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Dangerous Dyads Bargaining in the Shadow of Power.

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1 Dangerous Dyads Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

2 Part I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction A. Why do some pairs of states have dramatically different relationships? Conflict Hostile statements Hostile nonviolent actions Use, threat, display of force War Positive statements Diplomatic recognition Intercultural exchanges AlliancesTradeAid Vs.

3 B. Example: Six Dyad-Years US-Iraq 1987: US forgives Iraqi attack on USS Stark, aids Iraq US-Iraq 1987: US forgives Iraqi attack on USS Stark, aids Iraq US-Iran 1987: US destroys Iranian oil platforms, ships US-Iran 1987: US destroys Iranian oil platforms, ships Iran-Iraq 1987: Bloody war continues Iran-Iraq 1987: Bloody war continues

4 B. Example: Six Dyad-Years US-Iraq 2003: War US-Iraq 2003: War US-Iran 2003: No War US-Iran 2003: No War Iran-Iraq 2003: No War Iran-Iraq 2003: No War Why the differences? No single state has become more or less warlike….but the dyads have! Why the differences? No single state has become more or less warlike….but the dyads have!

5 C. Forms of Cooperation 1. Between Cooperation and Conflict: Bargaining a.Formal Bargaining: Treaties, etc. b.Tacit Bargaining: Reciprocal Action c.Arbitration: Third-party resolution d.Mediation: Third-party support

6 2. Alliances: Only 25% reliable at first glance…. War occurs… Allied Not Allied Intervene, YES 25%2% Intervene, NO 75%98%

7 From Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000):

8 …but examining the fine print reveals a different story!

9 3. Behavior: Convergence Example: Mutual Tariff Reduction

10 D. Forms of Conflict 1. War – Standard definition is 1000 battle- deaths 2. Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) – use, threat, or display of force

11

12

13 E. Are Conflict and Cooperation Opposites? 1. The Continuum View

14 2. High-Conflict Events

15 3. High-Cooperation Events Are these mutually exclusive with the conflict list? Are these mutually exclusive with the conflict list?

16 3. Sometimes Conflict and Cooperation Co-Exist

17 Part II. The Spiral to War Interaction Salience Issues Conflict- Producing Factors Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Producing Factors Outcomes A Model of Dyadic Interaction

18 Part II. The Spiral to War Interaction Salience Issues Conflict- Producing Factors Bargaining Conflict Cooperation A Model of Dyadic Interaction

19 A. Political Relevance 1. Interaction a.Ability to communicate b.Ability to act Interaction

20 c. Measures of Interaction i. Contiguity – Countries that border each other (or narrow body of water) (Countries surrounded by blue are contiguous to Red)  Interaction

21 ii. Major power status State-level finding: Major powers do more of everything – conflict and cooperation State-level finding: Major powers do more of everything – conflict and cooperation Result = Dyadic effect: If at least one dyad member is major power, increased levels of cooperation and conflict Result = Dyadic effect: If at least one dyad member is major power, increased levels of cooperation and conflict Interaction

22 iii. Politically-Relevant International Environments (PRIE), Criteria Dyad- Years % of Dyad- Years % of Wars % of MIDs All Dyads 675,015100%100%100% Land Contiguity 19,7232.9%65.9%50.3% Land/Sea Contiguity 32,8814.9%75.8%63.7% Either is major power 71, %51.6%45.8% PRIE (Any of these) 86, %94.5%85.2%

23 A. Political Relevance 2.Issue Salience a.Priority relative to other concerns b.Determines amount of power applied c.Low salience = inaction Interaction Salience Issues

24 B. What leads to dyadic conflict? Conflict- Producing Factors

25 1. Opportunity: Contiguity and Proximity Conflict- Producing Factors

26 Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient Conflict- Producing Factors Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distance Shift in gradient due to technology or development Wealthy/Advanced State Poor State

27 2. Dyadic Balance of Power Conflict- Producing Factors a. Disparity = Peace b. Parity = War Risk

28 c. Transitions: Dangerous? Conflict- Producing Factors

29 3. Issue Type: Territory Conflict- Producing Factors

30 4. Rivalry: Shadow of the Past Conflict- Producing Factors a. Repeated disputes  Future disputes b. Easier for diversionary war

31 c. Question: Is rivalry the cause of conflict? Conflict- Producing Factors i. Rivals fight more wars – or do states likely to fight become rivals? ii. Repeated crises  Use of more aggressive bargaining strategies iii. Rivals use more forceful strategies – against non-rivals!

32 iv. Rivals Learn Over Time

33 5. Arms Races a. Rivalry + Arms Race = Risk of War? b. Most arms races difficult to demonstrate: Conflict- Producing Factors

34 Can You Pick Out the 3 Arms Races? Canada-MexicoUS-USSRIsrael-Syria Australia-NZIndia-Pakistan Belgium- Netherlands

35 Part III. Pathways to Peace Interaction Salience Issues Conflict- Producing Factors Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Producing Factors Outcomes A Model of Dyadic Interaction

36 Part III. Pathways to Peace Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Producing Factors A Model of Dyadic Interaction

37 A. What Leads to Cooperation? Cooperation- Producing Factors

38 1. Joint Democracy a. Effects of Joint Democracy: i.The “Democratic Peace:” Virtually no wars between democracies Alleged Exceptions: US-UK 1812 (UK not democracy), UK-Germany WW1 (Germany not democracy), Finland-UK WW2 (no real combat), Peru-Ecuador (few casualties), India-Pakistan (civilians left out of the loop)Alleged Exceptions: US-UK 1812 (UK not democracy), UK-Germany WW1 (Germany not democracy), Finland-UK WW2 (no real combat), Peru-Ecuador (few casualties), India-Pakistan (civilians left out of the loop) ii.Fewer MIDs (1/3 to 2/3 reduction) Shift to covert from overt when force is usedShift to covert from overt when force is used MIDs less likely to escalate to higher levels of violenceMIDs less likely to escalate to higher levels of violence Increased reliance on mediation, arbitrationIncreased reliance on mediation, arbitration iii.Increased common interests (alliances, UN votes, IOs, etc) iv.Increased Trade – Why should this be? Cooperation- Producing Factors

39 v. Formal Agreements Cooperation- Producing Factors

40 b. Institutional Explanation Cooperation- Producing Factors

41 c. Norms Explanation Cooperation- Producing Factors

42 2. Shared Interests Power Transition Theory: Power Transition Theory: Mutual Satisfaction = Peace Side A Side B Outcome SatisfiedSatisfiedPeace SatisfiedDissatisfiedConflict DissatisfiedDissatisfied Peace or Intense Conflict Cooperation- Producing Factors

43 Evidence for Peace Through Shared Interests Alliance portfolios: Similarity generally reduces conflict Alliance portfolios: Similarity generally reduces conflict –Better predictor than dyadic alliance! UN Votes: Similar votes = closer economic ties UN Votes: Similar votes = closer economic ties Cooperation- Producing Factors

44 3. Similar Institutions Even after controlling for democracy / autocracy, similar government mechanisms (executive-legislative relations, etc) increase cooperation / reduce conflict. Even after controlling for democracy / autocracy, similar government mechanisms (executive-legislative relations, etc) increase cooperation / reduce conflict. 4. Advanced Economies Cooperation- Producing Factors Joint advanced economies trade, cooperate, ally more / fight less with each other than other dyads Joint advanced economies trade, cooperate, ally more / fight less with each other than other dyads

45 5. Economic Interdependence a. Mutual gains from trade i.Short explanation: Trade is voluntary ii.Absolute and Comparative Advantage Cooperation- Producing Factors

46 Absolute Advantage USAColombia MissilesOR 205 Coffee Given 100 resources, what can each country produce? Production possibilities without trade Trade allows specialization. US buys Coffee at < 10 resources. Colombia buys Missiles at < 20 resources. Example: Coffee = 1, Missiles = 10. US trades 5 missiles (50 resources) for 50 coffee (50 resources) Result: Both sides can achieve levels of consumption outside of the original production possibilities! Missiles Coffee

47 Comparative Advantage USABritain WheatOR Cars 105 Given 100 resources, what can each country produce? US has absolute advantage in both goods – 5 to 1 in wheat, 2 to 1 in cars -- so has comparative advantage (bigger relative advantage) in wheat UK has comparative advantage (smaller relative disadvantage) in cars (½ as productive rather than 20% as productive) UK buys wheat at < 5 resources, US buys cars at < 10 resources Example: Wheat = 1.5, Cars = 9. US sells 24 wheat (36 resources), buys 4 cars (36 resources) Wheat Cars 5

48 5. Economic Interdependence a. Mutual gains from trade i.Short explanation: Trade is voluntary ii.Absolute and Comparative Advantage b. Reinforces democratic peace: Cooperation- Producing Factors

49 5. Economic Interdependence a. Mutual gains from trade i.Short explanation: Trade is voluntary ii.Absolute and Comparative Advantage b. Reinforces democratic peace c. Allies trade more than enemies…but sometimes trade continues during war! Cooperation- Producing Factors

50

51 Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes Interaction Salience Issues Conflict- Producing Factors Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Producing Factors Outcomes A Model of Dyadic Interaction

52 Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Outcomes A Model of Dyadic Interaction

53 A. The Logic of Game Theory 1. Game theory = formal way to represent strategic interaction Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

54 2. Assumptions of Game Theory a. Rational choice, unrestricted preferences i.Connected preferences – Some outcomes preferred over others by the player (subjective utility) ii.Transitive preferences – If a player prefers outcome A to outcome B, and also prefers outcome B to outcome C, then the player must prefer outcome A to outcome C. iii.Choice – Pick the option believed to lead to preferred outcome Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

55 b. Elements of a game i. Players – In IR, this means states ii. Strategies – The choices players have iii. Outcomes – The results of the players’ choices iv. Payoffs – How much each player values each Outcome Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Player 2 Player 1 Strategy AStrategy B Strategy A Outcome 1 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Outcome 2 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Strategy B Outcome 3 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Outcome 4 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff

56 c. Where do payoffs come from? Realism: Power and security (relative gains concerns) Realism: Power and security (relative gains concerns) Liberalism: “There’s no accounting for taste” – but money often used (emphasis on absolute gains) Liberalism: “There’s no accounting for taste” – but money often used (emphasis on absolute gains) Radicalism: Distribution of wealth (relative economic gains) key Radicalism: Distribution of wealth (relative economic gains) key Constructivism: Skeptical of rationalism, but payoffs socially constructed, just like the game. Constructivism: Skeptical of rationalism, but payoffs socially constructed, just like the game. Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

57 3. Making Predictions: Solving a Game a. Goal = Find an equilibrium (stable behavior, unlikely to change without change in conditions) b. Basic tool = Nash Equilibrium  Neither player could do any better by unilaterally changing its strategy choice How to solve How to solve a simple 2x2 game  Player 2 Player 1 Strategy AStrategy B Strategy A 2,33,4 Strategy B 0,04,2 Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

58 Player 2 Player 1 Strategy AStrategy B Strategy A 2,33,4 Strategy B 0, 5 4,2 c. Limitation: No Equilibrium Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium. Prediction = no stable pure strategy, stability only results from “mixing” strategies (probabilistic prediction) Example: Example: Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

59 Player 2 Player 1 Strategy AStrategy B Strategy A 2,53,4 Strategy B 0,44,5 d. Limitation: Multiple Equilibria Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria. Prediction = either equilibrium can result Example: Example: Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

60 4. Games Nations Play a. Prisoners’ Dilemma: Used to model “Security Dilemmas” -- Efforts to increase own security make others less secure (arms races, etc.) b. Both players end up worse, even though each plays rationally! Player 2 Player 1 Remain SilentConfess Remain Silent Misdemeanor, Misdemeanor Life, Walk Free Confess Walk Free, LifeFelony, Felony Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

61 4. Games Nations Play b. Chicken i.Equilibria: Someone swerves – but who? ii.Used to model nuclear crises iii.Credible commitment – throw away the steering wheel! Player 2 Player 1 SwerveDrive Straight Swerve Status Quo, Status Quo Wimp, Cool Drive Straight Cool, WimpDEAD, DEAD Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

62 4. Games Nations Play c. “Battle of the Sexes” i.Equilibria: Both do better than nothing, but someone benefits more ii.Used to model environmental cooperation, border demarcation, etc. iii.Incentive to deceive – Convince other player you would prefer no agreement to getting your way Player 2 Player 1 TearjerkerAction Tearjerker 2, 10,0 Action 0,01, 2 Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

63 5. Is There Hope for Cooperation in a Rationalist World? a. a. Realists and some Radicals argue that Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) represents the international system  “Tragedy of (Great Power) Politics” or “class war” i. BUT: Tournament of Strategies showed that when playing repeated PD the best strategy is not “Always Defect” – it’s “Tit-for-Tat!” ii. Tit-for-Tat = Cooperate, then Reciprocate: Allows cooperation even in the most hostile circumstances BUT also risks escalation b. b. Liberalism argues that few interactions are true PDs and that those that are should be approached with TFT c. c. Social Constructivism argues that people create these structures, so they can transform them Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

64 6. Conclusions from Game Theory a. Anarchy need not  war. Cooperation can evolve even in a world full of PD players! b. Institutions and “tying hands” can allow credible commitment, allowing cooperation. Cooperative “win-win” strategies (maximize joint payoffs) include: i.Commit to silence in PD (join a gang that punishes squealers) ii.Commit to “no play” in Chicken iii.Commit to take turns in Battle of the Sexes, PD, or Chicken Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

65 7.Weaknesses of Game Theory a. Does not independently account for preferences – intuition and other theories do a lot of “work” for game theory b. Realistic games tend to have an infinite number of possible Nash Equilibria  limitations on predictive power c. Assumes structure of game is “fixed” d. Assumes common knowledge of rationality – may be problematic (Princess Bride) Bargaining Conflict Cooperation

66 B. Empirical Outcomes of Dyadic Bargaining 1.Who gets more? a.More power b.Cost Tolerance: Willing to take losses c.Salience ● Power predicts better than Power alone d.“Tied Hands” and Costly Signals: Ability to convince opponent that further concessions are impossible / unacceptable 2.Will bargaining fail? a.Zones of Agreement: Area of mutually acceptable outcomes (better than no agreement – which often means war -- for both sides) b.Expected costs of failure: What happens if there is no agreement? c.“Shadow of the Future” – Bargaining over future bargaining power (i.e. territory) is most difficult Outcomes

67 C. Outcomes of Conflict a. Economic conflict (tariffs)  increased political conflict (and vice versa) b. Dyadic war is rare and getting rarer: i.197 sovereign states  19,306 dyads. Formula = [n(n-1)]/2 ii.Nearly 1 million “dyad-years” over the past two centuries iii.Less than 1 war per 1,000 opportunities since = only 1 interstate war-year out of more than 150,000 dyad-years (Russia vs. Georgia) Outcomes

68 c. Who Wins Wars? i.Total victory uncommon (2/3 end by negotiation) ii.59% of wars won by initially stronger side -- BUT: initiators of wars victorious 68% of the time, yet only stronger 59% of the time iii.Implication: “Which side started it?” better predicts victory than military power, though advantage declines over time iv.Extension: Democracies win more often, though advantage declines over time (they lose long wars) Outcomes

69 3. Outcomes of Cooperation a. Some evidence that political cooperation  economic cooperation (US/USSR) b. Mediation and Arbitration appear unreliable BUT selection bias probably responsible (they get the tough cases) c. Foreign aid  increases dyadic trade gains  increased interdependence Outcomes

70 Review: Back to the Model Interaction Salience Issues Conflict- Producing Factors Bargaining Conflict Cooperation Cooperation- Producing Factors Outcomes

71 Part V: Deterrence – or Destruction? Will nuclear weapons save us from war? Will nuclear weapons save us from war?

72 A. Historical Background 1.Ancient Greece: The Melian Dialogue “The strong do what they will and the weak do what they must.” Athens demands submission by Melians, even though Melos is insignificant Why fight a war over something so small? Melians: It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves? Athenians: To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation. Melians: But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you? Athenians: No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness.

73 2. Masada Jewish revolt against Rome Jewish revolt against Rome Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada

74 b. Masada Jewish revolt against Rome Jewish revolt against Rome Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada Rome imports 15,000 laborers from around empire, spends a year building ramp Rome imports 15,000 laborers from around empire, spends a year building ramp Why? Why?

75 : Intra-War Deterrence Fails Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war  destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries  panic and social collapse Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war  destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries  panic and social collapse –1922, : Attempts to ban bombers Despite fear of bombers, Britain actually initiated city warfare in World War II! Despite fear of bombers, Britain actually initiated city warfare in World War II! –Deterrence failed… –Mass killing / city destruction generally didn’t have the expected effect on civilian morale

76 B. Nuclear Deterrence Strategies 1. Massive Retaliation: Depended on atomic superiority 2. Mutually-Assured Destruction: “Tripwires” 3. Flexible Response: Credibility at every level 4. Proportional Deterrence: Enter the French…. 5. Warfighting: Soviet and US Hard-liners’ doctrine

77 C. Requirements 1. Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 2. Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam 3. Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war 4. Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America 5. Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

78 No [adequate] attention has been paid to a proposal, extremely important from the military and political point of view, to create a fully automated retaliatory strike system that would be activated from the top command levels in a moment of a crisis. -- Soviet Central Committee, 1985

79 The “Dead Hand” System: Underground command post Underground command post If communications fail AND nuclear explosions detected by sensors… If communications fail AND nuclear explosions detected by sensors… Rocket is launched with internal radio Rocket is launched with internal radio Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to Soviet ICBMs Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to Soviet ICBMs Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will annihilate the USA Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will annihilate the USA Problem: They didn’t TELL us about it! Problem: They didn’t TELL us about it!

80 Iraq Invades Kuwait, 1990 All evidence suggests that Saddam did not expect opposition from the US – misinterpreted generic statement that US doesn’t take a position on the border disputes of other nations as permission to invade All evidence suggests that Saddam did not expect opposition from the US – misinterpreted generic statement that US doesn’t take a position on the border disputes of other nations as permission to invade

81 C. Requirements 1. Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 2. Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam 3. Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war 4. Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America 5. Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

82 Examples: US Nuclear Threats YearIssueThreat US Nuclear Position Result 1945Iran Truman: “We're going to drop it on you.” Monopoly USSR Withdraws 1955 Quemoy/ Matsu Eisenhower: “Atomic bombs can be used... as you would use a bullet.” Dominance PRC ceases shelling 1961Berlin Kennedy: “One chance in five of a nuclear exchange” Superiority Draw – USSR builds Wall 1969Vietnam Kissinger: “USA will take measures of the gravest consequence.” Advantage No Effect

83 C. Requirements 1. Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 2. Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam 3. Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war 4. Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America 5. Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

84 Sanctions on the PRC US Demand: Stop anti-democracy crackdown (i.e. Don’t preserve Communist government authority) US Demand: Stop anti-democracy crackdown (i.e. Don’t preserve Communist government authority) Sanctions: Sanctions: –Ban on arms sales –Ban on direct high-level military contacts –Ban on some government financing –suspension of export licenses for satellites contracted to be launched in China –suspension of export licenses for crime control and detection instruments and equipment –denial of export licenses for any goods or technology used in nuclear production, if the President finds that such products could be diverted to the research or development of a nuclear explosive device Outcome: China ignores sanctions, most of which are lifted within a year or two Outcome: China ignores sanctions, most of which are lifted within a year or two

85 Iraq Violates the Geneva Protocol, Iran-Iraq war is intense and bloody Iran-Iraq war is intense and bloody Iraq begins using tear gas, then blister agents, then nerve gas Iraq begins using tear gas, then blister agents, then nerve gas West is silent because Iran is considered the greater threat West is silent because Iran is considered the greater threat Iran retaliates, but lacked enough chemical weapons to do serious damage Iran retaliates, but lacked enough chemical weapons to do serious damage

86 C. Requirements 1. Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 2. Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam 3. Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war 4. Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America 5. Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

87 D. Types of Deterrence 1. General Deterrence: You won’t dare attack me because you know I’m armed and ready 2. Immediate Deterrence: I’m warning you right now – attack and I’ll shoot! 3. Extended Deterrence: Don’t attack my friend either -- or I’ll shoot 4. Existential Deterrence: I don’t have a gun but I could go buy one if needed

88 E. Dilemmas of Deterrence 1. Security Dilemma: Increased costs and credibility also mean decreased restraint 2. Vulnerability Dilemma: If you don’t attempt to counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to strike first… (Soviet silos) 3. Rational Irrationality: Fait accompli and “The threat that leaves something to chance:” Rationality decreases credibility, but irrationality decreases restraint

89 F. Does deterrence work? 1. Inherent uncertainty: If opponent does nothing, is deterrence working? 2. General deterrence creates bias: unstated threats may deter. Perhaps having to state a threat means it is unlikely to succeed… 3. Some evidence supports extended immediate deterrence

90 Part VI: Unanswered Puzzles of Dyadic Relations Do IGOs promote dyadic peace? Do IGOs promote dyadic peace? Do alliances create peace between dyads, or do they raise the specter of war? Do alliances create peace between dyads, or do they raise the specter of war? What bargaining strategy best avoids war and produces cooperation? What bargaining strategy best avoids war and produces cooperation?

91 A. Do Joint IGOs produce dyadic peace?

92 1. Unexplained finding: Same IGOs = increased war risk 2. Possible reasons a.Coincidence (IGOs not associated with war) b.Similar interests (IGOs and war have common causes) c.Interaction (IGOs cause war) d.Levels of Analysis (Improperly Aggregating to System Level) e.Differences between IGOs (Let’s study this more) i.Universal: No effect ii.Limited-purpose: Depends –Regional Political or Social = Increased war risk –Regional Military or Economic = Decreased war risk 3. Another puzzle: Same IGOs = decreased MIDs!

93 4. IGOs can produce convergence

94 B. Alliances 1. Statistical evidence: disputed. After controlling for contiguity, alliances seem to make war less likely between the allies 2. Why might allies be more likely to fight each other?

95 Alliances and Preferences Allies: Nowhere to go but down Nonaligned: Equal chance of increased conflict and increased cooperation Rivals: If not already fighting, nowhere to go but up

96 3. When have allies fought each other?

97 4. How do most alliances end?

98 5. When are alliances broken?

99 C. Which bargaining strategies promote peace? 1. Known hazards – Bully and Fight a.Bully: one OR both sides respond to concessions by increasing demands (i.e. appeasement fails) b.Fight: Reciprocal escalation (BOTH sides respond to conflict with higher level of conflict) 2. Appeasement also fails – Of six known cases in crises, five were diplomatic defeats for appeaser and one led to war

100 3. Reciprocity: A Strategy for Cooperation? Yes – But ALSO a recipe for conflict spirals! Yes – But ALSO a recipe for conflict spirals!

101 D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle? Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other

102 Bully and Fight Strategies Crisis Escalation Conflict Reduced Trade Rivalry Arms Races The Vicious Circle

103 D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle? Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other So do most cooperation-producing factors So do most cooperation-producing factors

104 The Virtuous Circle Joint Democracy Expectation of Reciprocal Concessions Alliances and Agreements Trade and Interdependence Advanced Economies

105 D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle? Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other So do most cooperation-producing factors So do most cooperation-producing factors Which of these two feedback loops is more powerful in the long run? Which of these two feedback loops is more powerful in the long run?


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