1. 11.STORM CLOUDS OVER TAIWAN 1.What will happen in the next 5-10 years? 2.Scenarios for cross-strait relations: Implications, etc. 3. What will happen in the longer term? 4.What will determine whether there is a war? 5.Which is the most useful IR theory for understanding the conflict?

2. 1.WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN NEXT 5-10 YEARS?  An extremely tense & unstable peace? 1.Taiwan will avoid rash actions that could provoke war for fear of alienating US (but will try to consolidate de facto independence) 2.China will keep pyschological pressure on Taiwan, but not initiate war that it can not yet be certain of winning 3.US will try to keep both states ‘under control’ & will still be able to do so

3. 1.WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN NEXT 5-10 YRS. (Contd.)  Factors of uncertainty: 1.Misperceptions of mutual political intentions (extreme mutual Beijing/Taipei, Beijing/Washington distrust) 1.Growing politicization & unpredictability of US China policy? 3.Leadership succession struggles in CCP 4.Chen may grow bolder if he strengthens his hold on power in Taiwan 5.Chinese or Taiwanese or both may fear that time is not on their side – China because of growth of pro- independence sentiment in Taiwan, Taiwan because of growth of Chinese military threat …

4. THE FACTOR TIME ‘[Taiwanese president] Lee felt that he must do something, to make sure that Taiwan does not lose out in time … China too has started to feel that time is not on its side … Something went wrong in Beijing following the return of Macau [1999] … Some of their actions may be influenced by the thought that if you take too long, both the people on the mainland & Taiwan will lose interest in the issue … If both sides think that time is not on their side, then you really have a problem’ Wang Gung-wu, director, East Asian Institute, Singapore, quoted in: ‘Will there be war?’, Straits Times, 3 June 2000

5. CHINESE SUSPICIONS OF US CHINA POLICY ‘The US military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 & its bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade shocked many Chinese strategists … US Taiwan policy, as they see now is … finally to dismember China into several smaller pieces. The US seeks more than a democratic China in its own image, but rather a weaker & divided China posing no strategic challenge forever’ Sheng Lijun, ‘China and Taiwan: Reconciliation Or Confrontation?’ (unpublished paper, August 2000)

6. WHEN WOULD CHINA ATTACK TAIWAN? 1.If Taiwan declares independence 2.If there is serious political instability on Taiwan 3.If foreigners interfere in cross-strait relations 4.If Taiwan is occupied by foreign forces 5.If Taiwan’s government comes under the control of a foreign power 6.If Taiwan acquires nuclear weapons 7.If Taiwan’s government refuses to participate in negotiations with China over reunification From Chinese government’s white paper on cross-strait relations, 21 February 2000

7. 3. WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN LONGER TERM?  Increased probability of reunification by coercion 1.Chinese/Taiwanese military balance is shifting in China’s favour 2.Chinese/US military balance also shifting in China’s favour (credible nuclear strike threat v. US mainland) 3.Decreasing US preparedness to defend Taiwan 4.Taiwan may have to confront choice of fighting alone or negotiating reunification largely on Chinese terms

8. 3. WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN THE LONGER TERM? (Contd.)  Factors of uncertainty: 1.Will the US ‘cave in’ as the Chinese leadership (& some other Asian leaders) expect? 2.How will China develop? * Will it democratize – and then become less preoccupied by Taiwan? * Will it be struck & weakened by grave economic & political crises? * Will it be led by a new generation of leaders less pre- occupied than current one by Taiwan? * Will it so strongly integrated into world economy by WTO that economic costs of war will be too punitive?

9. BEING UNABLE TO AVOID CHINA ‘We cannot escape from mainland China. We need a framework for dealing with it’ Ming-Tong Chan, Vice-chairman of Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan, Interview, 4 August 2000 ‘We cannot detach ourselves from China. Taiwan is too close’ George Tsai, Institute of International Relations, Chengchi University, Taipei, interview, 3 August 2000

10. THE INEXORABLE REUNIFICATION? Completion of quotation from Lee Kuan Yew, Storm Clouds over Taiwan, p. 27 ‘Clearly, the US can choose to fight & probably can defend Taiwan for another 10 to 20 years. But for how much longer? So, all this will end up in tears. It’s a cruel game to play with the Taiwanese. Their spirits will be crushed.’ ‘Lee: The Cruel Game’, interview in: Asiaweek, 8 June 2000, p. 17

11. 4. DETERMINANTS OF WAR  (Perceived) military balance of power (C/T; C/US)  Stance of the US (given growing C/T polarization): 1. Can it dissuade Taiwan from declaring independence, persuade it to negotiate seriously with China? 2. Will it increase arms sales to Taiwan to increase its self-defence capacity? 3. Will it be intimidated by Chinese military build-up (see above)?  Taiwan’s preparedness to fight, if necessary alone, rather than sacrifice its sovereignty  Internal political evolution of China

12. 5.WHICH IS THE MOST USEFUL IR THEORY?  Definitely not a ‘clash of civilizations’, but rather an old-fashioned ‘Cold War’ conflict!  Democratic liberalism not applicable  Commercial liberalism unconvincing – deteriorating political relations as economic ties have intensified  Institutionalism hard to test - but C, T & US being APEC members has not helped; too much hope being placed in joint WTO membership?  Constructivism usefully draws attention to importance of changing national identities (Taiwan) & worldviews of Chinese leadership  Pure, unadulterated realism – two antagonistic players kept apart only by military balance of power?