Presentation on theme: "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power"— Presentation transcript:
1 Bargaining in the Shadow of Power Dangerous DyadsBargaining in the Shadow of Power
2 Part I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction A. Why do some pairs of states have dramatically different relationships?ConflictHostile statementsHostile nonviolent actionsUse, threat, display of forceWarPositive statementsDiplomatic recognitionIntercultural exchangesAlliancesTradeAidVs.
3 B. Example: Six Dyad-Years US-Iraq 1987: US forgives Iraqi attack on USS Stark, aids IraqUS-Iran 1987: US destroys Iranian oil platforms, shipsIran-Iraq 1987: Bloody war continues
4 B. Example: Six Dyad-Years US-Iraq 2003: WarUS-Iran 2003: No WarIran-Iraq 2003: No WarWhy the differences? No single state has become more or less warlike….but the dyads have!
5 C. Forms of Cooperation Between Cooperation and Conflict: Bargaining Formal Bargaining: Treaties, etc.Tacit Bargaining: Reciprocal ActionArbitration: Third-party resolutionMediation: Third-party support
6 2. Alliances: Only 25% reliable at first glance…. War occurs…AlliedNot AlliedIntervene, YES25%2%Intervene, NO75%98%
17 Part II. The Spiral to War InteractionSalienceIssuesConflict-ProducingFactorsBargainingConflictCooperationCooperation-OutcomesA Model of Dyadic Interaction
18 Part II. The Spiral to War Conflict-ProducingFactorsInteractionSalienceIssuesBargainingConflictCooperationA Model of Dyadic Interaction
19 A. Political Relevance Interaction Ability to communicate Ability to act
20 c. Measures of Interaction Contiguity – Countries that border each other (or narrow body of water)(Countriessurrounded by blue are contiguous to Red)
21 Interactionii. Major power statusState-level finding: Major powers do more of everything – conflict and cooperationResult = Dyadic effect: If at least one dyad member is major power, increased levels of cooperation and conflict
22 iii. Politically-Relevant International Environments (PRIE), 1816-2001 CriteriaDyad-Years% of Dyad-Years% of Wars% of MIDsAll Dyads675,015100%Land Contiguity19,7232.9%65.9%50.3%Land/Sea Contiguity32,8814.9%75.8%63.7%Either is major power71,77010.6%51.6%45.8%PRIE (Any of these)86,39312.8%94.5%85.2%
23 A. Political Relevance Issue Salience InteractionSalienceIssuesA. Political RelevanceIssue SaliencePriority relative to other concernsDetermines amount of power appliedLow salience = inaction
24 B. What leads to dyadic conflict? ProducingFactorsB. What leads to dyadic conflict?
25 1. Opportunity: Contiguity and Proximity Conflict-ProducingFactors
26 Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient Conflict-ProducingFactorsProximity: Loss of Strength GradientWealthy/Advanced StatePoor StateResources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distanceShift in gradient due to technology or development
27 2. Dyadic Balance of Power Conflict-ProducingFactors2. Dyadic Balance of Powera. Disparity = Peaceb. Parity = War Risk
28 c. Transitions: Dangerous? Conflict-ProducingFactorsc. Transitions: Dangerous?
30 4. Rivalry: Shadow of the Past Conflict-ProducingFactors4. Rivalry: Shadow of the PastRepeated disputes Future disputesEasier for diversionary war
31 c. Question: Is rivalry the cause of conflict? ProducingFactorsc. Question: Is rivalry the cause of conflict?Rivals fight more wars – or do states likely to fight become rivals?Repeated crises Use of more aggressive bargaining strategiesRivals use more forceful strategies – against non-rivals!
33 5. Arms Races Rivalry + Arms Race = Risk of War? Conflict-ProducingFactors5. Arms RacesRivalry + Arms Race = Risk of War?Most arms races difficult to demonstrate:
34 Can You Pick Out the 3 Arms Races? Canada-MexicoUS-USSRIsrael-SyriaBelgium-NetherlandsAustralia-NZIndia-Pakistan
35 Part III. Pathways to Peace InteractionSalienceIssuesConflict-ProducingFactorsBargainingConflictCooperationCooperation-OutcomesA Model of Dyadic Interaction
36 Part III. Pathways to Peace BargainingConflictCooperationCooperation-ProducingFactorsA Model of Dyadic Interaction
37 A. What Leads to Cooperation? ProducingFactorsA. What Leads to Cooperation?
38 1. Joint Democracy Effects of Joint Democracy: Cooperation- Producing Factors1. Joint DemocracyEffects of Joint Democracy:The “Democratic Peace:” Virtually no wars between democraciesAlleged Exceptions: US-UK 1812 (UK not democracy), UK-Germany WW1 (Germany not democracy), Finland-UK WW2 (no real combat), Peru-Ecuador (few casualties), India-Pakistan (civilians left out of the loop)Fewer MIDs (1/3 to 2/3 reduction)Shift to covert from overt when force is usedMIDs less likely to escalate to higher levels of violenceIncreased reliance on mediation, arbitrationIncreased common interests (alliances, UN votes, IOs, etc)Increased Trade – Why should this be?
42 2. Shared Interests Power Transition Theory: Cooperation-ProducingFactors2. Shared InterestsPower Transition Theory:Mutual Satisfaction = PeaceSide ASide BOutcomeSatisfiedPeaceDissatisfiedConflictPeace or Intense Conflict
43 Evidence for Peace Through Shared Interests Cooperation-ProducingFactorsEvidence for Peace Through Shared InterestsAlliance portfolios: Similarity generally reduces conflictBetter predictor than dyadic alliance!UN Votes: Similar votes = closer economic ties
44 3. Similar Institutions 4. Advanced Economies Cooperation-ProducingFactors3. Similar InstitutionsEven after controlling for democracy / autocracy, similar government mechanisms (executive-legislative relations, etc) increase cooperation / reduce conflict.4. Advanced EconomiesJoint advanced economies trade, cooperate, ally more / fight less with each other than other dyads
45 5. Economic Interdependence Cooperation-ProducingFactors5. Economic InterdependenceMutual gains from tradeShort explanation: Trade is voluntaryAbsolute and Comparative Advantage
46 Absolute Advantage USA Colombia Missiles OR 20 5 Coffee 10 200 Given 100 resources, what can each country produce?20020MissilesCoffee10100Production possibilities without tradeTrade allows specialization. US buys Coffee at < 10 resources. Colombia buys Missiles at < 20 resources.Example: Coffee = 1, Missiles = US trades 5 missiles (50 resources) for 50 coffee (50 resources)Result: Both sides can achieve levels of consumption outside of the original production possibilities!
47 Comparative Advantage USABritainWheatOR10020Cars105Given 100 resources, what can each country produce?US has absolute advantage in both goods – 5 to 1 in wheat, 2 to 1 in cars -- so has comparative advantage (bigger relative advantage) in wheatUK has comparative advantage (smaller relative disadvantage) in cars (½ as productive rather than 20% as productive)UK buys wheat at < 5 resources, US buys cars at < 10 resourcesExample: Wheat = 1.5, Cars = 9. US sells 24 wheat (36 resources), buys 4 cars (36 resources)5010100WheatCars5
48 5. Economic Interdependence Cooperation-ProducingFactors5. Economic InterdependenceMutual gains from tradeShort explanation: Trade is voluntaryAbsolute and Comparative AdvantageReinforces democratic peace:
49 5. Economic Interdependence Cooperation-ProducingFactors5. Economic InterdependenceMutual gains from tradeShort explanation: Trade is voluntaryAbsolute and Comparative AdvantageReinforces democratic peaceAllies trade more than enemies…but sometimes trade continues during war!
51 Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes InteractionSalienceIssuesConflict-ProducingFactorsBargainingConflictCooperationCooperation-OutcomesA Model of Dyadic Interaction
52 Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes BargainingConflictCooperationA Model of Dyadic Interaction
53 A. The Logic of Game Theory BargainingConflictCooperationA. The Logic of Game Theory1. Game theory = formal way to represent strategic interaction
54 2. Assumptions of Game Theory BargainingConflictCooperation2. Assumptions of Game TheoryRational choice, unrestricted preferencesConnected preferences – Some outcomes preferred over others by the player (subjective utility)Transitive preferences – If a player prefers outcome A to outcome B, and also prefers outcome B to outcome C, then the player must prefer outcome A to outcome C.Choice – Pick the option believed to lead to preferred outcome
55 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff BargainingConflictCooperationb. Elements of a gamePlayers – In IR, this means statesStrategies – The choices players haveOutcomes – The results of the players’ choicesPayoffs – How much each player values each OutcomePlayer 2Player1Strategy AStrategy BOutcome 1Player 1 Payoff,Player 2 PayoffOutcome 2Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 PayoffOutcome 3Outcome 4
56 c. Where do payoffs come from? BargainingConflictCooperationc. Where do payoffs come from?Realism: Power and security (relative gains concerns)Liberalism: “There’s no accounting for taste” – but money often used (emphasis on absolute gains)Radicalism: Distribution of wealth (relative economic gains) keyConstructivism: Skeptical of rationalism, but payoffs socially constructed, just like the game.
57 3. Making Predictions: Solving a Game BargainingConflictCooperation3. Making Predictions: Solving a GameGoal = Find an equilibrium (stable behavior, unlikely to change without change in conditions)Basic tool = Nash Equilibrium Neither player could do any better by unilaterally changing its strategy choiceHow to solvea simple 2x2game Player 2Player1Strategy AStrategy B2,33,40,04,2
58 c. Limitation: No Equilibrium BargainingConflictCooperationc. Limitation: No EquilibriumNot every game has a Nash Equilibrium. Prediction = no stable pure strategy, stability only results from “mixing” strategies (probabilistic prediction)Example:Player 2Player1Strategy AStrategy B2,33,40,54,2
59 d. Limitation: Multiple Equilibria BargainingConflictCooperationd. Limitation: Multiple EquilibriaSome games have multiple Nash Equilibria. Prediction = either equilibrium can resultExample:Player 2Player1Strategy AStrategy B2,53,40,44,5
60 Misdemeanor, Misdemeanor BargainingConflictCooperation4. Games Nations PlayPrisoners’ Dilemma: Used to model “Security Dilemmas” -- Efforts to increase own security make others less secure (arms races, etc.)Both players end up worse, even though each plays rationally!Player 2Player1Remain SilentConfessMisdemeanor, MisdemeanorLife, Walk FreeWalk Free, LifeFelony, Felony
61 4. Games Nations Play Bargaining Conflict Cooperation b. Chicken Equilibria: Someone swerves – but who?Used to model nuclear crisesCredible commitment – throw away the steering wheel!Player 2Player1SwerveDrive StraightStatus Quo, Status QuoWimp, CoolCool, WimpDEAD, DEAD
62 4. Games Nations Play Bargaining Conflict Cooperation c. “Battle of the Sexes”Equilibria: Both do better than nothing, but someone benefits moreUsed to model environmental cooperation, border demarcation, etc.Incentive to deceive – Convince other player you would prefer no agreement to getting your wayPlayer 2Player1TearjerkerAction2, 10,01, 2
63 5. Is There Hope for Cooperation in a Rationalist World? BargainingConflictCooperation5. Is There Hope for Cooperation in a Rationalist World?Realists and some Radicals argue that Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) represents the international system “Tragedy of (Great Power) Politics” or “class war”i. BUT: Tournament of Strategies showed that when playing repeated PD the best strategy is not “Always Defect” – it’s “Tit-for-Tat!”ii. Tit-for-Tat = Cooperate, then Reciprocate: Allows cooperation even in the most hostile circumstances BUT also risks escalationLiberalism argues that few interactions are true PDs and that those that are should be approached with TFTSocial Constructivism argues that people create these structures, so they can transform them
64 6. Conclusions from Game Theory BargainingConflictCooperation6. Conclusions from Game TheoryAnarchy need not war. Cooperation can evolve even in a world full of PD players!Institutions and “tying hands” can allow credible commitment, allowing cooperation. Cooperative “win-win” strategies (maximize joint payoffs) include:Commit to silence in PD (join a gang that punishes squealers)Commit to “no play” in ChickenCommit to take turns in Battle of the Sexes, PD, or Chicken
65 7.Weaknesses of Game Theory BargainingConflictCooperation7.Weaknesses of Game TheoryDoes not independently account for preferences – intuition and other theories do a lot of “work” for game theoryRealistic games tend to have an infinite number of possible Nash Equilibria limitations on predictive powerAssumes structure of game is “fixed”Assumes common knowledge of rationality – may be problematic (Princess Bride)
66 B. Empirical Outcomes of Dyadic Bargaining Who gets more?More powerCost Tolerance: Willing to take lossesSalience ● Power predicts better than Power alone“Tied Hands” and Costly Signals: Ability to convince opponent that further concessions are impossible / unacceptableWill bargaining fail?Zones of Agreement: Area of mutually acceptable outcomes (better than no agreement – which often means war -- for both sides)Expected costs of failure: What happens if there is no agreement?“Shadow of the Future” – Bargaining over future bargaining power (i.e. territory) is most difficult
67 OutcomesC. Outcomes of ConflictEconomic conflict (tariffs) increased political conflict (and vice versa)Dyadic war is rare and getting rarer:197 sovereign states 19,306 dyads. Formula = [n(n-1)]/2Nearly 1 million “dyad-years” over the past two centuriesLess than 1 war per 1,000 opportunities since = only 1 interstate war-year out of more than 150,000 dyad-years (Russia vs. Georgia)
68 c. Who Wins Wars? Outcomes Total victory uncommon (2/3 end by negotiation)59% of wars won by initially stronger side -- BUT: initiators of wars victorious 68% of the time, yet only stronger 59% of the timeImplication: “Which side started it?” better predicts victory than military power, though advantage declines over timeExtension: Democracies win more often, though advantage declines over time (they lose long wars)
69 3. Outcomes of Cooperation Some evidence that political cooperation economic cooperation (US/USSR)Mediation and Arbitration appear unreliable BUT selection bias probably responsible (they get the tough cases)Foreign aid increases dyadic trade gains increased interdependence
70 Review: Back to the Model InteractionSalienceIssuesConflict-ProducingFactorsBargainingConflictCooperationCooperation-Outcomes
71 Part V: Deterrence – or Destruction? Will nuclear weapons save us from war?
72 A. Historical Background Melians: It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves?Athenians: To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation.Melians: But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?Athenians: No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness.Ancient Greece: The Melian Dialogue“The strong do what they will and the weak do what they must.”Athens demands submission by Melians, even though Melos is insignificantWhy fight a war over something so small?
73 2. Masada Jewish revolt against Rome Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada
74 b. Masada Jewish revolt against Rome Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of MasadaRome imports 15,000 laborers from around empire, spends a year building rampWhy?
75 3. 1919-1938: Intra-War Deterrence Fails Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries panic and social collapse1922, : Attempts to ban bombersDespite fear of bombers, Britain actually initiated city warfare in World War II!Deterrence failed…Mass killing / city destruction generally didn’t have the expected effect on civilian morale
76 B. Nuclear Deterrence Strategies Massive Retaliation: Depended on atomic superiorityMutually-Assured Destruction: “Tripwires”Flexible Response: Credibility at every levelProportional Deterrence: Enter the French….Warfighting: Soviet and US Hard-liners’ doctrine
77 C. Requirements Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of KuwaitCredibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossedFailures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, VietnamCost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the lineFailures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq warRestraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossedFailures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on AmericaRationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefitsPossible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination
78 No [adequate] attention has been paid to a proposal, extremely important from the military and political point of view, to create a fully automated retaliatory strike system that would be activated from the top command levels in a moment of a crisis.-- Soviet Central Committee, 1985
79 The “Dead Hand” System: Underground command postIf communications fail AND nuclear explosions detected by sensors…Rocket is launched with internal radioRadio broadcasts launch orders / codes to Soviet ICBMsThus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will annihilate the USAProblem: They didn’t TELL us about it!
80 Iraq Invades Kuwait, 1990All evidence suggests that Saddam did not expect opposition from the US – misinterpreted generic statement that US doesn’t take a position on the border disputes of other nations as permission to invade
81 C. Requirements Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of KuwaitCredibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossedFailures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, VietnamCost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the lineFailures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq warRestraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossedFailures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on AmericaRationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefitsPossible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination
82 Examples: US Nuclear Threats YearIssueThreatUS Nuclear PositionResult1945IranTruman: “We're going to drop it on you.”MonopolyUSSR Withdraws1955Quemoy/ MatsuEisenhower: “Atomic bombs can be used... as you would use a bullet.”DominancePRC ceases shelling1961BerlinKennedy: “One chance in five of a nuclear exchange”SuperiorityDraw – USSR builds Wall1969VietnamKissinger: “USA will take measures of the gravest consequence.”AdvantageNo Effect
83 C. Requirements Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of KuwaitCredibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossedFailures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, VietnamCost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the lineFailures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq warRestraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossedFailures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on AmericaRationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefitsPossible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination
84 Sanctions on the PRCUS Demand: Stop anti-democracy crackdown (i.e. Don’t preserve Communist government authority)Sanctions:Ban on arms salesBan on direct high-level military contactsBan on some government financingsuspension of export licenses for satellites contracted to be launched in Chinasuspension of export licenses for crime control and detection instruments and equipmentdenial of export licenses for any goods or technology used in nuclear production, if the President finds that such products could be diverted to the research or development of a nuclear explosive deviceOutcome: China ignores sanctions, most of which are lifted within a year or two
85 Iraq Violates the Geneva Protocol, 1982-1983 Iran-Iraq war is intense and bloodyIraq begins using tear gas, then blister agents, then nerve gasWest is silent because Iran is considered the greater threatIran retaliates, but lacked enough chemical weapons to do serious damage
86 C. Requirements Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of KuwaitCredibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossedFailures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, VietnamCost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the lineFailures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq warRestraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossedFailures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on AmericaRationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefitsPossible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination
87 D. Types of DeterrenceGeneral Deterrence: You won’t dare attack me because you know I’m armed and readyImmediate Deterrence: I’m warning you right now – attack and I’ll shoot!Extended Deterrence: Don’t attack my friend either -- or I’ll shootExistential Deterrence: I don’t have a gun but I could go buy one if needed
88 E. Dilemmas of Deterrence Security Dilemma: Increased costs and credibility also mean decreased restraintVulnerability Dilemma: If you don’t attempt to counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to strike first… (Soviet silos)Rational Irrationality: Fait accompli and “The threat that leaves something to chance:” Rationality decreases credibility, but irrationality decreases restraint
89 F. Does deterrence work?Inherent uncertainty: If opponent does nothing, is deterrence working?General deterrence creates bias: unstated threats may deter. Perhaps having to state a threat means it is unlikely to succeed…Some evidence supports extended immediate deterrence
90 Part VI: Unanswered Puzzles of Dyadic Relations Do IGOs promote dyadic peace?Do alliances create peace between dyads, or do they raise the specter of war?What bargaining strategy best avoids war and produces cooperation?
92 A. Do Joint IGOs produce dyadic peace? 1. Unexplained finding: Same IGOs = increased war risk2. Possible reasonsCoincidence (IGOs not associated with war)Similar interests (IGOs and war have common causes)Interaction (IGOs cause war)Levels of Analysis (Improperly Aggregating to System Level)Differences between IGOs (Let’s study this more)Universal: No effectLimited-purpose: DependsRegional Political or Social = Increased war riskRegional Military or Economic = Decreased war risk3. Another puzzle: Same IGOs = decreased MIDs!
99 C. Which bargaining strategies promote peace? Known hazards – Bully and FightBully: one OR both sides respond to concessions by increasing demands (i.e. appeasement fails)Fight: Reciprocal escalation (BOTH sides respond to conflict with higher level of conflict)Appeasement also fails – Of six known cases in crises, five were diplomatic defeats for appeaser and one led to war
100 3. Reciprocity: A Strategy for Cooperation? Yes – But ALSO a recipe for conflict spirals!
101 D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle? Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other
105 D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle? Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each otherSo do most cooperation-producing factorsWhich of these two feedback loops is more powerful in the long run?