzberg, Dolman).
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Explain the relevance and usefulness of military theory in planning for and conducting operational art

4. TOA Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
TOA
T102) Paul Davidson Reynolds, A Primer in Theory Construction (TOA)
Scientific knowledge must provide: 1. A method of organizing & categorizing things (typology), 2. “Predictions” of future events, 3. Explanations of past events, 4. Sense of understanding about causal relationships, 5. Potential for control (indep. Variables)
Desirable characteristics of scientific knowledge:
Abstractness (independent of space and time)
Intersubjectivity (Agreement about meaning among relevant scientists)
Empirical relevance (can be compared to “known” evidence)
T104) James Schneider, “Vulcan’s Anvil” (TOA)
Am. CW marks departure from classical strategy & mvmt twd op art.
Post-CW to WWI: Evolution of empty battlefield (more lethal wpns but lower casualty rates = strgth of the defense)
IOT overcome defense, needed to develop MNVR tactics (3rd dimension)
“OA characterized by employment of forces in deep distributed ops”
OA greatly enabled by RR: logistics, mvmt w/in theater; fresher troops.
Structure of OA: 1) Distrib. ops (various battles in time & space w/single aim), 2) Distrib campaigns (no single decisive battle), 3) Cont. logistics, 4) Instantaneous C2, 5) Op’ly durable formations, 6) Op’l vision, 7) Works best against similarly distrib. enemy, 8) Distrib continuous deployment.
T103) John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History (TOA)
History ≠ prediction, but helps to broaden experience/knwlge base
Present as a singularity (funnel from past to future)
History is scientific: reality, representation, persuasion
Try not to be reductionist; work w/lmted generalizations, contingent causation, sim’s over modeling; trace processes to known outcomes.
Fractals: patterns can be found, even in chaotic systems
Immediate, intermediate, distant causes (diminishing relevance)
Exceptional vs. general causes (PH attack example)
Particularization of generalization
History studies phenomena w/which it can’t interact; embraces complexity and enables pattern recognition w/o singular causes.
T105) Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence (TOA)
Increase in scale of battles required new level of war in 1800s = Op’l Art
Questions for Op’l planners: 1. In what way does this differ from strat.& tact. Levels? 2. How do we ID op’l problems? 3. How to differentiate bw practical aspects of OA and cognitive aspects of OL? 4. How do we justify an op’l level of war?
Answer: Use a systems approach; look at components & whole system
Criteria for op’l acts: 1. Cognitive tension bw strat & tact, 2. Based on mnvr & dynamic interaction, 3. Synergy, 4. Aim should be disruption of ENY systems, 5. Contemplate choas, 6. Non-linear, 7. Acct for interaction bw mnvr & attrition, 8. Independent entities, 9. Relate to univ. theory.
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (TOA)
T104) Paradigm: Universally recognized scientific evidence/action (law, theory, application & instrumentation) that provides models that create new traditions of scientific research.
2 essential characteristics: Sufficiently unprecedented & open-ended.
Paradigms change a group into a profession set rules, starting pt, etc.
Paradigms start with an anomaly, which is explored, leading to an adjusted theory; can be factual (inductive) or theoretical (deductive).
Remember: not all scientific (or military) knowledge is cumulative; when things are disproved, they can be thrown out and replaced with new knowledge.

5. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA TOA
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
TOA
Block 2:
T107: Intellectual Context I
- Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought.
T108: Intellectual Context II
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War.
- Jomini, Antoine Henri. The Art of War.
- Echevarria, Antulio. Clausewitz and Contemporary War.
- Calhoun, Mark. “Clausewitz and Jomini: Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory.”
T109: Intellectual Context III
T110: Theory and Culture
- Lynn, John A. Battle,
- Porter, Patrick. Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes
T111: Chinese Military Theory
- Ames, Roger T., ed. and trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare.
- Griffith, Samuel B., ed. and trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of War
T112: American Military Theory
- Linn, Brian McAllister. The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War.
- Echevarria, Antulio J. II. “American Operational Art, ”
Enabling Learning Objective (ELO) 2 (Lessons )
Action: Assess military theory in terms of its cultural and intellectual context
Condition: Provided historical and contemporary references on military theory and operational art in its cultural and intellectual context
Standard:
• Describe the impact of intellectual context on theory development
• Analyze the relationship of theory to culture and their influence on the practice of warfare
• Describe ancient Chinese military theory in the context of its cultural influences
• Assess the past and present state of American military theory
• Evaluate the applicability of military theory in a context different from that within which it arose
The second block, Context, looks at the intellectual context of theory (Gatt, Clausewitz, Jomini, Echevarria, Calhoun), the impact of culture on theory (Lynn, Porter), describes Chinese military theory in context of cultural influences (Ames, Griffiths), and past and present American military theory (Linn, Echevarria).
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Explain the relevance and usefulness of military theory in planning for and conducting operational art

6. TOA Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
TOA
Clausewitz Book 2 “On the Theory of War”:
Major characteristics of war: 1) Moral forces & effects, 2) Positive reaction (though unpredictable), 3) Uncertainty of information.
Theory is a study, not a doctrine.
War isn’t art or science; part of man’s social existence.
Historical examples can: 1) explain an idea, 2) apply an idea, 3) support a statement, or 4) be deduced for doctrine (most difficult is #4 – details!)
Better to study one campaign in depth than many shallowly – you learn more by digging into the details about successes and failures.
Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare William Griffith vs. Roger Ames (TOA)
General principles: Know self, enemy, terrain
CDR must have ch’I (character, moral courage) and ho (harmony)
Hsing: Strategic positioning enabling victory before battle
Shih: Strat. advantage of releasing all latent energy in concentration
Yin-Yang: complimentary opposites; do what ENY won’t expect.
Warfare is the art of deceit; high importance of intel
Griffith trans: (1950s): focused on Sun Tzu’s possible history & intent in writing (systematic treatise to guide generals); influence on Mao
Ames trans (1980s): More descriptive; possibility of 2 Sun Tzu’s; war tied to eastern philosophy
Clausewitz scholars (TOA)
Antulio Echevarria: Cl’s aim was to bring the spirit of inquiry to the subject of war; connection b/w 8 books = dynamic relat. b/w purpose and means; Form matters as much as content; the essence of war is violence = center of Cl’s trinity.
Mark Calhoun: Uses Reynolds’s criteria to assess J and Cl’s theories; Concl: J = didactic manual for conduct of war; Cl: unifying theory to increase CDR’s judgment, but must be understood in context
Alan Beyerchen:: Seeking exact analytical soln’s doesn’t fit nonlinear reality of war; sensitive to starting conditions; relat. to chaos theory
Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle (TOA)
The way an Army fights is determined by they way it thinks about previous wars, interprets curr. threats, and anticipates future wars
Three schools of thought: 1. Guardians: War plans = engr project; using art & science to predict consequences (Colin Powell). 2. Heroes: War = struggle for intangible martial virtues; flexible, innovative thinking; neg. view of scient. knowledge & civ. pop. (Patton). 3. Managers: War = running a corporation; when we fail, it’s time to reorganize; need best wpns, educated professionals IOT win wars. (Marshall).
All three schools exist simultaneously, w/ strengths & weaknesses, to create Army’s way of war.
John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (TOA)
Warfare practices aren’t evolutionary, but are driven primarily by culture, and secondarily by technology; military culture reflects civilian life.
Discourse vs. Reality:
D: Ideal war, nat’l interests, last resort, WIN, short wars, state-on-state, “exit strategy,” decisive battle
R: Non-state actors, info warfare, ill-defined boundaries, messy & lengthy, non-decisive, economic impacts, risk aversion vs. “risk-all”

7. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA TOA
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
TOA
Block 3:
T113: Systems Theory I
- Bousquet, Antoine. The Scientific Way of Warfare.
T114: Systems Theory II
- Osinga, Frans. Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd.
T115: Theory of Irregular War
- Daase, Christopher. “Clausewitz and Small Wars.”
- Heuser, Beatrice. “Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People’s War.”
- Schmitt, Carl. Theory of the Partisan
- Biddle, Stephen. “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.”
T116: Civil War Violence
- Kalyvas, Stathis. The Logic of Violence in Civil War.
T117: Political Geography
- Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa.
T118: Theory and Planning
- Mintzberg, Henry. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (1994).
- Dolman, Everett Carl. Pure Strategy
Enabling Learning Objective (ELO) 3 (Lessons )
Action: Demonstrate the ability to evaluate critically various forms and uses of military theory
Condition: Provided historical and contemporary references on theory, method, military theory, and planning
Standard:
• Evaluate the applicability of traditional military theory within the current operational environment
• Describe the relationship of American military theory to technology and systems theory
• Describe the emergence of ideology as a component of military theory and modern warfare
• Analyze theories of political geography and civil war violence and their relevance to planning for military action in complex contingencies
• Assess the relationship of military and systems theory to planning and strategy development
The third block, Military Theory, looks at traditional military theory in modern context (Bousquet), relationship b/t US military theory to technology and systems theory (Osinga/Boyd), emergence of ideology (Daase, Heuser, Schmitt, Biddle), geography and civil war (Kalyvas, Herbst), and military/systems theory to planning and strategy (Mintzberg, Dolman).
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Explain the relevance and usefulness of military theory in planning for and conducting operational art

8. TOA Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
TOA
Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare (TOA)
Warfare practices reflect the dominant body of scientific ideas within that timeframe (NOT a causal argument; analogy/metaphor)
1. Mechanistic (Clock): Cause & effect; Enlightenment; Frederick the Great’s “war machine”; gunpowder
2. Thermodynamic (Engine): Responsive to change; conservation of energy; entropy; Clause was clock/engine amalgam (Clock: COG, Mass; Engine: Fog, friction, complexity, rejection of linearity)
3. Cybernetic (Computer): Info = opposite of entropy; importance of feedback loops
4. Chaoplectic (Internet): develop. of ORSA; overreliance & simplification led to failure in Vietnam (McNamara)
Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (TOA)
Major issues for building states: 1. Cost of expanding dominant pwr infrast, 2. Nature of nat’l boundaries, 3. Design of state system.
Africa’s current state is NOT based on colonialism; sovereignty issues pre-date colonialism
Africa ≠ Europe: land is abundant, so wars are fought more for people or treasure NOT territory
Actual “rule” only effective IVO cities and capitols, not in hinterland.
Wars mostly internal = lack of nationalism and tax base
Post-colonial theme = firm boundaries with weak internal control.
Alternatives to current int’l state system: 1. Look at Africa regionally, 2. Decertify nonfunct’l states, 3. Recognize new nation states (ala Balkans)
Boyd’s OODA Loop (TOA) Understand this diagram
Mintzberg’s Concept of Strategy (TOA) Understand this concept
Everett Dolman, Pure Strategy (DOA)
Tacticians look for solutions; strategists look for continuous progress (diff. perspectives.
Complexity is an attempt to understand the chaos; deal with systems of indep but interrelated parts where inputs ≠ outputs; must try to avoid overly disruptive inputs (over correction – Dorner).
Chaos & Complexity = biggest influence on modern war/OA (net-centric)
Quantum physics – prediction much easier at tactical level than strategic
We work mostly in complex, adaptive systems – no final state & in state of perpetual flux (Does this negate the Element of OA for End State?)
Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (TOA)
Why is violence prevalent in some cities during CW and absent in other seemingly similar ones?
Violence is less about collective emotions, ideologies, and culture, and more a process taking place bc of human aversion to homicidal violence.
Violence is rational if it has purpose; strat. & tact; can obtain compliance.
Control = deciding factor in estab/maintaining collaboration; must be gained through discriminate violence.
3 zones of control: Incumbent, Insurgent, & contested control
Prop 1: level of control = level of collaboration, rate of defection
Prop 2: Indiscriminate violence is counterproductive in CW.
You don’t know who’s collaborating w/ENY unless you have some level of control; that’s why we fight in contested zones to gain control.

9. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA EOA
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian War
Doctrine and Theory after Civil War
Philippines,
Meuse-Argonne 1918
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/ GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
EOA
OBJECTIVES
Understand Op’l Art and Op’l Level today and since Clausewitz
Revisit Clausewitz’s: classical strategy, campaigns, theaters of operations, marches, supply, terrain, lines of operation and communication, offense, defense, and culminating point.
Use Clausewitz and contemporaries to set theoretical foundation for campaign analyses throughout EOA.
Practice campaign evaluation methods: MC, Elements of Op Art
British operations in 1776 are the standard for understanding campaign art at end of 18c, prior to Napoleonic warfare: included ground and naval components, a mix of regular and guerilla forces, and coalition warfare on both sides.
For our classical theorists, Jomini and Clausewitz, Napoleon’s wars were never far from their minds. The 1806 war between France and Prussia, a classic example of large-unit operations in a conventional environment.
Scott’s campaign demonstrated joint aspects, logistics and intelligence, and synchronized conventional and pacification operations.
Battle of Königgrätz (1866): best example of military commander and politician terminated a conflict and restored the political dialogue. Franco-Prussian War (1870-1): German military victory did not immediately translate to political victory. A stubborn defense, an uprising in Paris, a hybrid war in the countryside nearly broke up Bismarck’s coalition.
E101: Course Introduction
Carl von Clausewitz, On War
ADP 3-0
ADRP 3-0, Chapter 4
Bruscino, “The Theory of Operational Art and Unified Land Operations”
JP 3-0, Ch 1, 2, 5A, 5B.
E102: The Campaign in America: 1776
Fischer, Washington’s Crossing
E103: Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Epstein, Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War
Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon
E104: Mexico City, 1847
Johnson, A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign
Scott, “Vera Cruz and Its Castle”
E105: Moltke & Franco-Prussian War
- Wawro, Franco-Prussian War: German Conquest of France in
EOA teaches us how to evaluate past and present practice of Op Art by understanding development of theory and doctrine, analyzing historical campaigns and operations, examining changes and continuities of American Op Art, and applying Op Art to historical scenarios.
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of operational art.

10. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA EOA
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian War
Doctrine and Theory after Civil War
Philippines,
Meuse-Argonne 1918
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/ GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
EOA
OBJECTIVES
Late 19c American theorists studied Civil War and other American wars, Napoleonic Wars, and German Wars of Unification. Understand their perceptions of operational dilemmas.
American intervention in Philippines, beginning with end of conventional fight with insurrectionists and continuing through declared end of insurrection in Explore Op art in a counterinsurgency or counter guerrilla war
WWI, US suffered at Cantigny. After several months of supporting operations and smaller offensives, Pershing assaulted Metz and German frontier at end of Sep1918. Meuse-Argonne was largest campaign in American military history. This lesson investigates this operation's design.
E106: Doctrine and Theory after Civil War
John Bigelow, Principles of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American Campaigns
Arthur L. Wagner, Strategy: Lecture by Col Arthur L. Wagner, Asst Adjt-General, U.S.A., to Officers of Regular Army and National Guard at Maneuvers at West Point, Ky., and at Fort Riley, Kansas, 1903
Matthew F. Steele, “The Conduct of War,”
E107: Philippines,
Ramsey, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in Philippines,
Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in Philippine War,
E108: Meuse-Argonne 1918
American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and Battlefields in Europe, 1992
Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War,
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of operational art.

11. EOA SCOA MDW FOA DOA Doctrine TOA EOA
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian War
Doctrine and Theory after Civil War
Philippines,
Meuse-Argonne 1918
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/ GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
EOA
OBJECTIVES
The origins, building blocks, and thought processes behind American doctrine, education, and planning in interwar period, and how that led to American concept and understanding of op’l art.
1. How allies understood problem, visualized end state, and described it to subordinates. 2. German plan to defeat Allied invasion: High Command’s vision of how to defend western coast and how subordinates implemented vision.
Branches and sequels: when successful, not successful, or enemy surprise? E.g., Commonwealth unable to capture Caen b/c German defenders dominate terrain. American advance delayed b/c Wehrmacht infantry and armor master defense in bocage. German perspective, defense continued despite Allied aircraft dominating airspace b/c reinforcements continued to arrive. Unable to destroy Allies on beach, limit Allied advance to narrow enclave. As V1 and V2 rockets attack England, jet aircraft and better tanks enter battle, still hope that Allied invasion would progress no farther. Focus on what happened, and what should have happened.
Soviet operations in spring/summer German Army effectively shattered and only capable of conducting op’l delay. How did that happen? What was Soviet operational art? Understand specific campaign, nature of Soviet op’l art, and its influence on development of U. S. Army doctrine in the 1980s.
E109: Interwar Operational Art
Matheny, Carrying War to Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945
E110: NW Europe: OVERLORD
Pogue, The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command
D’Este, Decision in Normandy
E111: NW Europe: COBRA/ GOODWOOD
Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit,
E112: Eastern Front, 1944
Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler
Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of operational art.

12. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA EOA OBJECTIVES
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian War
Doctrine and Theory after Civil War
Philippines,
Meuse-Argonne 1918
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/ GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
EOA
OBJECTIVES
Discuss strategic setting, command structure at national and theater level, resource allocation, and course of Philippines campaign to end of Prepare a single, integrated and synchronized, joint (SAL) op’l approach for lodgment on Luzon.
Discuss follow-on op’ns to Luzon landings. Address a review of op’ns, any potential or real points of departure from plans, decision-making that went into (or should have gone into) those departures, ease or difficulty in deviating from plans in general, and role of strategy in op’l reframing.
Understand relationship between policy, strategy, and operations: What guidance did Pres Truman and UN Security Council give to MacArthur? How did MacArthur, as an operational commander, coordinate forces under his direction? How did he anticipate and respond after Chinese intervention? How did 8th Army conduct this period of war?
Explore escalation in Vietnam to see intersections of strategy and operations in a conflict with simultaneous conventional and COIN elements.
Balance b/t COIN and conventional ops, changing strategic guidance, Vietnamization, and evolving (or devolving) American forces in Vietnam. How did commanders arrange tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to pursue strategic objective in 1970?
E113: Philippines, 1945 I
Smith, Triumph in the Philippines – U.S. Army in World War II
Sixth U.S. Army, “Report of Luzon Campaign”
Reports of General MacArthur: Campaigns of MacArthur in Pacific
E114: Philippines, 1945 II
E115: Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Millett, The War for Korea, : They Came From the North
E116: Vietnam Escalation
Cosmas, MACV : Joint Command in Years of Escalation,
E117: Cambodia, 1970
Shaw, Cambodian Campaign: 1970 Offensive & America’s Vietnam War
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of Op Art.

13. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA EOA OBJECTIVES
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian War
Doctrine and Theory after Civil War
Philippines,
Meuse-Argonne 1918
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/ GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
EOA
OBJECTIVES
This conflict ended hostilities along Egyptian-Israeli Border, and cemented gains along Israel-Jordan border, Israel has been involved in almost constant conflict with several Palestinian nationalist organizations. Victory did not bring lasting peace. Conduct and outcome of conflict largely depended on client state’s relationship with sponsoring superpower, US and USSR, and other interested parties, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Lesson examines op’l approach of three main participants in a war that influenced America military development and Op Art in last decades of 20c.
US Army engaged in deep reflection on where it stood in world. Result was formal introduction of operational level of war and Op Art into Army thinking and doctrine. Lesson revisits major doctrinal publications of post-Vietnam era to discuss complex intersections of history, theory, institutional culture, strategic context, and doctrine.
Discuss operational problems attendant to ending wars, and what lessons of past say about conflicts of present and future.
E118: 1973 Arab Israeli War
Gawrych, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory
Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness,
E119: AirLand Battle
FM (1976)
FM (1983)
Bronfeld, “Did TRADOC Outmanoeuvre the Manoeuvrists? A Comment,”
E120: Nixon’s War
Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of Op Art.

14. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA SCOA
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy: The Founders
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
SCOA
S101: From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Spec Ops as Instrument of US Foreign Policy
Cogan, “Desert One and Its Disorders,”
Roman and Tarr, “Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness”
MacKubin Owens, “Hollow Promise of JCS Reform,”
S102: US Policy Process
McDougall, Const’l History of U.S. Foreign Policy: 222 Years of Tension in Twilight Zone
Federalist Papers
No.10: “Union as Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection”
No.15: “Insufficiency of Present Confederation to Preserve the Union”
No.24: “Powers Necessary to Common Defense Further Considered”
No. 51: “Structure of Government Must Furnish Proper Checks and Balances between Different Departments”
No.69: “Real Character of Executive”
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (2011), Chapter II, Section A
Hammond, “Development of Nat’l Strategy in Executive Branch: Overcoming Disincentives”
Lord, “Crisis Management: A Primer”
S103: US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy: The Founders
Herring, From Colony to Superpower
Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: Economic Foundations of Military Power”
OBJECTIVES
Explore dynamics of Op EAGLE CLAW and its reverberations in years that followed. This period help us understand worldview of men and women who served since that time.
McDougall surveys executive & legislative tension over foreign policy. Does JP 5-0 reflect an idealized process or not? Hammond & Lord discuss how executive develops policy and strategy.
Understand US foreign policy tradition and American practice of political economy in early Republic. Provides background for subsequent discussion of IR theory and tendency to lump American statesmen into camp of realists versus idealists.
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
Analyze impact on Op Art of:
Past/present American statecraft
Examine DIME, Int’l Order & Security relationships
Analyze strategy and strategic culture
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate strategic context for contemporary operational art

15. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA SCOA S104: Perspectives on IR Theory
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy: The Founders
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
SCOA
S104: Perspectives on IR Theory
Thucydides, “Melian Dialogue,”
Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,”
Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,”
Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and rebuilding Order after Major Wars
Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: Introduction to Strategic History
S105: Alliances and Institutions
Walt, “Alliance Formation and Balance of World Power,”
Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars
(Theory)
Lake, “Beyond Anarchy: Importance of Security Institutions”
Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World”
(European Practice)
DeVore, “Armed Forces, States, and Threats: Institutions and British and French Responses to 1991 Gulf War”
Techau, “No Strategy, Please, We’re German—Eight Elements that Shaped German Strategic Culture”
(Asian Practice):
Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia”
Nam, “Relocating US Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in Changing Defense Posture”
S106: IR: Special Topics
Brodie, “Anatomy of Deterrence”
Schelling, Arms and Influence
Freedman, Deterrence
Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism”
OBJECTIVES
Background on alliances, deterrence, and state power in int’l arena. Understand realist, liberal int’list, and constructivist schools. Proto-realist Thucydides “coercive diplomacy.” Snyder: overview. Jervis, Gray, and Ikenberry provide extra depth.
Alliance theory and perspectives of trad’l allies. After WWII, Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Asst, NATO, Aus-NZ-US, and bilateral alliances in Asia. NSS 2010: “Start point for collective action will be with other countries” based on relationship b/t US and close friends/allies in Europe, Asia, Americas, Middle East”
Deterrence and compellence: Brodie and Schelling are classics. Freedman: Cold War strategy about nuclear weapons and deterrence, critiques contemporary concepts. Kroenig and Pavel discuss approach to deterrence of terrorism. Deterrence supplanted strategy in national security. NMS 2011 discusses deterring terrorism and nuclear weapons: “preventing war as important as winning, so deterring nuclear attack on US, allies/partners is role of US nuclear weapons.” “Adapt deterrence to countering extremists: difficult, but they make cost/benefit calculations and depend on states and others we can influence.”
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
Analyze impact on Op Art of:
Past/present American statecraft
Examine DIME, Int’l Order & Security relationships
Analyze strategy and strategic culture
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate strategic context for contemporary operational art

16. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA SCOA S107: Pol-Economy: Cold War
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy: The Founders
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
SCOA
S107: Pol-Economy: Cold War
Gray, War, Peace and International Relations
Truman:
NSC 68
Gaddis and Nitze, “NSC 68 and Soviet Threat Reconsidered”
Fatua, ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, Korean War &Creation of Cold War Army
Eisenhower
NSC 162/2
Metz, Eisenhower as Strategist: Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace
Bacevich, “Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Challenge to Civilian Control, ”
S108: US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Herring, From Colony to Superpower
Leffler, “9/11 and Past and Future of American Foreign Policy
Obama: "Address Accepting Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway“
Lizza, “Consequentialist: How Arab Spring remade Obama’s Foreign Policy
S109: Pol-Economy: Base Force
Jaffe, Development of Base Force
Rothmann, “Forging New National Military Strategy in Post-Cold War World: Perspective from Joint Staff”
Brown, Kevlar Legions: Transformation of US Army,
S110: Post-Gulf War Army
JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations
Angstrom and Widen, “Adopting a Recipe for Success: Modern Armed Forces and Institutionalization of Principles of War,”
OBJECTIVES
Understand intersection b/t political economy & nat’l strategic guidance (SCOA 9 &13). Two appreciations of political economy (“grand strategy”) in Cold War. After WWII, Truman demobilized and converted US industry for domestic needs thru balanced budget & reduced defense budgets. After Korean War, Truman’s NSC 68 rapidly mobilized based on Keynsian economics. Ike’s NSC 162 focused US defense on “long haul” Cold War with USSR.
Establish broad context for discussions of political economy, military affairs, smart power, and strategic culture.
By late 80s, Carter/Reagan military buildup contributed to budget deficits. End of Cold War, Bush reduced military expenditure b/c 1989/91 and not sustainable. CJCS Powell’s Base Force for post-Cold War (political economy and strategy). Jaffe: Powell‘s attempt to shape future defense. Rothmann: J5 formulation of NMS 1992 to complement Powell’s Base Force. Kevlar Legions: how US Army coped with Cold War end.
Understand how inst’l Army adapted to ‘90s financial and op’l demands. Includes first iteration of JP 3-0 and history of principles of war to better understand current doctrinal debates.
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
Analyze impact on Op Art of:
Past/present American statecraft
Examine DIME, Int’l Order & Security relationships
Analyze strategy and strategic culture
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate strategic context for contemporary operational art

17. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA SCOA S111: StratComs vs. Smart Power
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy: The Founders
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
SCOA
S111: StratComs vs. Smart Power
Armitage and Nye, Jr., CSIS Commission on Smart Power
Gray, Hard Power and Soft Power: Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in 21st Century
S112: Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Strachan, “Lost Meaning of Strategy”
Mackubin Owens, “Strategy and Strategic Way of Thinking”
Petraeus, “Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam”
McMaster, “On War: Lessons to be Learned”
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Decade of War, v.I: Enduring Lessons from Past Decade of Operations
S113: Contemporary Strat Guidance
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning
Kugler, New Directions in US National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: Review of Official Strategic Document
Panetta, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
Dempsey’s Address at Duke University
S114: Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: Introduction to Strategic History
Freedman, “Escalators and Quagmires: Expectations and Use of Force”
Lake, “Limits of Coercive Airpower”
Strachan, “Strategy and Limitation of War”
OBJECTIVES
Juxtapose smart power and hard power. Use of ideas and information as power. Lesson builds on “power” (SCOA 4/5). 21c nature of power & use of force (SCOA 14).
Understand lesson learning, strategy and strategic theory. Mahan: Art of War rests on a few principles and application to history… when principles and precedents mastered, student is ready to begin. After WWII, FM included Pearl Harbor lessons; after ‘54, lessons dropped. SCOA 1: lessons of Ops EAGLE CLAW and URGENT FURY on ‘80s Defense Reform. SCOA 11: principles of war—ultimate lessons learned. Currently, Afghan and Iraq lessons. Do we learn lessons? Who learns lessons, people or institutions? How are right lessons determined? Are we at beginning of our labors? Strachan & Owens provide perspective on current understanding of strategy; subsequent readings ask which lessons should be learned for future strategy.
Builds on SCOA 2, US policy process and development of strategy within executive branch and SCOA 7, 9, and 12 on political economy and strategic thinking. Basis for FOA strategic guidance . Does everything work as JP 5-0 process charts suggest? How do we understand strategy in 21c?
Brodie believed atomic-bomb/tech-revolution threatened to make war unlimited and absolute. Gen Smith believed West accepts limits on warfare. Consider utility of force as a member of profession of arms and Op’l Artist.
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
Analyze impact on Op Art of:
Past/present American statecraft
Examine DIME, Int’l Order & Security relationships
Analyze strategy and strategic culture
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate strategic context for contemporary operational art

18. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA MDW
Justice of War and Justice in War
Justice in War: Civilians on the Battlefield
Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas
Justice in War: Emerging Technologies
Justice in War: PoWs and Detainees
M101: Justice of War and Justice in War
Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration
McCreedy, “Ending the War Right: Just Post Bellum and Just War Tradition”
M102: Justice in War: Civilians on Battlefield
M103: Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas
Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: History and Moral Legacy of WWII Bombing Campaign of Civilians in Germany and Japan
Morris, Fog of War: Robert S. McNamara, Whole New Story
M104: Justice in War: Emerging Technologies
Arkin, “Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems”
Tonkens, “Case Against Robotic Warfare: Response to Arkin”
Strawser, “Moral Predators: Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles”
Galliott, “Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles and Asymmetry Objection: Response to Strawser”
Dipert, “Ethics of Cyberwarfare”
Cook, “‘Cyberation’ and Just War Doctrine: Response to Dipert”
M105: Justice in War: PoWs and Detainees
Gillman and Johnson, Operational Law Handbook
DiMeglio, Law of Armed Conflict Desk Book
Gillman and Johnson, Law of Armed Conflict Supplemental
Sadat, “Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law”
OBJECTIVES
Evaluate moral constraints and moral implications of op’l actions in war using theory and history to evaluate moral dilemmas in war. Three theories: justice of war -in war; and -in peace.
Analyze moral arguments for justice of war and justice after war; explain moral justification for war.
Analyze moral dilemmas posed by presence of civilians in war
Analyze moral arguments of British and Americans for firebombing German and Japanese cities in WWII; explain moral dilemmas faced by commanders in war.
Analyze moral arguments for and against using autonomously manned systems in war; explain moral dilemmas faced by commanders in war.
Analyze moral and legal arguments re PoW and detainee rights; explain moral dilemmas faced by commanders in war.
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
Analyze moral dilemmas re
“justice of war” and “justice after war”
posed by presence of COBs (justice in war)
faced by commanders in war (justice in war)
emerging technology presents in war (justice in war)
PoWs and detainees on battlefield (justice in war)
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Judge the moral implications of operational actions in war.

19. SCOA MDW DOA Doctrine EOA FOA TOA DOA D401: Intro to ADM OBJECTIVES
Intro to ADM I-III
Understand Op Env I-III
Understand Op Problem I-IV
Develop Op Approach I-III
Practice ADM I-IV
D401: Intro to ADM
ADRP 5-0. Ch 2. Pay particular attention to Value of Planning (p2-1) & ADM (p2-4)
TRADOC Pam CDR’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, Ch 1 & 2
Gregor, William. “Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations”
Evans, “Centre of Gravity Analysis in Joint Military Planning and Design: Implications and Recommendations for the Australian Defense Force”
Adamson, An Asymmetric Threat Invokes Strategic Leader Initiative: The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.
D402: Intro to ADM
Swain, “Commander’s Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design.” Op design is commanders business and all successful commanders practice it.
Schoen, Educating the Reflective Practitioner. Ch 2, 4, 5, 7. Modern world needs reflective practice; difference in educating applied practitioners and theoretical scientists; pay attention to reflection in action and reflection on action.
Lawson, How Designers Think. Ch 1, 6, 7. Design in architecture. Model of design problems in ch6.
D103: Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas
Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: History and Moral Legacy of WWII Bombing Campaign of Civilians in Germany and Japan.
Morris, Fog of War: Robert S. McNamara, Whole New Story.
D104: Intro to ADM
OBJECTIVES
Explain: doctrinal explanation of ADM and relationship to military planning; ADM development; and ADM key components.
Describe purpose, use and audience of ADM and MDMP; what is narrative construction and its purpose; is a Frame the same as a theory; explain reframing and provide historical example
Purpose of commander’s appreciation and campaign design; what are products; explain how complexity, complex adaptive systems, and ill-structured problems are important to Cdrs; explain how discourse, narrative, and systemic understanding support commander’s appreciation; understanding of problem frame; how does commander’s appreciation link to detail planning?
What are benefits and limitations of various approaches discussed by Gregor? Importance of formal methods of analysis; importance of evidence; Difference and purposes of inductive and deductive approaches?
Describe Swain’s definitions of design and planning, why do op’l design, describe his design methodology, why lead design, and what are links b/t Op Art and design?
Schoen, explain: reflection in action; reflection on action; importance of reflective practitioner; why design before knowing what to do; importance of dialogue between coach and student?
Lawson, explain: design is noun & verb; drawing is important to design; purpose for & military equivalent of presentation-, production- & design-drawings; how model of design problems helps mil-planners think about op’l environment; how mil-planners use design problems, solutions, and process?
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
Understand the Army Design Methodology.
Analyze the current operational environment.
Explain the military problem.
Develop a new operational approach to solve a military problem.
Build a design concept.
Perform leadership in teams.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Employ ADM when faced with unfamiliar problems to develop a conceptual plan.