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Coercive Measures Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions.

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Presentation on theme: "Coercive Measures Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions."— Presentation transcript:

1 Coercive Measures Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions

2 I. Military Intervention A. Predicting intervention 1. Interstate War Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict a. Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention b. Alliance portfolios predict side choice

3 What is an alliance portfolio? All of the allies of a state Similar portfolios generally reduce conflict / increase cooperation  Better predictor than dyadic alliance!

4 I. Military Intervention A. Predicting intervention 1. Interstate War Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict a. Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention b. Alliance portfolios predict side choice c. More likely when existing parity between combatants

5 Balances of Power: Disparity and Parity Disparity Parity

6 I. Military Intervention A. Predicting intervention 1. Interstate War Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict a. Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention b. Alliance portfolios predict side choice c. More likely when existing parity between combatants d. Great powers intervene much more frequently!

7 2. Intervention in Civil Wars Predictors (all prior to intervention):  Battle-Deaths, Refugees/Displacement, Media Reporting (US all types), Duration  Cold War, Bilateral Colonial Ties, Contiguity, Civil War State’s Rivals and Rivals’ Rivals, Parity, Bilateral FDI (military intervention only!), Prior Intervention.  Stronger rebels attract more pro-rebel intervention.

8 2. Intervention in Civil Wars Inhibiting factors: Economic/Military power of target (government), Oil exports of CW state, Population/Density, Prior Great Power Intervention, Victory Tough calls: Democracy of intervener and target (mixed – leans positive), Bilateral Trade (mixed)

9 B. When does intervention work? 1. Who wins interstate wars? a. Who started it? Initiators win most wars quickly, but tend to lose long wars. b. Bigger economy usually wins (GDP outperforms military predictors) c. Bigger military also helps – parity makes victory less likely for both sides (stalemate)

10 Parity Leads to Long Wars, Makes Stalemate More Likely

11 2. Intervention in Civil Wars No Pro-Rebel Intervention Pro-Rebel Intervention No Pro-Government Intervention 119 (60.41%) 24 (12.18%) Pro-Government Intervention 29 (14.72%) 25 (12.69%)

12 2. Intervention in Civil Wars a. Does intervention lead to compromise?

13 2. Intervention in Civil Wars Probability of Compromise, Intervention for government No intervention

14 2. Intervention in Civil Wars a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes b. Does intervention prolong wars?

15 2. Intervention in Civil Wars a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes b. Does intervention prolong wars? Yes c. Is intervention getting more common?

16 Intervention Over Time Number of Civil Wars Intervention Frequency 36%25%31%35%24%49%51%

17 2. Intervention in Civil Wars a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes b. Does intervention prolong wars? Yes c. Is intervention getting more common? Yes d. The intervenor’s dilemma: Saving lives vs. Justice i. Want to end the war quickly? Help the strong crush the weak ii. Want to find a compromise? Write off another 10,000 people

18 II. Sanctions and Pressure A. Predicting Sanctions 1. US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US a. Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant b. Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions

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20 II. Sanctions and Pressure A. Predicting Sanctions 1. US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US a. Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant b. Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions 2. General: Asymmetric dependence a. If I depend on you, I am unlikely to sanction you b. If you depend on me, I am more likely to sanction you c. Problem: Measuring dependence is hard

21 Example: US-South Africa 1984: Asymmetric Interdependence? US = 15% of S.A. trade, but S.A. = only 1% of US trade Issue: Apartheid  US backs South Africa, vetoes UN resolutions for sanctions  US imposes minor sanctions only (to forestall larger ones)  Question: Why not sanction?

22 Answer: Minerals USSR was obviously unreliable for strategic minerals Example: US-South Africa

23 US needed imports of critical minerals: Example: US-South Africa

24 F-100 Engine Use of Imported Metals (F-15 and F-16 aircraft – key to air defense in 1980s) Titanium 5,366 lbs 77% (Australia, South Africa) Cobalt 910 lbs 73% (Norway, Finland) Tantalum 3 lbs 80% (China) Columbium 171 lbs 100% (Brazil) Aluminum 720 lbs 100% (Australia) Chromium 1,656 lbs 80% (South Africa) Nickel 5,024 lbs 63% (Canada) (Note: Metals indicated are used in more than one place in engine)

25 Best case: end trade = price increases Worst case: end trade = inferior hardware Example: US-South Africa

26 No: Fear of resource conflict  nuclear proliferation  1957: US provides nuclear reactors, enriched uranium  1970s: Insecurity in southern Africa = security-based rationale for atomic bomb (South Africa fears Soviet influence)  : US cuts off nuclear cooperation over NPT dispute; UK terminates bilateral defense treaty over apartheid  “laager mentality:” Fear of Soviet invasion, need to force Western defense, conventional arms embargoes, isolation  proliferation  : US-Soviet pressure fails to prevent probable nuclear test (possibly joint Israeli-South African test)  1980s: Six atomic bombs constructed  1990: White government dismantles arsenal before majority rule Example: US-South Africa Did South Africa’s Minerals Make It Secure?

27 B. Do sanctions work? 1. The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposed (game theory)

28 B. Do sanctions work? 1. The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposed (game theory) 2. Keys to success a. Sanction must be large % of target’s GDP b. Sanction must not harm sender (very much) c. Problem: Trade is mutually beneficial. Cutoff will always harm sender 3. Success usually takes less than 5 years

29 III. Foreign Aid A. Predicting foreign aid 1. In general (who gets the most aid?) a. Free market countries (especially during Cold War) b. Post-Colonial states (especially during decolonization) c. Poverty and Debt 2. Specific relationships a. US: Egypt, Israel, Iraq (since 2003) b. Japan: “Friends of Japan” – similar UN voting and trade c. Western Europe: Former colonies

30 B. US Gives Low % of GDP for development…

31 …but still manages to be the largest donor

32 1. Recent International Affairs spending (aid and diplomacy): Surprising stability

33 2. Long-Term Decline in Foreign Aid

34 3. Top Three Recipients of US Aid: FY 2001 – FY 2009 (And 2010 Request) st Israel Iraq Israel 2 nd Egypt Israel Afgh Egypt Afgh 3 rd JordPakEgyptAfgh Israel Afgh Egypt Israel and Egypt were the top two from 1979 to 2002 and in the top five ever since 9/11 (along with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – countries where US forces have been fighting). Why?

35 C. Does foreign aid work? 1. Aid and corruption: No overall correlation, positive or negative a. More corrupt countries tend to attract US aid b. Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from Australia and Scandinavia 2. Aid and growth a. “Good policies:” Aid may have positive effect b. “Bad policies:” Aid has no effect c. Problem: Hard to establish effect of aid on growth. Why?

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